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Abstract 
Responding to mixed evidence regarding the decision-usefulness of annual report disclosures 
for derivative financial instruments to capital market participants and concerns identified by 
practice, the objective of this thesis is to explore whether the derivatives disclosures required 
under international accounting standards provide users with information that is decision-
useful, and to the extent that they do not, identify possible reasons. User perceptions of 
usefulness were examined through two qualitative studies. 
The first study comprised interviews with credit-side analysts. The aim of the first study was 
the same as the overarching research objective. The first study revealed companies’ 
disclosures were decision-useful to some extent. However, failure to reflect actual use of 
derivatives throughout the period and the inability of users to understand companies’ risk 
management practices and off-balance sheet risk from information considered generic and 
boilerplate, were limitations.  
The second study analysed IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures (IFRS 7) and related 
documents over a ten-year period from 2004 to 2014. The aim of the second study was to 
explore usefulness from the perspective of the design of IFRS 7, including the extent to 
which the IASB has incorporated users’ views into the standard over time. The second study 
revealed that the design of IFRS 7 has evolved to suit the economic interests of audit firms. 
However, in the second study, where users expressed a desire for improved information about 
risk management practices and off-balance sheet risk, audit firms supported them. The 
resistance of companies to disclosing risk management practices and off-balance sheet risk, 
combined with the reluctance of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to 
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mandate disclosures that may cause companies to incur proprietary costs, were identified as 
the main obstacles to decision-usefulness.  
The results of the first study complement and extend existing archival and survey research, 
and increase knowledge about the informational requirements of lenders, an important class 
of financial statement user. The results support the IASB’s disclosure recommendations in its 
exposure draft, the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (IASB, 2015d), but at the 
same time, highlight that for these proposed measures to be successful in relation to IFRS 7, 
the IASB may need to address other issues.  
The results of the second study provide new evidence about the disclosure preferences of 
stakeholders to the standard setting process and the types of arguments most likely to 
influence the IASB. Where earlier research identified a pluralistic standard setting process 
influenced by preparers, this research shows that a different pattern emerges over a longer 
period. The research findings across both studies highlight to the IASB that the disclosure of 
risk management practices and off-balance sheet risk exposure is strongly demanded by users 
and resisted by companies. 
The limitations of this research include the small sample of interviewees from one category 
of user, analysis of a single disclosure standard, and limited generalisability. However, these 
were compensated for in part by the expertise of the interviewees and the economic 
importance of the disclosure standard, IFRS 7. Future research could extend this study to 
other accounting standards, examine the disclosure preferences of stakeholder groups in more 
depth, and explore how the IASB makes its cost/benefit evaluations, particularly for 
proprietary costs. 
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Glossary 
Big 4 Largest global professional services firms: PWC, KPMG, Deloitte, 
EY. 
Buy-side analyst See fund managers. 
Business risk Any risk that may affect company profit. 
Cash flow hedge A hedge of the exposure to variability in cash flows attributable to a 
particular risk associated with a recognised asset or liability, or a 
highly probable forecast transaction. 
Credit risk The risk that one party to a financial instrument will fail to discharge 
an obligation and cause the other party to incur a financial loss. 
Credit-side analyst Banks and other financial institutions employ analysts to provide 
independent credit analysis on the companies and industries to which 
the bank has exposure. 
Currency risk The risk that the fair value or future cash flows of a financial 
instrument will fluctuate due to changes in foreign exchange rates. 
Decision-usefulness The objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide 
financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to 
existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in 
making decisions about providing resources to the entity. 
Derivative A derivative is a contract with a value that is dependent upon, or 
derived from, one or more underlying variables (e.g. interest rate or 
foreign exchange rate), rather than its nominal value. 
 
Equities Issued share capital of public companies traded on equities markets  
Equity research Production of forecast information by sell-side analysts, primarily 
cashflow and profit based measures, and management strategy to 
support buy/sell/hold recommendations and reports on equities. 
Fair value hedge A hedge of the exposure to changes in fair value of a recognised asset 
or liability or unrecognised firm commitment. 
Financial risk Risk associated with financial assets and liabilities. 
Front-end Annual report sections devoted to mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure narrative, prior to statutory reporting sections, typically 
starting with the directors’ report. 
Fund managers Individuals within investment companies, assurance, and pension 
funds responsible for asset selection and allocation decisions. Also 
referred to as buy-side analysts, some funds conduct their own 
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research but many are consumers of sell-side analyst reports. 
Futures contract A futures contract is a derivative in which counterparties agree to buy 
or sell an asset for a price agreed upon today (the future price) with 
delivery and payment occurring at a future point, the delivery date. 
Hedge See fair value hedge and cash flow hedge. 
Hedged item An asset, liability, firm commitment, highly probable forecast 
transaction, or net investment in a foreign operation that exposes a 
company to risk of changes in fair values or future cash-flows. 
Hedging instrument A designated financial instrument, often a derivative, whose fair 
value or related cash flows should offset changes in the fair value or 
cash flows of a designated hedged item. 
Hedged rate The combined or ‘effective rate’ of the underlying variable (e.g. 
interest rate) of the hedged item and the hedging instrument. 
Interest rate risk The risk that the fair value or future cash flows of a financial 
instrument will fluctuate due to changes in market interest rates. 
Liquidity risk The risk that an entity will encounter difficulty in raising funds to 
meet commitments associated with financial instruments. Liquidity 
risk may result from an inability to sell a financial asset quickly at 
close to its fair value.  
Mandatory 
disclosure 
Reporting compliant with relevant reporting standards and 
regulatory/legislative requirements. 
Market risk The risk that the fair value or future cash flows of a financial 
instrument will fluctuate due to changes in market prices, comprises 
currency risk, interest rate risk, and other price risk. 
Option An option is a derivative in which counterparties agree that the 
purchaser of the option has the right to buy or sell a particular asset at 
a later date at an agreed upon price. 
Other price risk The risk that the fair value or future cash flows of a financial 
instrument will fluctuate due to changes in market prices other than 
those arising from interest rate risk or currency risk, whether those 
changes are caused by factors specific to the individual financial 
instrument or its issuer, or by factors affecting all similar financial 
instruments traded in the market. 
Recognition and 
measurement 
Transactions are recognised in the primary financial statements and 
measured in accordance with the requirements of applicable 
accounting standards. 
Risk reporting Voluntary and mandatory reporting by companies of business and 
financial risks and their management of those risks. 
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Sell-side analyst Producers of equities research and forecasting data for consumption 
by fund managers and other buy-side participants. 
Sophisticated user Users of financial information are either sophisticated (expert) users 
or private investors. Sophisticated users are investment analysts (sell-
side), fund managers (buy-side), and corporate lenders (credit-side). 
Speculation Investment in stocks, property, derivatives, or other ventures in the 
hope of gain but with the risk of loss. Derivatives not held for 
hedging purposes are held for speculation (also referred to as ‘held 
for trading’). 
Swap A derivative in which counterparties exchange specific cash flows of 
one party's financial instrument for those of the other party's financial 
instrument. Common swaps include interest rate and foreign currency 
swaps. 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
Information provided by companies within annual reports not 
required by statutory reporting requirements. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Despite the prevalence and importance of derivative financial instruments and their regular 
association with financial scandals, it is notoriously difficult for companies to summarise risk 
management practices, end of period balances, and within period performance relating to 
derivatives and related transactions in a succinct and understandable way (Chalmers & 
Godfrey, 2000; Ernst & Young, 2008; Papa & Peters, 2011, 2013; Roulstone, 1999; Woods 
& Marginson, 2004). That companies achieve transparency in their disclosure of derivatives 
is, however, extremely important, “because no single number, regardless of the measurement 
attribute used, provides all the information users need to understand financial instruments” 
(IASB, 2008b para.BD19). This thesis examines the decision-usefulness of the disclosures for 
derivative financial instruments. 
1.2 Motivation 
While derivatives serve a useful and practical risk management function in business, there 
has been significant growth in the development of new types of derivatives since the mid-
1970s, and some believe that the accounting standard setters have not kept pace with these 
changes (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007). This was particularly evident during the 1980s, as rapid 
financial innovation led to new and exotic instruments engineered around the basic building 
blocks of swaps, options, and futures contracts (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007). It was similarly 
the case during the 2007/8 financial crisis, when banks structured transactions to ensure 
derivatives remained off balance-sheet and largely undisclosed (Jones, 2011). 
Chapter 1: Introduction  2 
 
Ongoing issues with accounting for derivatives have resulted in the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) working on projects for the recognition, measurement, and 
disclosure of these often complex instruments for most of the past twenty-five years (IASB, 
2008b). This has resulted in standards being issued, amended, replaced, and further amended. 
The first disclosure standard, IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation and Disclosure (IAS 
32) was issued in 1995 and replaced in 2005 with the acknowledgement that “techniques used 
by entities for measuring and managing exposure to risks arising from financial instruments 
have evolved and new risk management concepts and approaches have gained acceptance” 
(IASB, 2005 para.IN1). Accordingly, IAS 32s replacement, IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures (IFRS 7), increased the requirements for companies to provide information about 
their exposure to the risks associated with recognised amounts, why management enter into 
those risks, and how they are managed (IASB, 2005). Since its issue, the IASB have 
substantively amended IFRS 7 three times for disclosures applicable to derivatives: twice in 
response to deficiencies identified during the 2007/8 financial crisis, and once following a 
comprehensive review of hedge accounting. 
An increased volume of disclosures applicable to derivatives under IFRS 7 has coincided 
with increased concern from regulators and the accounting profession that financial statement 
disclosures are growing in length while decreasing in informativeness (ACCA, 2012; FRC, 
2009, 2011; Hoogervorst, 2013; IASB, 2008a, 2008b; KPMG, 2011). In their 2015 exposure 
draft, the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (Conceptual Framework) the IASB 
called upon companies to focus more on entity specific information and avoid “boilerplate” 
disclosures (IASB, 2015d para.7.18). For IFRS 7, practitioner research has highlighted that 
poor quality disclosure by companies is an ongoing issue (Ernst & Young, 2008; Papa & 
Peters, 2011, 2013).  
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Against the background of financial engineering, new disclosure requirements, and poor 
disclosure quality, a lack of transparency regarding companies’ use of derivatives has been a 
factor in accounting scandals for many years. Most notably, during 2007/8, uncertainty 
regarding banks’ exposures to asset securitisations and credit default swaps brought inter-
bank lending to a virtual halt (Barth & Landsman, 2010). More recently, the JP Morgan 
Chase ‘London Whale’ trading scandal of 2012 cost the company $6.2 billion, while the CEO 
dismissed the matter as a “tempest in a teapot” and claimed that highly complex transactions 
using synthetic derivatives were “economic hedges” (US Senate, 2013, p. 1).  
Companies outside of the financial services sector also make use of derivatives (Chalmers & 
Godfrey, 2000; Gebhardt, 2012; Heaney & Winata, 2005; Nguyen & Faff, 2002) and losses 
can be significant. Two Australian examples of corporate failure linked to derivatives and 
poor disclosure were the mining companies Sons of Gwalia Ltd and Croesus Mining Ltd, 
where potentially important information relating to risks around hedge restructuring were not 
fully disclosed to stakeholders (Taylor, Tower, & Neilson, 2010). It was further claimed that 
during the 2007/8 financial crisis, non-financial companies in emerging economies lost 
billions of dollars through their use of a popular currency derivative, ostensibly held for the 
purpose of hedging risk on import and export transactions (Dodd, 2009; Zeidan & Rodrigues, 
2012). The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland, has warned that 
conditions and the use of structured derivative products may once again be aligning for a 
similar event in some Asian economies (BIS, 2014).  
That hedging and lack of transparency is implicated in so many of the scandals involving 
derivatives is particularly relevant at present, as there is a new standard for the recognition 
and measurement of financial instruments. As companies adopt IFRS 9 Financial Instruments 
(IFRS 9), they will be subject to less restriction on obtaining favourable hedge accounting 
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treatment. This will increase the need for high quality disclosures to avoid situations where 
hedging is used by companies to camouflage speculation.  
Despite the strong economic basis for derivatives disclosures and concerns identified by 
practitioners, academic research into the usefulness of derivatives disclosure has been 
limited. Some conclusions about decision-usefulness can be inferred from archival research, 
such as Ryan (2012), who found a less than expected degree of value-relevance or risk-
relevance for derivatives disclosures. However, archival research does not usually provide 
insight into the reasons underlying its results. Other limitations of existing archival research 
include its emphasis upon the quantitative disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 and the focus 
upon the banking sector. More broadly, archival research is unable to determine whether 
financial statements are the source of information used by the market, or whether other 
undisclosed information might have been more useful. Similarly, recent survey evidence 
from Johansen and Plenborg (2013) identified high user demand for financial instruments 
disclosure coupled with comparatively low user satisfaction and pointed to a need for more 
research into why satisfaction is low, or how satisfaction could be increased. This thesis 
addresses these areas of limitation. 
This research takes a user perspective of disclosure. To the extent that archival research 
addresses aspects of the decision-usefulness construct (Barth, Beaver, & Landsman, 2001) it 
reflects the perceptions of the market taken as a whole. Users are defined in the Conceptual 
Framework as “existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors” (IASB, 2010a 
para.OB2). They are the individual capital markets participants that provide finance to an 
enterprise. This distinction is non-trivial, given that for the IASB the objective of financial 
reporting is to provide users with financial information that will assist them to make 
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“decisions about providing resources to the entity” (IASB, 2010a para.OB2). This is the 
decision-usefulness objective of financial reporting.  
1.3 Objective 
Motivation for this research arose from observation of scandals related to derivative financial 
instruments, reactive changes to mandatory disclosures by the standard setter, and concern 
from practitioners and academics that companies comply with the requirements of IFRS 7 in 
a ‘boilerplate’ manner. This led to the research objective: to explore whether the derivatives 
disclosures required by IFRS 7 provide users with information that is decision-useful, and to 
the extent that they do not, identify possible reasons.  
1.4 Research Questions 
The research objective required the identification of possible reasons why information 
provided pursuant to IFRS 7 may not be decision-useful. These reasons were identified 
through a review of existing literature, and gaps in the literature led to the research questions.  
A small body of literature has consistently identified poor disclosure quality for derivatives 
disclosures, which may have implications for usefulness (Chalmers & Godfrey, 2000; Ernst 
& Young, 2008; Papa & Peters, 2011, 2013; Roulstone, 1999; Woods & Marginson, 2004). 
However, the extent to which this poor disclosure quality affects users is unknown. Despite 
identified deficiencies, do users still find the information provided under IFRS 7 useful? 
Research on this topic suggests sophisticated users may be willing to search through an 
annual report for the information they require (Durocher & Gendron, 2010; Thinggaard, 
1996), and the disclosures companies provide under IFRS 7 may be susceptible to careful 
analysis (Ryan, 2012). Mixed evidence of value-relevance or risk-relevance is also suggestive 
of a problem with the disclosures (Ryan, 2012); however, archival research does not provide 
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further insights. For example, it does not show whether some other disclosure might be more 
useful than what is there (Skinner, 1996). This would be indicative of a problem with the 
design of IFRS 7. This led to two research questions. The first question concerned what is 
presently required under IFRS 7 and how companies disclose this information. The second 
question concerned what is not in IFRS 7 that might be useful to users i.e. the standard’s 
design: 
RQ1 Do the disclosures for derivatives made under IFRS 7 fulfil their purpose by meeting 
the decision making needs of users, and if not, why not? 
RQ2 To the extent that the disclosures for derivatives required by IFRS 7 are not useful, 
what disclosures would be more useful? 
Further, the literature on standard setting has expressed concern that the information needs of 
users of financial information are not foremost during the standard setting process (Hopwood, 
1994). That is, it is possible private interests such as audit firms or large corporations have 
captured the standard setting process so it reflects their interests, rather than the interests of 
users (Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007). As a result, the design of IFRS 7 may be such 
that it should not be expected to meet the needs of users. However, little empirical research 
addresses this possibility. For example, although research has revealed users do not strongly 
participate in the IASB’s formal consultations on standard setting (Jorissen, Lybaert, Orens, 
& Van Der Tas, 2012), little is known about the extent to which the IASB incorporates users’ 
views into an accounting standard over time. This led to the third research question: 
RQ3 Are the disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 designed to meet the needs of users, or do 
they preference the needs of another stakeholder group? 
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In order to answer the third research question, it was necessary to identify the information 
needs of users and other stakeholder groups that may have captured the standard setting 
process. As explained in Section 4.5, there is some direct evidence regarding the types of 
disclosures users and preparers find useful, although some categories of user, such as lenders, 
are underrepresented in the literature (Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010). However, there is 
relatively little information regarding the disclosure preferences of audit firms, and even less 
on regulators. This is perhaps because the roles of audit firms (Suddaby et al., 2007) and 
regulators have changed with the advent of international standard setting.1 Accordingly, a 
sub-research question was added to support Research Question 3: 
SRQ3.1 What disclosure characteristics do different stakeholder groups prefer? 
1.5 Theoretical Perspective 
The theoretical perspective of American pragmatism, in particular the thinking of Charles 
Sanders Peirce, a late nineteenth century philosopher, logician, mathematician, and 
statistician, provided an influence on this research. As discussed in Chapter 5, the pragmatism 
of Peirce brings a human dimension to analytic or logical positivism that makes it both 
relevant and useful for research in a field such as accounting. The approach of Peircean 
pragmatism provides justification for research that answers the call for accounting research 
more closely aligned with the needs of practice (Arnold, 2009; Bricker & Previts, 1990; 
Carlin, 2011; Fülbier, Hitz, & Sellhorn, 2009; Granof & Zeff, 2008; Holthausen & Watts, 
2001; Leisenring & Johnson, 1994; Schipper, 1994; Stevenson, 2011; Tilt, 2010).   
                                                 
1 The role of national regulators has changed with the advent of international standard setting, as they are now 
stakeholders and lobbyists in the standard setting process. 
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1.6 Research Design 
Research design is concerned with methodology and method. That is, how a researcher goes 
about “finding out whatever he or she believes can be known” (Guba & Lincoln, 1998, p. 
201). How a piece of research will be carried out and analysed is influenced by both the 
philosophical stance underpinning the research (Carson, Gilmore, Perry, & Gronhaug, 2001; 
Crotty, 1998; Guba & Lincoln, 1998), as well as questions of methodological fit (Edmondson 
& McManus, 2007). Peircean pragmatism requires an empirical approach that recognises 
knowledge is relative to human experience and data must be interpreted. This was suited to 
research that seeks to make a practical contribution on a complex issue. Both qualitative and 
quantitative research is possible in this paradigm. However, qualitative research is suited to 
answering how and why questions concerning complex social phenomena in an exploratory 
setting (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). A qualitative approach was therefore the best fit for 
the present research. Two qualitative studies were undertaken in order to answer the research 
questions. 
The aim of the first study was that of the overarching research objective: To explore whether 
the derivatives disclosures required by IFRS 7 provide users with information that is 
decision-useful, and to the extent that they do not, identify possible reasons. This 
encompassed how companies apply the disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 within their annual 
reports, as well as potential issues with the design of IFRS 7. The research method comprised 
semi-structured interviews with credit-side analysts from Australia’s largest banks, and 
answered the first two research questions.   
The aim of the second study was to evaluate decision-usefulness from the perspective of the 
design of IFRS 7. The research method comprised a content analysis of documents covering 
the development of IFRS 7 over a ten-year period from 2004 to 2014 and answered the third 
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research question and sub-research question. Conceptual framing or theorising,  provides a 
way of interpreting and explaining actions and events (Llewelyn, 2003). For the first study, 
there was no ex ante theorising as the goal was to obtain the views of the analysts rather than 
impose the views of the researcher. In the second study, the economic theory of regulation 
advanced by Stigler (1971) justified an economic incentives approach and supported a 
rational evaluation of results.  Table 1.1 summarises the research design. 
Table 1.1 Summary of research design 
Research 
Objective  
To explore whether the derivatives disclosures required by IFRS 7 provide users with 
information that is decision-useful, and to the extent that they do not, identify possible reasons. 
 
Study Study 1 Study 2 
Aim To explore whether the derivatives disclosures 
required by IFRS 7 provide users with 
information that is decision-useful, and to the 
extent that they do not, identify possible 
reasons. 
To explore decision-usefulness from the 
perspective of the design of IFRS 7. 
Research 
questions 
RQ1: Do the disclosures for derivatives 
made under IFRS 7 fulfil their 
purpose by meeting the decision 
making needs of users, and if not, 
why not? 
 
RQ2:  To the extent that the disclosures for 
derivatives required by IFRS 7 are 
not useful, what disclosures would be 
more useful? 
RQ3  Are the disclosure requirements of 
IFRS 7 designed to meet the needs 
of users, or do they preference the 
needs of another stakeholder 
group? 
 
SRQ3.1  What disclosure characteristics do 
different stakeholder groups 
prefer? 
 
Data In-depth interviews with 16 bank analysts. 
 
IAS32, IFRS 7, four exposure drafts issued by 
the IASB, and 459 comment letters submitted 
to IASB in response to exposure drafts from 
2004 to 2014. 
 
Method of 
Analysis 
Content analysis of interviews adopts an open 
coding approach to identify the views of the 
analysts.  
Content analysis of documents adopts an 
economic incentives approach to understand 
stakeholder lobbying behaviour and outcomes. 
Findings interpreted through the lens of 
economic theories of regulation. 
 
1.7 Results 
Evidence from both studies shows users want better information about companies’ risk 
management strategies and risk exposures. While IFRS 7 gives companies the flexibility to 
provide this information, companies resist, ostensibly on the grounds of commercial 
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sensitivity. Although the second study concluded that IFRS 7 has evolved to favour the 
economic interests of audit firms, on this issue, audit firms supported the improved disclosure 
of risk management and risk, and their interests aligned with the interests of users. The 
resistance of companies to providing this information, combined with flexible disclosure 
requirements in IFRS 7, was identified as the main obstacle to decision-usefulness.  
1.8 Contribution and Limitations 
The results of the first study extend existing archival and survey research. They increase 
knowledge of the informational requirements of lenders, an important class of financial 
statement user. The first study supports the IASB’s disclosure recommendations in its 
exposure draft, the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (IASB, 2015d), but at the 
same time highlights that for the proposed measures to be successful, the IASB may need to 
address other issues in relation to IFRS 7. The results of the second study provide new 
evidence about the disclosure preferences of stakeholders to the international standard setting 
process, and the types of argument most likely to influence the IASB. Where earlier research 
identified a pluralistic standard setting process influenced by preparers, this research shows 
that a different pattern emerges over a longer period. The research findings highlight to the 
IASB that the disclosure of risk management and risk is strongly demanded by users, and 
strongly resisted by companies. 
The limitations of this research include the small sample of interviewees from one category 
of user, analysis of a single disclosure standard, and limited generalisability. However, these 
were compensated for in part by the expertise of the interviewees and the economic 
importance of the disclosure standard, IFRS 7.  
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1.9 Summary 
This chapter identified the objective of the thesis: to explore whether the derivatives 
disclosures required by IFRS 7 provide users with information that is decision-useful, and to 
the extent that they do not, identify possible reasons. Possible reasons why the disclosures 
may not be decision-useful were identified through a review of existing literature and gaps in 
the literature led to the research questions. Two qualitative studies answered the research 
questions and met the overarching objective. The structure of the thesis is as follows:  
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Institutional Setting
Chapter 3 Theories of Regulation
Chapter 4 Literature Review
Chapter 5 Theoretical Perspective
Chapter 7 Study One – Results
Chapter 6 Research Methods
Chapter 8 Study Two – Results
Chapter 9 Discussion and Conclusions
 
Chapter 2 provides the institutional background necessary to understand derivatives, the 
international standard setting process, and the history of IFRS 7. Chapter 3 outlines interest 
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theories of regulation that provide a conceptual framework for understanding standard 
setting, and in particular, the economic theories of regulation used in the second study. 
Chapter 4 sets out the literature that supports the research questions. Chapter 5 describes the 
theoretical perspective that underpins the research methods in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 provides 
the results for the first study and discusses the implications. Chapter 8 provides the results 
and implications for the second study. Chapter 9 draws conclusions about the overarching 
research objective and sets out contributions, limitations, and opportunities for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2 INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Chapter 1 introduced and summarised the research. This chapter provides background 
information regarding the nature of derivatives, the standard setting process, and the 
development of IFRS 7. Section 2.1 explains how derivatives work and why their disclosure 
is important. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the current (2015) structure of the IASB 
and its due process. Section 2.3 tracks the history of standard setting for derivatives, which 
provides a framework for understanding the IASB’s due process in the present context, and 
how IFRS 7 developed during the period under examination.  
2.1 Derivatives and risk 
Under IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (IAS 39) (IASB, 1998), 
a derivative is a contract whose fair value derives from changes to one or more underlying 
variables. Common types of derivative are swaps, options and futures contracts. The 
underlying variables in a derivative contract are applied to a notional amount, and the 
contract is settled at a future date. Examples of underlying variables are an interest rate, 
financial instrument price, commodity price, foreign exchange rate, index of prices or rates, 
credit rating, or credit index. Examples of a notional amount are dollars or bushels of wheat. 
Companies are required to recognise derivatives in their balance sheets at fair value (IASB, 
1998), and as fair value derives from the underlying variables, it is only through disclosure 
that a user of financial statements can understand the balance sheet valuation including 
valuation methods and assumptions, and the sensitivity of the valuation to the underlying 
variables. 
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The cost of buying a derivative contract is the charge the originator of the contract, often a 
bank, makes to arrange the transaction. By adjusting margins or some of the terms and 
conditions, the originator can ensure that the cost of a derivative to the purchaser is very low. 
The initial cost of a derivative is required to be either zero or a nominal amount unrelated to 
the notional value of the contract (IASB, 1998). It is this requirement that differentiates a 
primary financial instrument, such as a bank loan, from a derivative. This means that for a 
relatively low cash outlay, derivatives can provide exposure to changes in underlying 
variables for very large notional values. It is only through disclosure that a user of financial 
statements can understand the nature, extent, and timing of companies’ risk exposures. 
Companies enter into derivatives contracts either to increase or decrease risks. Derivatives 
can be part of a company’s risk management strategy and used appropriately, reduce, or 
mitigate business risks. This is hedging and it is conceptually similar to buying insurance. 
Derivatives not used for hedging are used for speculation, and increase business risk. An 
example of using a derivative for hedging might be if an Australian trader has an obligation 
to settle a debt in a foreign currency in three months’ time. The trader could make certain of 
the future cash out-flow by entering into a swap to sell Australian currency and buy the 
applicable foreign currency in three months, at an exchange rate agreed upon today. To the 
extent that the terms of the foreign currency swap exactly match the terms of the future 
obligation, the trader would either reduce or eliminate exposure to fluctuations in the 
exchange rate. If the same trader entered into the same derivative contract without having an 
existing foreign currency payable, then business risk would be increased. The trader is 
speculating that the two currencies will move in a favourable direction between the date of 
the derivative contract and settlement date. It is only through disclosure that a user of 
financial statements can know whether a company’s purpose in holding derivatives is to 
hedge or speculate. 
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It is therefore clear that the recognised amount of a derivative has relatively little information 
value without appropriate disclosure. Fair value may be “the best single number that we can 
put into the accounts, but, on its own, without that ecosystem of information, it is relatively 
meaningless” (Lee, 2012, p. 326). 
The following two sections explain the structure of the IASB and its due process, and then 
document the development of IFRS 7 from its inception in 2004 to the end of 2014. 
2.2 The Standard Setting Process 
The IASB is the independent standard setting body of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) Foundation. Figure 2.1 shows the organisational structure of the IFRS 
Foundation. 
IFRS Foundation Monitoring Board
IFRS Foundation Trustees
IFRS Foundation
International 
Accounting Standards 
Board
IFRS Interpretations 
Committee
IF
R
S 
A
d
vi
so
ry
 C
o
u
n
ci
l
A
SA
F*
* Accounting Standards Advisory Forum
 
Figure 2.1 Structure of the IFRS Foundation 
Adapted from: IASB (2015b) 
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The IFRS Foundation is subject to considerable oversight. Constituted in 2009, the IFRS 
Foundation Monitoring Board provides the highest level of oversight. Its members are 
representatives of capital market authorities responsible for standard setting (IASB, 2015i). 
The IFRS Foundation Trustees are responsible for governance of the IFRS Foundation and 
answer to the monitoring board (IASB, 2015l). Most, but not all of the trustees have a 
regulatory or standard setting background. Neither the IFRS Foundation Monitoring Board 
nor the IFRS Foundation Trustees are involved in standard setting and their positions are not 
full-time.  
The IFRS Foundation comprises two bodies; the IASB responsible for standard setting, and 
the IFRS Interpretations Committee that provides consensus views and interpretations on 
current accounting issues (IASB, 2015g). The IASB has 14 full time members responsible for 
the development and publication of IFRS. It is a requirement that IASB members are 
independent experts with a mix of recent practical experience in setting accounting standards; 
in preparing, auditing, or using financial reports; or in accounting education (IASB, 2015h). 
Broad geographical diversity is also required (IASB, 2015h). The IASB members receive 
advice from a number of advisory committees, including the IFRS Advisory Council and the 
Accounting Standards Advisory Forum. The IFRS Advisory Council is the formal advisory 
body to both the IASB and the trustees of the IFRS Foundation and consists of 
representatives from all stakeholder groups affected by and interested in the IASB's work 
(IASB, 2015e). The Accounting Standards Advisory Forum comprises representatives from 
12 geographically diverse standard setting bodies. 
The IASB explains the standard setting process on its website (IASB, 2015k). Due process 
begins with an item added to the IASB’s work plan in response to a need for information by 
investors or other capital market participants. The IASB identifies this need in various ways 
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such as through the research and stakeholder outreach activities of its staff, the IFRS 
Advisory Council, the IFRS Interpretations Committee, and national standard setters. The 
IASB’s discussions of potential projects and its decisions to adopt new projects take place in 
public board meetings and in consultation with the IFRS Advisory Council and national 
accounting standard setting bodies. Once the IASB has added an item to its agenda, a 
decision is made whether to undertake the project independently or in conjunction with 
another standard setter. For larger or more complex projects, a consultative group may be 
established.  
Although a discussion paper is not mandatory, the IASB normally publishes one as its first 
publication on any major new topic to explain the issue and solicit early comment from 
stakeholders. A discussion paper will include an overview of the issue, dissenting views, and 
the IASB’s preliminary view, followed by an invitation to comment. The IASB may also hold 
public meetings to discuss issues and conduct other outreach activities. Irrespective of 
whether the IASB has published a discussion paper, they must publish an exposure draft as a 
mandatory step in their due process.  
An exposure draft takes the form of the standard it proposes to add to or amend and includes 
an invitation to comment. After resolving issues arising from public comment on exposure 
drafts, the IASB considers whether it should expose any revised proposals to public 
comment, for example by publishing a second exposure draft. When satisfied that it has 
reached a conclusion on the issues arising from the final exposure draft, the IASB instructs its 
staff to draft the IFRS. A majority of the members of the IASB must approve all discussion 
papers, exposure drafts, and the IFRS before issue.  
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The IASB invites public comment on all proposals published as a discussion paper or 
exposure draft. The length of time that the comment period is open varies; however, for 
major projects the IASB will normally allow a period of at least 120 days for comment. To 
give the public timely access to the comment letters, IASB staff regularly post the letters 
online. The IASB members review comment letters within the comment period and IASB 
staff normally provide a summary and analysis of the comments. IASB staff post these 
summaries on the relevant project page of the website. Once board members have considered 
the views received in comment letters, a position summary is posted on the website 
summarising the major points raised in the letters. In addition, in the basis for conclusions on 
each pronouncement, the IASB responds to the main issues raised in the comment letters 
received.  
2.3 History of IFRS 7 
The history of financial statements disclosure for derivatives intertwines with the history of 
their recognition and measurement. There have been two major financial instruments projects 
undertaken by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and its successor 
the IASB, both of which had implications for the disclosure of derivatives. Between these 
two projects, the IASB made several substantive changes to the disclosure of financial 
instruments that affected derivatives. Figure 2.2 shows the history of the applicable 
accounting standards.  
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IFRS 7 Financial 
Instruments: 
Disclosures
July 2014
IFRS 13 Fair Value 
Measurement
Current
Effective 
Jan 2018
May 2011
Dec 1998
IAS 39 Financial 
Instruments: 
Recognition and 
Measurement
IFRS 9 Financial 
Instruments
Fair value measurement 
transferred from IAS 39 and 
disclosures from IFRS 7
Jun 1995
IAS 32 Financial 
Instruments:  
(Disclosure and) 
Presentation
Aug 1990
IAS 30 Disclosures in 
the Financial 
Statements of Banks 
and Similar Financial 
Institutions
Current
Current
Current
Withdrawn
 IAS 32 re-named 
when disclosures 
transferred to IFRS 7
Issue date
Recognition & 
Measurement
Presentation & 
Disclosure
Status
Standards
Contents of IAS 39 
progressively 
transferred to IFRS 9
Oct 1985
IAS25 Accounting for 
Investments
Withdrawn
 
Figure 2.2 History of accounting standards for financial instruments 
 
2.3.1 The first major financial instruments project 
When the first major project on financial instruments commenced in 1988, there was no 
acknowledgement of financial assets, financial liabilities or derivatives in any international 
accounting standard. IAS 25 Accounting for Investments (IAS 25) was the most relevant 
international standard. It comprised fourteen paragraphs and covered recognition, 
measurement, and disclosure of investments as diverse as commodities, investment 
properties, and financial investments, including derivatives. Historical cost was the 
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benchmark treatment, with market value a permitted alternative determined primarily by 
management intent. Disclosure requirements were minimal and companies had significant 
discretion. Standards in Australia, the UK, and Europe were similar to IAS 25, although the 
US was beginning to issue separate standards for financial instruments on a piecemeal basis 
(IASB, 2003). The scope of the first international financial instruments project was 
consequently ambitious: it was to encompass recognition, measurement, presentation, and 
disclosure, plus hedge accounting. 
Camfferman and Zeff (2007) documented the progress of the first major financial instruments 
project, which began with strong committee participation from members of the IASC. 
However, early signs of future conflicts were evident when it was unknown which of two 
benchmark measurement approaches would be approved by the board up to the date of the 
first exposure draft in 1991 (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007). Divided by increasingly entrenched 
views on measurement, the IASC issued discussion papers and exposure drafts in succession, 
shifting between an intent-based mixed measurement model and a full fair value model for 
financial instruments (IASB, 2003). In 1995, the IASC split the financial instruments project 
in two and issued the less controversial presentation and disclosure standard, IAS 32. Then, 
in 1998, the IASC settled on a compromise over recognition and measurement that became 
IAS 39 (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007). Intended as an interim solution, IAS 39 had an intent-
based mixed measurement model with no full fair value option. Australia voted against IAS 
39 and the US, UK, and France abstained (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007).2  
                                                 
2 Although based on the existing US model, the US had wanted the international standard to be an improvement 
of what they saw as the limitations of their own system, not a replication of it. They also had issues with 
procedural deficiencies. The UK and Australia favoured full fair value accounting, while France had concerns 
regarding the reliability and prudence of the standard. France also disagreed with the board’s refusal to address 
macro hedging in IAS 39 (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007). 
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There was little question that derivatives would be measured at anything other than fair value 
throughout the first financial instruments project, as measuring derivatives at cost essentially 
takes them off balance sheet. Problems the project had with derivatives tended to be more 
technical. Rapid advances in financial engineering made it difficult for committee members 
to keep up to date, not only on the advances, but also on their full implications (Camfferman 
& Zeff, 2007). There was disagreement over hedge accounting, but much was overshadowed 
by the debate about measurement (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007). 
2.3.2  Evolution of the disclosure standards 
In 1995, the IASC issued the first disclosure standard, IAS 32, during the course of the first 
major financial instruments project. IAS 32 contained disclosures that had significance for 
derivatives, as well as for other financial instruments. It required appropriate classification of 
financial instruments; disclosure of accounting policies; a description of the terms and 
conditions of financial instruments by class, or individually if material; the disclosure of 
hedging transactions; information on fair value calculations including methods and 
assumptions for non-market based valuation inputs; and disclosures for assets partially or 
fully derecognised. However, IAS 32 had relatively few specific requirements for the 
disclosure of financial risks. It had a principles-based requirement for companies to explain 
their risk and risk management practices, but was not prescriptive beyond a requirement to 
disclose information about interest rate risk and credit risk. 
Between the issue of the first disclosure standard, IAS 32, in 1995, and the IASB taking over 
responsibility for standard setting in 2001, changes made to IAS 32 were relatively minor. A 
financial instruments improvement project instigated by the IASB in 2001, while resulting in 
a number of technical changes for IAS 39, did not significantly affect IAS 32. However, at 
the same time, the IASB began an examination of industry standard, IAS 30 Disclosures in 
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the Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial Institutions (IAS 30). Originally 
issued in 1990, IAS 30 required additional disclosures for the financial instruments of 
regulated deposit-taking institutions, some of which applied to derivatives. By late 2002, the 
IAS 30 project had been expanded and eventually led to the disclosure requirements of both 
IAS 30 and IAS 32 forming the foundation of IFRS 7, a new general disclosure standard for 
financial instruments (Deloitte, 2015). Recognising the increasing exposure of non-banks to 
the kind of risks traditionally associated with the financial services sector (IASB, 2004), 
IFRS 7 combined the financial instrument disclosures of IAS 32 with the risk disclosure 
requirements of IAS 30, and increased the disclosure of financial risk for all companies. The 
IASB issued IFRS 7 in 2005, with an effective date from 1 January 2007. 
Subsequent amendments to IFRS 7 affecting derivatives have mainly been in response to 
problems identified from the 2007/8 financial crisis and in furtherance of US convergence. In 
November 2006, the IASB issued a discussion paper, Fair Value Measurement (IASB, 2006a, 
2006b). This discussion paper contained proposals intended to replace fair value 
measurement guidance held within individual IFRSs with a single, unified definition of fair 
value, and further authoritative guidance on the application of fair value measurement in 
inactive markets. Based upon US standard, Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 157 
Fair Value Measurement (SFAS 157), the IASB discussion paper introduced the concept of a 
fair value hierarchy based upon the observability of inputs used in valuations. By close of the 
comment period in April 2007, the IASB had received 136 comment letters. However, 
overtaken by the events of the 2007/8 financial crisis, in April 2008, the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) (2008, p. 56) urged the IASB to “strengthen its standards to achieve better 
disclosures about valuations, methodologies and the uncertainty associated with valuations.” 3 
                                                 
3 Established by the Group of 20 nations (G20) in 1999, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) succeeded the 
Financial Stability Forum in 2009. The FSB is charged with responsibilities relating to the coordination of work 
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In May 2008, the IASB formed an expert advisory panel, the purpose of which was to 
consider best practice for measuring and disclosing the fair value of financial instruments in 
markets that were no longer active (IASB, 2008d). Within a month of receiving the panel’s 
report, the IASB had exposed for public comment ED/2008/10 Improving Disclosures about 
Financial Instruments. ED/2008/10 contained two key disclosure recommendations made by 
the expert panel, to introduce a three-level fair value hierarchy that distinguished between the 
observability of inputs into valuation models, and to increase the disclosures for valuations 
reliant upon management originated inputs (IASB, 2009b). As the amendments in 
ED/2008/10 pre-empted completion of the fair value measurement project by several years, 
the IASB was proposing disclosures referencing a hierarchy that was not included in IAS 39 
or elsewhere. 4 The IASB adopted amendments to IFRS 7 resulting from ED/2008/10 in 
March 2009, and reflecting the perceived urgency of the changes, backdated the effective 
date to January 2009.  
In addition to its instructions concerning fair value, the FSB (2008, p. 56) also required that 
the IASB “improve the accounting and disclosure standards for off-balance sheet vehicles on 
an accelerated basis and work with other standard setters toward international convergence.”  
Derecognition under IAS 39 was at that time complicated by internal inconsistencies within 
the standard. The IASB claimed that combining different derecognition concepts and 
terminology, e.g. risks and rewards, control, and continuing involvement, made the standard 
difficult to interpret and apply (IASB, 2009a). Accordingly, in April 2009, and without prior 
public consultation, the IASB issued exposure draft ED/2009/3 Derecognition. ED/2009/3 
proposed a new basis for derecognition and made changes to IFRS 7 aimed at enhancing 
                                                                                                                                                        
of international standard setters and national financial authorities, monitoring of country compliance with 
international standards, and addressing developments in financial stability (Davis, nd). 
4 Following the initial 2006 discussion paper, the IASB issued two exposure drafts on fair value measurement in 
2009 and 2010, and issued IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement in 2011. 
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users’ ability to evaluate the risk exposures that sometimes remain after derecognition (IASB, 
2009a). The IASB adopted amendments to IFRS 7 resulting from ED/2009/3 in October 
2010. 
2.3.3 The second major financial instruments project 
In March 2008, ten years after the IASC adopted IAS 39 as an interim solution, the IASB 
published a discussion paper, Reducing Complexity in Reporting Financial Instruments 
(IASB, 2008b), which initiated a second major project on accounting for financial 
instruments. An acknowledged reaction to failures during the financial crisis, this discussion 
paper attributed much of the complexity in reporting financial instruments to the many ways 
they are measured and the complexity of the associated rules (IASB, 2008b). The IASB 
divided its second major financial instrument project into three phases. These were 
classification and measurement, impairment, and hedge accounting. In July 2014, having 
completed the three phases, the IASB issued IFRS 9, which has an effective date of January 
2018, with early adoption permitted. Of relevance to derivatives, the IASB completed the 
general hedge accounting phase of IFRS 9 in November 2013. Figure 2.3 shows the 
disclosure approaches for hedges before and after companies adopt IFRS 9. 
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Description of type of 
hedge i.e. fair value or 
cash flow
Description of hedging 
instrument (derivative) 
and its FV
Description of the nature 
of the risk being hedged 
Information on cashflow 
and FV hedges e.g. 
various amounts 
recognised in 
comprehensive income
An entity shall disclose the following separately for each type of hedge 
Current hedging disclosure 
requirements of IFRS 7 (2015)
12 qualitative and quantitative disclosure requirements to meet the high level objectives
 
Hedging disclosures of IFRS 7 
from adoption of IFRS 9 (2018)
Hedging strategy and 
how it is applied to 
manage risk
How  hedging activities 
may affect the amount, 
timing and uncertainty of 
entity’s future cash flows
The effect that hedge 
accounting has had on 
the entity’s position and 
results
An entity shall apply the disclosure requirements to those risk exposures that an entity 
hedges and for which it elects to apply hedge accounting
Over 40 qualitative and quantitative disclosure requirements to meet the high level 
objectives
 
Figure 2.3 Comparison of current hedge disclosure requirements with requirements 
following adoption of IFRS 9 
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IFRS 9 introduced a new hedge accounting model that the IASB intends will align hedge 
accounting more closely with companies risk management activities (IASB, 2010b). As this 
means companies will be able to designate more transactions as hedges, the second objective 
of this phase of the financial instruments project was to improve the ability of investors and 
other users to understand risk management activities, and assess the amounts, timing, and 
uncertainty of cash flows through increased disclosure (IASB, 2014c). A separate project on 
macro or portfolio hedging is ongoing. Appendix A provides a list of all amendments to the 
financial instrument disclosure standards from the issue of ED 7 in 2004 to the end of 2014, 
highlighting amendments applicable to derivatives discussed in this section. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter provided the institutional background to this research. It explained that the most 
important characteristics of derivatives cannot be known from their recognised amounts and 
must be explained through transparent disclosure. The structure of the IASB and its due 
process were described including opportunities for stakeholder involvement in the standard 
setting process, followed by the history of international standard setting for financial 
instruments and derivatives. This demonstrated how IFRS 7 has developed over time, some 
of the political pressures that have faced the standard setter, and that improvements to the 
disclosure of derivatives have often been a reactive process. Chapter 3 introduces the theories 
of regulation that provide a framework for understanding the standard setting process and the 
second study in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 THEORIES OF REGULATION 
Chapter 2 provided the institutional background necessary to understand this research. It 
explained why disclosure is important for derivatives, the structure and processes of 
international standard setting, and the development of IFRS 7. The theories of regulation 
described in this chapter provide a lens through which the standard setting process can be 
understood. Section 3.1 overviews several theories that explain the drivers of regulation and 
regulatory behaviour. Section 3.2 discusses public interest theory. Section 3.3 extends public 
interest theory with the political theory of regulatory capture. Section 3.4 then introduces the 
economic theories of regulation that combine earlier political and economic explanations of 
regulatory behaviour and develop a testable model. Economic theories are used to interpret 
the findings of the second study.5 
3.1 Theories of Regulation 
Most theories of regulation can be divided into two broad camps: public interest theories and 
private interest theories (Mitnick, 1980).6 These correspond to a view of regulators as either 
“other-regarding” or “self-regarding” (Mitnick, 1980, p. 85). While public interest theories 
may explain how the IASB sees its role, and political capture theories provide a useful 
descriptive model, it is the economic theories of regulation that support the economic 
incentives approach taken in the second study and justify the inferences made. 
                                                 
5 As explained in Section 1.6 and Section 6.2.4 the first study was not explicitly theorised. 
6 Many theories may be used to understand regulation, and many are variations on the interest theories discussed 
here. However, there are other theoretical perspectives that are quite different. Institutional theorists, for 
example, reject the rational actor model arguing that “institutional structure and arrangements, as well as social 
processes, shape regulation” (Gaffikin, 2008, p. 81). Other theories completely reject neo-classical assumptions 
(Gaffikin, 2008). 
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3.2 Public Interest Theory 
Public interest theory asserts that regulation is developed in response to demand from the 
public for the correction of an inefficient or inequitable market (Levine & Forrence, 1990; 
Peltzman, 1989; Posner, 1974). A belief that markets are inefficient and regulation is the 
“cure”, underpins virtually all public interest accounts of regulation (Levine & Forrence, 
1990, p. 168). In the public interest perspective, regulators are assumed to act for the benefit 
of others and not for their own benefit (Levine & Forrence, 1990). Public interest theory 
therefore reflects an expectation of how public servants should behave (Levine & Forrence, 
1990). Although empirical research shows that regulators do not always act in the interests of 
the public, they sometimes do (Levine & Forrence, 1990), and public interest theory 
continues to have currency (Gaffikin, 2008). 
A feature of public interest theory is that it contains no linkage or mechanism by which 
perceptions of public interest are defined and then translated into legislative action (Mitnick, 
1980; Posner, 1974). This makes “determining what is in the public interest … a normative 
question” (Gaffikin, 2008, p. 79). Accordingly, the IASB have created their own linkage, 
defining their public interest objective in terms of the promotion of growth and long-term 
stability in global financial markets (IASB, 2015a). The Conceptual Framework elaborates 
the IASB’s public interest objective in the objective of financial reporting, which is: 
…to provide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to 
existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making 
decisions about providing resources to the entity. Those decisions involve 
buying, selling or holding equity and debt instruments, and providing or 
settling loans and other forms of credit (IASB, 2010a para.OB2). 
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The IASB makes its objective of financial reporting operational through the objective of each 
accounting standard. For IFRS 7, information will be decision-useful if it enables users to 
evaluate the significance of financial instruments for an entity’s financial position and 
performance, the nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments to which an 
entity is exposed during the period and at the end of the reporting period, and how the entity 
manages those risks (IASB, 2005).  
Consistent with the view of regulators acting in the public interest, the IASB strives to act in 
the best interests of the capital market participants it identifies as users. It achieves this by 
promulgating accounting standards that are, by its own definition, decision-useful. However, 
as stated, public interest theory is not always borne out by evidence (Levine & Forrence, 
1990; Peltzman, 1989; Posner, 1974), and the failure of regulation to achieve a public interest 
objective is not uncommon (Deegan, 2014). In response, public interest theorists have 
advanced reasons as to why, if regulators act honestly in the public interest, they may not 
succeed. One suggestion is that regulatory agencies are created for genuine public purposes, 
but are then mismanaged, with the result that high ideals are not achieved (Mitnick, 1980; 
Posner, 1974). Alternatively, areas where regulation is deemed necessary are often intractable 
by nature, and this is compounded by the high cost of negotiating with large numbers of 
stakeholders in a political setting (Ehrlich & Posner, 1974; Posner, 1974). This last 
interpretation of regulatory failure is consistent with those that question whether financial 
reporting is ever likely to be:  
…up to the task of providing transparency to capital markets within the hyper 
financialized economy of the 1990s and 2000s where the combination of 
uncontrolled financial innovation, complex financial instruments, deregulation, 
moral hazard, and the consolidation of economic and political power within 
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the financial sector [has] rendered the financial system increasingly 
ungovernable (Arnold, 2009, p. 807). 
The implication of public interest interpretations of regulatory failure is that regulatory failure 
will become, on average, a more serious problem over time (Posner, 1974). This would be 
consequential for the IASB and the market. 
3.3 Regulatory Capture Theory 
An alternative perspective of regulatory failure within a public interest framework is that 
although regulators may begin with the aim of protecting the public interest, they will 
ultimately come under the control of, or be captured by, those that they regulate (Mitnick, 
1980; Posner, 1974). Mitnick (1980, p. 95) defined “capture” to include direct and indirect 
control. Control can be exercised indirectly through coordination of activities between 
regulator and regulated so that private interests are served, ensuring that a regulator is 
ineffective or neutralised, and co-opting a regulator so that they come to share the perspective 
of the regulated (Mitnick, 1980). The basic structure of a rewards system may also have the 
effect of aligning the interests of a regulator with those of the regulated (Mitnick, 1980).  
Although potentially relevant in the context of the present research, there are questions that 
this version of capture theory, with its origins in the field of political science, cannot answer. 
First, it does not explain why the regulator should (or would) have a public interest motive 
(Levine & Forrence, 1990; Posner, 1974). Second, it has no ability to differentiate when there 
is more than one regulated group (Posner, 1974). In the context of international standard 
setting, both preparers and audit firms are regulated groups with potentially conflicting 
interests. 
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3.4 Economic Theories of Regulation 
Economic theories of regulation are an extension of political capture theory (Peltzman, 
1989).7 Premised on the notion that the most politically effective private interests will 
dominate the regulatory process, economic theories of regulation take no account of public 
interest motivations (Deegan, 2014; Posner, 1974). Whilst having a long history, the most 
influential of the economic theorists was Stigler (1971), who combined existing research into 
capture theory with new economic analysis (Mitnick, 1980). Unlike earlier theorists, Stigler 
attempted to develop an explicit, testable model of regulation (Mitnick, 1980; Peltzman, 
1989; Posner, 1974).  
Stigler (1971) saw regulation as a product like any other, subject to the laws of supply and 
demand, and concluded that all actors would act rationally to advance their own economic 
interests. Through regulation, regulators have the ability to impose costs and confer benefits. 
In this, Stigler directed attention to factors bearing on the value of regulation to particular 
individuals or groups; as, other things being equal, a product is supplied to those who value it 
the most. Identifying that the regulated industry would usually have a higher individual per 
capita stake than the public the regulation was intended to benefit, Stigler concluded that 
regulation would be acquired by the regulated industry, and be designed and operated 
primarily for its benefit.  
In reaching this conclusion, Stigler (1971) also directed attention to factors bearing on the 
cost of obtaining regulation. Smaller well-organized groups will usually benefit the most 
from regulation, as their cost of organisation is relatively lower than larger and more diffuse 
groups. Smaller groups are more homogeneous in their preferences and have fewer free riders 
                                                 
7 Economic theories of regulation are also called economic theory, private interest theory, public choice theory, 
and capture theory (Gaffikin, 2008) 
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that do not contribute resources. That the public is generally more diffuse, more diverse, and 
has more free riders, increases their cost of organisation relative to the regulated industries 
(Peltzman, 1976; Posner, 1974; Stigler, 1971). The publics’ lower per capita stake in the 
regulation and relatively higher cost of organisation also explains why they tend not to 
complain when regulation does not prioritise their interests (Stigler, 1971).   
In Stigler’s view of regulatory behaviour, regulators will act in their own self-interest, with 
goals such as job retention, securing and enhancing power, and personal wealth after the 
period of office-holding ends (Levine & Forrence, 1990). As such, interest groups can 
influence the outcome of the regulatory process by providing financial or other support. In a 
political context, this is usually in the form of “votes and money” (Peltzman, 1989, p. 6). The 
IASB, lacking the coercive power of government, is dependent upon its major stakeholders 
both for financing (money), and for their continued support for international standards 
(votes). The IASB is also dependent upon its major stakeholders to provide its office-holders 
and for the provision of technical expertise.  
Stigler (1971) identified ways in which the power of a regulator to grant benefits to interest 
groups is restricted, including the extent of procedural safeguards and admission of powerful 
outsiders to the political process. The IASB is subject to oversight from bodies that draw their 
members from all stakeholder groups. The IFRS Foundation Monitoring Board comprises 
national and supranational capital market regulators and provides the highest level of 
oversight; the IFRS Foundation Trustees are responsible for governance and answer to the 
monitoring board. Neither of these bodies is involved in standard setting. The IASB is further 
constrained by a public due process. Powerful outsiders are admitted to the process, including 
national and supranational regulators and the governments behind them. Regulators not only 
comprise members of the monitoring board and a majority of the trustees of the IFRS 
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Foundation, the IASB consults with them on all aspects of the standard setting process. 
Regulators have no direct economic incentive in the product of regulation, as they are neither 
the regulated nor consumers of regulation.  
Stakeholders with a direct economic interest in the regulatory process will act to influence the 
regulator to maximise their own profitability. However, they are not interested in any concept 
of aggregate wealth (Stigler, 1971). This is why regulated industries prefer controls over 
entry, or limits on the growth of new entrants, to a shared benefit. A central hypothesis is that 
“every industry or occupation that has enough political power to utilize the state will seek to 
control entry” (Stigler, 1971, p. 5).  
3.5 Summary 
This chapter identified three theories of regulation that may be used to understand 
international standard setting. Public interest theory may explain the explicit motivation of 
the IASB, while capture theories and economic theories of regulation provide a means to 
differentiate between stakeholders and identify their motivations from their economic 
incentives. Chapter 4 introduces the literature that supports and justifies this research. 
   34
CHAPTER 4 LITERATURE REVIEW8 
Chapter 3 discussed theories of regulation that may be used to understand international 
standard setting and the economic theories that provided a conceptual framework for the 
second study. This chapter reviews the literature that supports the research questions in 
Section 1.4. The first two sections in this chapter support the first two research questions: 
RQ1 Do the disclosures for derivatives made under IFRS 7 fulfil their purpose by meeting 
the decision making needs of users, and if not, why not? 
RQ2 To the extent that the disclosures for derivatives required by IFRS 7 are not useful, what 
disclosures would be more useful? 
 Section 4.1, identifies and describes disclosure quality issues raised in the IFRS 7 literature, 
and Section 4.2 evaluates the implications of archival and other literature that address aspects 
of the usefulness construct for IFRS 7. The next three sections support the third research 
question: 
RQ3 Are the disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 designed to meet the needs of users, or do 
they preference the needs of another stakeholder group? 
Section 4.3 evaluates the literature on public lobbying during the IASBs due process on new 
accounting standards, while Section 4.4 analyses the political environment within which 
standard setting takes place and other paths to influence.  
                                                 
8 Sections 4.1 and 4.2 contain material published in Bean and Irvine (2015) 
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Finally, Section 4.5 explains what is known about the information preferences of stakeholders 
in the standard setting process and propositions are made to support the testing of sub-
research question 3.1: 
SRQ3.1 What disclosure characteristics do different stakeholder groups prefer? 
4.1 IFRS 7 Disclosure Quality Research 
The IASB considers it important that disclosures for financial instruments, including 
derivatives, satisfy two broad objectives, both of which are necessary for users to understand 
these instruments. The first objective is to provide users of financial statements with an 
understanding of the significance of derivatives for a company’s financial position and 
performance, that is, an explanation of recognised amounts (IASB, 2005 para.1(a)). The 
second, equally important objective, is to provide users with information about companies’ 
exposure to the risks associated with those recognised amounts, and to provide an 
understanding of why management entered into those risks and how they are managed 
(IASB, 2005 para.1(b)). Disclosures of transferred financial assets supplement the other 
disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 (IASB, 2005 para.42A). Figure 4.1 summarises the main 
requirements of IFRS 7 that apply to derivatives.  
 Items classified as 
hedges
Quantitative 
information on 
credit risk, 
liquidity risk and 
market risk(s)
Fair value 
methods and 
assumptions
Qualitative 
information on 
credit risk, 
liquidity risk and 
market risk(s)
Accounting 
policies, classes 
and categories
Transferred 
financial assets 
not derecognised 
in their entirety
Transferred 
financial assets 
derecognised in 
their entirety
Objective 1
Significance of 
derivatives for financial 
position and 
performance
Objective 2
Nature and extent of 
off- balance sheet risk 
and how those risks are 
managed
Transfers of financial 
assets
 
Figure 4.1 IFRS 7 disclosures most relevant to derivative financial instruments 
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Significance of derivatives for financial position and performance 
Requirements applicable to derivatives under the first objective depicted in Figure 4.1 include 
appropriate levels of aggregation and disaggregation, accounting policies, disclosures for 
items measured at fair value, and information on hedging transactions.9 
IFRS 7 requires companies to group financial instruments into classes appropriate to the 
nature of the information disclosed. While companies determine the level of aggregation they 
believe is necessary, IFRS 7 provides that, at a minimum, companies not combine 
information with different measurement characteristics. Companies are also required to 
disclose their accounting policies such that users may understand the financial statements. 
Recent research has indicated that not all companies may be complying with this basic 
requirement to provide their accounting policies for derivatives (Birt, Rankin, & Song, 2013). 
Fair value measurements are classified according to a three level hierarchy determined by the 
observability of their inputs.10 The standard requires the disclosure of measurement methods 
and assumptions with additional information on the sensitivity of the assumptions used for 
Level 3 valuations. Clearly, there are increasing opportunities for earnings management as 
the use of less observable, management originated inputs increases. Companies have also 
used undisclosed transfers between levels of the hierarchy to hide losses (Jones, 2011; 
Kothari, Ramanna, & Skinner, 2010). Accordingly, a reconciliation of movements between 
the levels of hierarchy has been required since 2009. 
                                                 
9 In May 2011 the Board relocated the disclosures about fair value measurements from IFRS 7 to IFRS 13 Fair 
Value Measurement (IASB, 2011 paras. 91-99). 
10 Level 1 inputs are quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical assets or liabilities that the entity 
can access at the measurement date. Level 2 inputs are inputs other than quoted prices included within Level 1 
that are observable for the asset or liability, either directly or indirectly. Level 3 inputs are unobservable inputs 
for the asset or liability (IASB, 2011 paras. 72-90). 
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Hedging is a risk management strategy that involves taking an offsetting position to a risk 
exposure such as interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, or commodity-price risk. IAS 39 
identifies two main types of hedging strategies.11 This recognises that companies commonly 
hedge both the possibility of changes in cash flows (e.g. the possibility that interest rates may 
fall causing interest income on a variable rate investment to fall), and the possibility of 
changes in fair value (e.g. the possibility that interest rates may rise, causing the value of a 
fixed rate investment to fall). While the two types of hedge may involve companies entering 
into derivatives with exactly opposite risk positions, companies desire hedge accounting for 
both strategies.  
The purpose of hedge accounting is to remove timing differences caused in part by the mixed 
measurement model, as timing differences are not economically justified when a hedging 
relationship exists. IAS 39 achieves matching in one of two ways. Always requiring that 
derivatives are measured at fair value, IAS 39 either brings forward the recognition of gains 
and losses on the hedged item by measuring it at fair value (for a fair value hedge), or it 
defers the gain or loss on the hedging instrument (derivative) by recognising it initially 
through other comprehensive income (for a cash flow hedge). When the transaction 
associated with the cash flow hedge crystallises, the gain or loss from the hedging instrument 
is recycled out of equity and matching occurs in the profit and loss account. IAS 39 currently 
sets very strict hurdles for a transaction to qualify for hedge accounting, quite possibly due to 
the income smoothing opportunities inherent in hedge accounting, as well as companies’ use 
                                                 
11 Accounting for the third type of hedge recognised by IAS 39, a hedge of a net investment in a foreign 
operation is similar to a cash flow hedge. IAS 39 does not currently recognise portfolio hedges as a separate 
type of hedge. 
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of misleading language about hedging to obscure whether derivatives are for the purpose of 
offsetting risk or taking risk.12  
IFRS 7 currently requires companies to disclose by type of hedge utilised, a description of the 
derivatives designated as hedging instruments and the nature, timing, and extent of the risks 
hedged. A large proportion of listed companies engage in hedging activity, with interest rate 
and foreign exchange risk the main risks hedged (Bodnar & Gebhardt, 1999; Chalmers & 
Godfrey, 2000; Heaney & Winata, 2005; Nguyen & Faff, 2002). Commodity price hedging is 
more common in the mining sector (Birt et al., 2013). Research conducted by practitioners 
has suggested that companies may fail to disclose sufficient specific information about 
hedges and policies on hedging, potentially limiting users’ understanding of how companies 
manage their risks and their knowledge of whether a well-defined and well-monitored 
procedure for risk management exists (Papa & Peters, 2013).  
A loosening of the restrictions on hedge accounting once companies adopt IFRS 9 will make 
the hedging disclosures even more critical.13 Accordingly, the disclosure requirements upon 
adoption of IFRS 9 are fundamentally different to existing requirements, in that their starting 
point is the type of risk exposure, rather than the type of hedge. Companies adopting the new 
hedge accounting model will have to provide a description of their risk management strategy 
for categories of risk that they decide to hedge, how that strategy has been applied, how 
hedging activities might affect future cash flows, as well as the effect that hedge accounting 
has had on both financial position and performance. As shown in Figure 2.3 (Section 2.3.3), 
the IASB also increased the volume of disclosures.  
                                                 
12 Companies engage in selective hedging, and in doing so, are effectively taking a view on whether market 
changes will benefit or disadvantage them (Bodnar & Gebhardt, 1999; Géczy, Minton, & Schrand, 2007). An 
example of this is the Australian mining company, Sons of Gwalia Ltd. Prior to its collapse in 2002, none of its 
directors, management, or the highly sophisticated institutional investors who held major positions in the 
company seemed to be aware that its hedging strategy was, in fact, highly speculative (Bartholomeusz, 2004).   
13 IFRS 9 effective date is January 2018, with early adoption permitted. 
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Nature and extent of risks and how those risks are managed 
To meet the second objective of providing disclosures that enable an understanding of 
financial risk and risk management practices (see Figure 4.1), IFRS 7 requires that companies 
must disclose the financial risks to which they are exposed, which typically include credit 
risk, liquidity risk, and market risk. Companies must describe how each risk arises, how it is 
measured, management’s objectives, policies and processes for managing the risk, and 
whether there are any changes from the previous period. 
Companies are required to disclose summary quantitative information for each risk category, 
based on information provided internally to management. To the extent that this information 
is not representative of transactions during the year, a company must provide additional 
information. IFRS 7 mandates several minimum quantitative disclosures if they are not 
provided under the summary requirements. These include information on maximum exposure 
to credit risk, both with and without the effects of collateral; a maturity analysis for derivative 
financial liabilities, with contractual maturities where relevant; a description of how liquidity 
risk is managed; and disclosures of market risks. Market risks are key trading exposures and 
may include interest rate, foreign exchange rate, equity price, and commodity price risks. A 
sensitivity analysis is required for each type of market risk to which a company has exposure 
at the end of the period, showing the effect on profit or loss and equity of a specified change 
in the market. An alternative to a sensitivity analysis is an analysis of value-at risk (VaR), 
more commonly used by banks and financial institutions. 
Research has shown that most quantitative disclosures of off-balance sheet risks tend to be 
formulaic. With credit risk for example, very few companies appear to provide specific 
information on concentrations of risk and credit quality of assets that are not past due or 
impaired (Ernst & Young, 2008; Papa & Peters, 2011). For liquidity risk, research has found 
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that the majority of companies do provide required quantitative information on undiscounted 
cash flows, but fail to consistently provide sufficient detail in narrative disclosures (Ernst & 
Young, 2008). For market risk, most criticism has been directed at companies’ lack of 
disclosure of methods, inputs, and assumptions applied in the sensitivity analysis (Ernst & 
Young, 2008; Papa & Peters, 2011). In addition to criticism levelled at the narrative 
disclosure of methods and assumptions underlying the quantitative disclosures, the disclosure 
of managements’ objectives, processes, and policies for managing these risks is considered 
generic and uninformative (Chalmers & Godfrey, 2000; Ernst & Young, 2008; Papa & 
Peters, 2011, 2013; Roulstone, 1999; Woods & Marginson, 2004). This is an on-going issue, 
even though the IASB added a paragraph to IFRS 7 in 2010 explaining that qualitative 
descriptions and explanations are necessary for users to have a full understanding of the 
quantitative disclosures. 
Transfers of financial assets 
As shown in Figure 4.1, IFRS 7 requires ancillary disclosures where companies have 
transferred financial assets and have not obtained derecognition under IAS 39, or achieving 
derecognition, have retained some of the risks associated with the transferred asset. In the 
case of the former, companies are required to provide sufficient information to permit users 
to understand the nature of the transaction. In the case of the latter, the 2007/8 financial crisis 
highlighted issues with asset securitisations used to remove poorly performing assets from 
companies’ balance sheets. Another technique used by the failed bank Lehman Brothers was 
the use of repurchase agreements (derivatives) to remove up to US$50 billion of risky assets, 
including other derivatives and securitisations, from their books for short periods around 
balance date (Jones, 2011). Effective from 2010, the IASB introduced substantial new 
disclosure requirements intended to prevent similar situations in the future.  
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Therefore, the consensus from studies on disclosure quality is that the technical requirements 
of IFRS 7 are met in most cases, but often in ways that are perfunctory and lack transparency. 
This coincides with a more general concern from regulators, standard setters, and the 
accounting profession that financial statement disclosures are growing in length, while 
decreasing in informativeness (ACCA, 2012; FRC, 2009, 2011; Hoogervorst, 2013; IASB, 
2008a, 2008b; KPMG, 2011). The IASB has responded by inserting a chapter on presentation 
and disclosure in their exposure draft for the Conceptual Framework, with a request for 
companies to focus more on entity specific information and avoid “boilerplate” disclosures 
(IASB, 2015d para.7.18).  
However, what is unknown is to what extent poor disclosure quality affects users. Despite 
identified deficiencies, do users still find the information provided under IFRS 7 useful? 
Research on this topic suggests sophisticated users may be willing to search through an 
annual report for the information they need (Durocher & Gendron, 2010; Thinggaard, 1996). 
Consistent with this possibility, Ryan (2012) believed that with the right motivation, 
information provided in the disclosures for derivatives can be successfully analysed.  
4.2 IFRS 7 Usefulness Research 
The main body of literature relating to IFRS 7 concerns the value-relevance or risk-relevance 
of particular items contained in the disclosures. Traditional value-relevance literature 
examines aspects of usefulness for equity investors. That is, tests of value-relevance extend 
knowledge regarding the relevance and reliability of accounting amounts through their 
reflection in equity values (Barth et al., 2001). Similarly, risk-relevance literature reveals the 
extent to which the market has used a particular piece of accounting information to price 
companies’ risk. This provides information about users’ expectations that the item will allow 
them to evaluate the consequences of future events for company performance (Ryan, 2012).  
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Archival market based research into the disclosures required by IFRS 7 predominantly 
focuses upon individual quantitative disclosures in the financial statements of banks and 
reports mixed results. For example, early findings that disclosures of VaR modelling were 
associated with measures of company value or measures of risk (Jorion, 2002; Lim & Tan, 
2007; Liu, Ryan, & Tan, 2004) were contradicted in more recent work (Pérignon & Smith, 
2010). Similarly, research into companies’ use of fair values calculated under each of the 
three hierarchies of fair value suggests some relation between the degree of observability of 
the inputs used in the fair value calculation and share price or risk measure, but evidence is 
also inconsistent (Liao, Kang, Morris, & Tang, 2010; Riedl & Serafeim, 2011; Song, 
Thomas, & Yi, 2010). This led Ryan (2012, p. 316) to conclude that, “… risk disclosures in 
financial reports are risk-relevant but less so than one would expect given the high-volume of 
and strong economic bases for those disclosures.”  
Another way that research has approached the usefulness construct is by asking users about 
their views and preferences (Beattie & Pratt, 2002). Typically, these direct studies utilise 
survey questionnaires and interview based methods. Surveys of users are quite sparse 
(Johansen & Plenborg, 2013) and have tended to provide more information about investors 
than lenders (Beattie & Pratt, 2002). However, in one recent study, Johansen and Plenborg 
(2013) provided evidence on the usefulness of 24 mandatory disclosures, including IFRS 7, 
by surveying 288 users (private investors, professional investors, sell-side analysts, and bank 
analysts) and 89 companies (small, medium, large, and state-owned) to obtain their views. 
They identified that the IFRS 7 disclosures are highly demanded by all categories of user, that 
these are also among the items thought by companies to be most costly to prepare, and that 
users are comparatively less satisfied with these notes. These findings clearly point to a need 
to identify ways to increase satisfaction with the disclosures for users while considering the 
cost to preparers. There are differing opinions in the literature as to what would improve the 
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disclosure of derivatives. For example, Johansen and Plenborg (2013) suggested that a 
reduction in the complexity of the notes required under IFRS 7 would make them simpler for 
preparers and, they hoped, more user-friendly. Others believe that complex transactions 
require more rigorous disclosure, not less (e.g. Ryan, 2012). 
While some conclusions about the decision-usefulness of disclosures for derivatives can be 
inferred from archival literature, such as Ryan (2012), who found a less than expected degree 
of value-relevance or risk-relevance, archival research does not provide insight into the 
reasons underlying its findings. Other limitations of archival research include its emphasis 
upon the quantitative disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 and focus upon disclosures in the 
banking sector. More broadly, this type of research is unable to determine whether financial 
statements are the source of information used by the market, or whether other, undisclosed 
information might be more useful. Similarly, recent survey evidence from Johansen and 
Plenborg (2013) identified high user demand for derivatives disclosure coupled with 
comparatively low user satisfaction and pointed to a need for more research into why 
satisfaction is low, or how satisfaction could be increased. Acknowledging users’ lack of 
advocacy during the standard setting process (Giner & Arce, 2012; Jorissen et al., 2012; 
Jorissen, Lybaert, Orens, & van der Tas, 2013; Larson, 2007), individual interviews may be 
more effective in eliciting users’ views (Weetman, Davie, & Collins, 1996). 
Both the structure of the IASB and its due process described in Section 2.2 provide 
opportunities for interested parties to participate in the standard setting process. This leads to 
claims that stakeholders lobby the IASB and leaves open the prospect of one or more private 
interests having undue influence over accounting standards that do not preference the needs 
of users. The following two sections discuss two strands of academic literature that examine 
the standard setting process. These are related to the third research question that asked 
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whether the disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 are designed to meet the needs of users or 
preference the needs of another stakeholder group. The first strand of literature examines the 
participation of stakeholders during the IASB’s public consultation on accounting standards. 
This literature analyses comment-letters written by stakeholders to meet its research 
objectives. The second strand is politically or theoretically motivated and focusses on less 
overt lobbying and paths to influence. 
4.3 Lobbying Research 
While there has been substantial research into lobbying activity directed at various national 
standard-setting regimes, research into lobbying of the IASB is a much more recent 
phenomenon. Due to the often necessary reliance placed upon publicly available information, 
lobbying literature has examined comment-letters submitted by stakeholders during public 
consultation and can be broadly classified into two strands. The first strand is research that 
increases knowledge of stakeholder engagement and participation. The second strand is 
research that increases knowledge of standard setters’ responses to lobbying. With some 
overlap in individual studies, typical questions asked in each category are summarised in 
Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2 Categories of lobbying literature and typical research objectives 
 
Participation studies
•Stakeholder characteristics and 
diversity
•Stakeholder reasons to lobby
•Content or characteristics of 
stakeholder submissions
Influence studies
•Influence of stakeholders on 
standard setters
•Motivation of standard setters to 
respond to lobbying efforts
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Participation studies have shown that from the early days of the IASC to the present, overall 
stakeholder participation in the international standard setting process has increased as the 
IASB has become more important (Jorissen et al., 2013; Larson, 2007). The majority of 
comment letters are written by preparers, audit firms, and regulatory bodies (Chatham, 
Larson, & Vietze, 2010; Giner & Arce, 2012; Jorissen et al., 2012). Few letters are written by 
users and user participation may actually be decreasing (Jorissen et al., 2013). The lack of 
participation by users has been interpreted as a risk to the legitimacy of the IASB (Giner & 
Arce, 2012; Jorissen et al., 2012, 2013; Larson, 2007), as the provision of information that is 
useful to users is the objective of financial reporting (IASB, 2010a).  
Participation studies have further identified geographic biases towards Anglo-Saxon 
countries in terms of the volume of comment letters (Jorissen et al., 2013; Orens, Jorissen, 
Lybaert, & Van Der Tas, 2011). As a natural consequence of the preponderance of comment 
letters from preparers and their representatives, a small body of research has focused upon 
preparers, as either the main objective or part of a wider study. Research into preparers has 
focussed on company size and timing of contributions (Jorissen et al., 2012), the institutional 
settings of the lobbyists’ country of origin (Orens et al., 2011), or how company 
characteristics are associated with the views expressed in submissions (Katselas, Birt, & 
Kang, 2011). 
Few studies have evaluated the influence of lobbyists on the IASC and IASB during public 
consultations on standard setting. Findings of influence have been mixed, with some (Cortese 
& Irvine, 2010; Kwok & Sharp, 2005), but not all (Bamber & McMeeking, 2015; Giner & 
Arce, 2012) identifying some degree of preparer influence over the standard setting process. 
Cortese and Irvine (2010) found that multinational corporations had captured standard setting 
for the extractive industry, while Kwok and Sharp (2005) concluded that the standard setter 
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attempted to meet the needs of as many stakeholders as possible, while noting that changes to 
standards following public consultation were at the behest of preparers. Giner and Arce 
(2012) found a pluralistic process, as did Bamber and McMeeking (2015), although the latter 
observed the views of the large audit firms were downplayed by the standard setter. In taking 
account of the views of all stakeholders, the IASB avoids the “potential negative impact that 
any widely observable procedural bias resulting from excessive influence would have”, 
thereby preserving “moral and cognitive legitimacy” (Bamber & McMeeking, 2015, p. 11).  
Earlier research into the IASC similarly found a standard setter seeking acceptance from its 
constituents and willing to compromise (Kenny & Larson, 1993; Larson & Brown, 2001). 
One interpretation of the influence research is that international standard setting is generally 
pluralistic, although preparers have significant influence.  
While counting letters and identifying influence based upon changes made in standards is an 
accepted approach in the literature (Kenny & Larson, 1993; Kwok & Sharp, 2005; Saemann, 
1995), it is also acknowledged as a somewhat unsatisfactory test (Giner & Arce, 2012; Kenny 
& Larson, 1993; Weetman et al., 1996). This is why researchers have combined analyses of 
comment letters with interviews with IASB board members (Kwok & Sharp, 2005) or with 
documentary evidence of IASB deliberations (Bamber & McMeeking, 2015). However, both 
of these approaches add an IASB perspective to the analysis. A further issue is that none of 
these studies collected data from exposure drafts issued after 2005, when international 
standards came into effect in many countries and over 100 countries subsequently adopted 
them (IASB, 2015f). This may have consequences for interpretations of the IASB’s 
legitimating behaviour within the “complex and shifting interrelationships” of the 
international accounting arena (Hopwood, 1994, p. 245). Given mixed results, it is also 
possible that relative influence is context-specific and is not drawn out by single issue or 
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single exposure draft studies (Weetman et al., 1996). Existing studies do not evaluate long-
term influence and most do not take account of unseen influences.14  
4.4 Political Influence Research 
Influence may be acquired in ways other than public lobbying. This has led researchers to 
examine the relationships of influence at the IASB and other mechanisms through which 
influence is exercised in the standard setting process (Bengtsson, 2011). Describing the 
seminal work of Camfferman and Zeff (2007) on the history of the IASB as “at times … 
reading like a murder mystery, tracing tactical manoeuvring, horse-trading, and outright 
power play”, Botzem and Quack (2009, p. 990) argued for recognition of the roles and 
motivations of the IASB’s stakeholders. From the intensely political origins of international 
harmonisation (Camfferman & Zeff, 2007; Thorell & Whittington, 1994), to how the IASB 
has shaped and been shaped by the financialisation of the political economy (Arnold, 2009, 
2012; Martinez-Diaz, 2005; Perry & Nölke, 2005, 2006), and the role of the private sector 
(Botzem & Quack, 2009; Hopwood, 1994; Perry & Nölke, 2005), it has been argued that the 
standard setting process is intensely political.   
Some researchers have made a link between growth in world capital markets, increased 
financialisation of business (away from industrial forms of capital), and the involvement of 
large audit firms in this process (Arnold, 2009; Martinez-Diaz, 2005; Perry & Nölke, 2005; 
Suddaby et al., 2007). This perspective has tended to dominate political economy literature. 
The well-documented origins and continued reliance of the IASB on the accounting 
profession and close relationships with big business have contributed to concerns that 
standard setting has become dominated by the principle of expertise over that of 
                                                 
14 An exception is the identification by Cortese and Irvine (2010) of a discrepancy between stakeholder lobbying 
and the outcome of standard setting for IFRS 6. 
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representativeness (Botzem & Quack, 2009; Hallström, 2004; Martinez-Diaz, 2005). An 
example is that although the IASB adds items to its agenda in response to what it believes are 
the needs of users (IASB, 2015k), discussion papers are drafted solely on the basis of analysis 
drawn from staff research and recommendations. While suggestions made by the IFRS 
Advisory Council, working groups, other standard-setters, and presentations from invited 
parties are recognised in this process, their role is purely consultative and the IASB’s 
technical personnel remain in control (Botzem & Quack, 2009). This strengthens the 
principle of expertise and feeds into concerns about the influence of audit firms, as many of 
the IASB’s personnel arrive from the global professional services firms. At the same time, 
audit firms provide staff to their client-firms (Suddaby et al., 2007) leading to a feedback-
loop of shared norms, values, and beliefs (Botzem & Quack, 2009; Camfferman & Zeff, 
2007; Power, 2009). In this way global audit firms exert their influence, both directly through 
the provision of money and expertise, and indirectly by controlling the discourse (Hopwood, 
1994). 
An alternative perspective is that the IASB is more strongly influenced by the vested interests 
of big business and the national governments and regulators that support them (Danjou & 
Walton, 2012; Zeff, 2002, 2007). Observations of changing patterns of influence since the 
2007/8 financial crisis may serve to support the view of increased influence of European and 
other regulatory bodies at the expense of audit firms (Bengtsson, 2011; Burlaud & Colasse, 
2011).  
Whichever private interest is assumed to have the greatest influence on the standard setting 
process, it is generally agreed that although the IASB puts users at the forefront in its 
Conceptual Framework, it has little genuine contact with them (Durocher, Fortin, & Côté, 
2007; Durocher & Gendron, 2010; Hopwood, 1994; Larson, 2007; Young, 2006). As 
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Hopwood (1994, p. 248) observed, “the voice of the user is almost invariably one that is 
referred to indirectly, often by the representatives of the audit industry who claim to be able 
to articulate the needs, interests and perspectives of the user community.” 
The third research question requires an understanding of what users and other stakeholders 
find useful in financial disclosure, which led to sub-research question 3.1. Section 4.5 
identifies the economic consequences of disclosure for users and other stakeholders. The 
identification of economic consequences led to expectations about the lobbying behaviour of 
stakeholders expressed as propositions tested in the second study. 
4.5 The Interest Groups 
The IASB identifies its stakeholders as accountants, financial analysts and other users of 
financial statements, the business community, stock exchanges, regulatory and legal 
authorities, academics and other interested individuals, and organisations from around the 
world (IASB, 2014b). Lobbying research categorises stakeholders as financial statement 
users, financial statement preparers, audit firms, and regulators. An additional category is 
added for academics, consultants, or others that may write comment letters (e.g. Giner & 
Arce, 2012; Kwok & Sharp, 2005). Three groups: users, preparers, and audit firms have a 
direct economic interest in the outcome of the standard setting process that should ultimately 
dictate their preferences (Zeff, 1978). In accordance with the economic theories of regulation 
outlined in Section 3.4, users are the intended beneficiaries of the regulation, while preparers 
and audit firms are the subjects of regulation. Economic theories predict that other 
stakeholders, such as regulators and the IASB, will tend to represent one or more of the three 
vested interests for whom the contents of an accounting standard has direct economic 
consequences (Zeff, 1978). 
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Prior research offers theories and some evidence about the disclosure preferences of each 
stakeholder category based upon their economic incentives.  
4.5.1 Users 
Users are the investors, lenders, and other creditors that rely upon the financial statements to 
make resource allocation decisions (IASB, 2010a). Financial statement disclosures reduce the 
private proprietary information of corporate preparers and lower information asymmetry 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001). Although all users consistently show a preference for financial 
statements and footnotes over other sources of information (ACCA, 2012; Beattie & Pratt, 
2002; Berry & Robertson, 2006; Chandra, 1975; De Zoysa & Rudkin, 2010; Gassen & 
Schwedler, 2010; Hines, 1982; Johansen & Plenborg, 2013; Vergoossen, 1993) different 
categories of user may differ in terms of the disclosure characteristics they prefer. Private 
investors, for example, show a preference for summarised information (Beattie & Pratt, 2002; 
Johansen & Plenborg, 2013) and are more likely to be concerned about high volumes of 
disclosure and “information overload” (Beattie & Pratt, 2002, p. 74). However, private 
investors do not tend to contribute during the standard setting process (Georgiou, 2010). 
In the IASB’s public consultations on standard setting, users are sophisticated investors. They 
are the investment management and financial analyst industry groups that write comment 
letters and involve themselves in the standard setting process. Financial analysts place a high 
value on predictive or forward looking information (Beattie & Pratt, 2002; Johansen & 
Plenborg, 2013), including complex note disclosures that require judgement (Johansen & 
Plenborg, 2013). This is defined as a preference for complex information. Complex 
disclosures require estimation and judgement. 
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Analysts have a strong preference for quantitative information (Campbell & Slack, 2008; 
Papa & Peters, 2011) that is standardised and comparable (Papa & Peters, 2011, 2013). 
Analysts are not generally concerned by high volumes of detailed disclosure and want more 
granularities rather than less (Campbell & Slack, 2008). This is defined as a preference for 
uniformity. Uniform disclosures contain specific rule based requirements that reduce 
managerial choice and preference quantitative or tabular disclosures over qualitative or 
narrative disclosures.  
Analysts are also interested in understanding management objectives and strategy, value-
drivers, and detailed information on lines of business (Beattie & Pratt, 2002). Preparers and 
investors that are not owners might consider such information commercially sensitive; 
however, analysts and potential investors that are not owners value commercially sensitive 
information, as they do not bear the cost (Elliott & Jacobson, 1994). This is defined as a 
preference for commercially sensitive disclosure. Commercially sensitive disclosures are 
either future oriented, revealing future strategies and plans that have not yet occurred, or 
provide detailed operational information (Elliott & Jacobson, 1994). Commercially sensitive 
disclosures may be either uniform or complex disclosures. 
As users, by definition, cannot demand information when needed, they will favour full 
disclosure including uniform, complex, and commercially sensitive disclosures that increase 
transparency. The proposition is: 
P1 Users will support new disclosures that increase transparency. 
4.5.2 Preparers 
Preparers are the mainly listed companies required to prepare accounts in accordance with 
international accounting standards. Positive accounting theory predicts that managers will 
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lobby against new or increased disclosures that have high processing costs, as they reduce 
firm profit (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). Processing costs include staff costs to gather and 
process information, staff training, systems development costs, and audit costs (Elliott & 
Jacobson, 1994). A number of factors affect the extent to which new disclosures will increase 
processing cost. Uniform disclosures increase processing costs, but individually do not have 
high processing costs. However, large volumes of uniform disclosure have a correspondingly 
high processing cost. Complex disclosures that require estimation and judgement by their 
nature have high processing costs. However, complex disclosures based upon information 
that is already gathered for management purposes do not have a high incremental processing 
cost (Elliott & Jacobson, 1994). Existing lobbying research supports the expectation that 
preparers will reject disclosures that increase processing costs (Elbannan & McKinley, 2006; 
Jorissen et al., 2012; Saemann, 1999). The proposition is: 
P2 Preparers will oppose disclosures that increase processing costs. 
Managers will also lobby against commercially sensitive disclosures that create a competitive 
disadvantage (Beattie & Smith, 2012; Elliott & Jacobson, 1994). The costs of competitive 
disadvantage are ‘proprietary costs’. Commercially sensitive disclosures are either future 
oriented, revealing future strategies and plans that have not yet occurred, or provide detailed 
operational information (Elliott & Jacobson, 1994). Future oriented disclosures are expected 
to generate higher concerns about proprietary costs, as rivals have more time to react before 
the disclosed information affects the market (Berger, 2011). Competitive disadvantage may 
arise from the application of a disclosure standard when competitors are private companies 
not required to comply with international standards. Commercially sensitive disclosure may 
be either uniform or complex but are not narrative disclosures. Less prescriptive narrative 
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disclosure requirements are more likely to give managers the discretion to avoid disclosing 
commercially sensitive information. The proposition is: 
P3 Preparers will oppose disclosures that may be commercially sensitive. 
4.5.3 Audit firms 
Audit firms are the large global and mid-tier professional services firms that write comment 
letters to the IASB. Although in principle audit firms act on behalf of the owners of the 
companies they audit, they have direct and indirect pecuniary interests in the outcome of the 
standard setting process. Little is known about the behaviour of audit firms in international 
standard setting and researchers have called for them to be subjected to analysis (Cooper & 
Robson, 2006; Humphrey & Loft, 2009; Jorissen et al., 2012). 
Audit firms may lobby on behalf of their clients on accounting issues because their clients 
pay their fees. An alternative explanation is that the lobbying efforts of audit firms will often 
coincide with those of their clients because their incentives are aligned (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1981, 1986). That is, an accounting change with a positive wealth effect on a 
client-firm would lead to a larger client and consequently higher audit fees. However, in 
some cases an audit firm may obtain a greater benefit from acting against the interests of its 
clients, such as when an accounting change leads to more work and incrementally higher 
audit fees (Watts & Zimmerman, 1981). Large audit firms may also value the longer term 
effect of increased disclosure in consolidating their business interests (Stigler, 1971). This 
occurs through the exclusion of smaller audit firms that are unable to compete in an 
increasingly specialised environment. There is some evidence that audit firms support 
increased disclosure (Puro, 1984).  
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Auditors are expected to favour increased disclosures that are uniform, as they lead to higher 
audit fees. Uniform disclosures are prescriptive and quantitative and reduce judgement. In 
requiring less judgement from managers to prepare them, uniform disclosures also require 
less judgement from auditors to audit them. Such disclosures can be standardised and 
checklists developed. Checklists enable junior staff to perform more of the audit work 
(McBarnet, 2001; McBarnet & Whelan, 1991). In this respect, the economic interests of the 
audit firms may partly coincide with the interests of those they are legally bound to represent, 
that is, the shareholders of the companies that they audit (users). The proposition is: 
P4 Audit firms will support disclosures that are uniform. 
A caveat is that an auditor will only favour increased disclosure to the extent that they are 
able to pass the associated audit risk onto their client through their fees. As this is not always 
possible, auditors are more likely to align with their clients in lobbying against a change 
regarding disclosures that have a high risk of misstatement (Meier, Alam, & Pearson, 1993). 
The provision of some fair value estimates and forecasted information falls into this category 
of complex disclosures that increase audit risk and are not amenable to audit by checklist. In 
this respect, the economic interests of audit firms may partly coincide with the interests of 
their clients (preparers), as complex disclosures have high processing costs. The proposition 
is: 
P5 Audit firms will oppose disclosures that are complex. 
4.5.4 Regulators 
Regulators are national standard setters and regulatory agencies, as well as supranational 
bodies such as the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Economic theories predict 
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that a regulatory body will be motivated by goals such as job retention, securing and 
enhancing power, and personal wealth after the period of office-holding ends (Levine & 
Forrence, 1990). In most cases, this means regulators reflect the interests of the national or 
regional governments that back them. Individual governments, and by extension their 
national standard setters and regulatory bodies, will always intervene where accounting 
considerations might be expected to adversely impact their economic or social policies (Zeff, 
1978, 2002). This means in most cases, regulators are expected to act in the interests of big 
business. An exception may occur when the stability of financial markets becomes more 
salient than business interests are. Regulators are expected to act where necessary to 
safeguard the integrity of capital markets, as this is also a goal of national governments and 
business in a global economy. In the latter case, regulators will evidence a preference for the 
user perspective of disclosure that increases transparency. There is some evidence of 
regulators adopting a user perspective (Giner & Arce, 2012). The proposition is: 
P6 Regulators will support the disclosure preferences of preparers. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter positioned the present research within existing literature and justified the 
objective and research questions. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 supported the first two research 
questions. Section 4.1 demonstrated that disclosure quality research might have implications 
for the usefulness of information provided by companies under IFRS 7. In Section 4.2, 
archival research indicated mixed results regarding the value-relevance and risk-relevance of 
quantitative disclosures prepared under IFRS 7, but did not identify if other information 
might be more useful to users. Sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 supported the third research question 
and sub-research question. Section 4.3 revealed that there is limited evidence based research 
into influence over international standard setting. In Section 4.4, regulatory capture was 
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identified as a plausible reason for disclosures provided under IFRS 7 not being decision-
useful. In Section 4.5, the interest groups that lobby the IASB and their preferences were 
identified using an economic incentives approach and existing literature. Chapter 5 introduces 
the theoretical perspective, including the assumptions about the nature of reality and 
knowledge that underpins the research methodology and methods described in Chapter 6. 
   57
CHAPTER 5 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Chapter 4 presented the literature that informs and supports this research. This chapter sets 
out the theoretical perspective that underpinned the conduct of the research. Section 5.1 
discusses the ontology and epistemology that are underlying assumptions in the conduct of 
research. Section 5.2 describes the philosophy of Peircean pragmatism that provides a logical 
context for ontology, epistemology, methodology, and methods. Section 5.3 connects 
Peircean pragmatism to the present research. 
5.1 Theoretical Perspective 
A researcher’s worldview is a basic belief system that guides them “not only in choices of 
method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways” (Guba & Lincoln, 
1998, p. 95). A particular theoretical perspective must fit with the researcher’s worldview, 
providing a logical context for ontology, epistemology, methodology, and methods (Gaffikin, 
2008). 
Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality. The extent to which a researcher believes 
that reality is real determines what they think they can know about “how things really are” 
and “how things really work” (Guba & Lincoln, 1998, p. 201). This research was conducted 
from a realist perspective. A realist ontology is often associated with an objectivist 
epistemology, although this does not have to be the case (Crotty, 1998). An epistemology is 
“a way of understanding and explaining how we know what we know” (Crotty, 1998, p. 3). 
An objectivist epistemology suggests that meaning is inherent in an object. That a tree 
“would be a tree, with that same meaning, whether anyone knew of its existence or not” 
(Crotty, 1998, p. 43). Alternatively, the constructionist epistemology adopted in this research 
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accepts that “all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon 
human practices” (Crotty, 1998, p. 42). For an epistemological constructionist, knowledge (or 
truth) is neither objective nor subjective, but is made by human beings (Crotty, 1998). On this 
understanding, there is no true or correct interpretation, only more or less useful 
interpretations (Crotty, 1998). As explained by Crotty (1998, p. 61), a critical mind-set can be 
consistent with a constructionist viewpoint, for example, “early exponents of American 
pragmatism - Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewy - were constructionist 
and critical.” This is consistent with research that considers the possibility of change. The 
realist ontology and constructionist epistemology of this research guided and constrained its 
methodology. Methodology is concerned with research design and method, how a researcher 
goes about “finding out whatever he or she believes can be known” (Guba & Lincoln, 1998, 
p. 201).  
5.2 Peircean Pragmatism 
The theoretical perspective of Peircean pragmatism reflects the views adopted in this thesis, 
and provides a logical context for ontology, epistemology, methodology, and methods. Table 
5.1 compares Peircean pragmatism with other well-known theoretical perspectives.  
Table 5.1 A comparison of theoretical perspectives 
 Theoretical perspective 
 Positivism Pragmatism Critical realism Post-modernism 
Ontology 
 
Realist Realist Realist Idealist 
Epistemology 
 
Objectivist Constructionist Constructionist Subjectivist 
 
The American logician, statistician, and philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce, developed his 
theory of pragmatism in the late 1860s together with William James and Chauncey Wright 
Chapter 5: Theoretical Perspective  59 
 
(Misak, 2013b).15 Pragmatism subsequently achieved prominence in the first half of the 
twentieth century with the work of William James, and later John Dewey, although they took 
pragmatism in directions different to the analytical approach of the principal founder, Peirce 
(Misak, 2013a). Perhaps as a result, many accounts “tend to reflect a popularised view of 
pragmatism rather than the careful nuances of its founders” (Gaffikin, 2008, p. 72). 
Accordingly, much of the material in this chapter is an analysis of primary sources, including 
public lectures, meeting notes, articles, and unpublished working papers progressively 
released by Peirce’s beneficiary, Harvard University, through the 1930s-1950s as eight books 
of collected papers.  
The Peircean pragmatism described in this chapter requires a rigorous empirical approach, 
while recognising that all knowledge is relative to human experience. With mental flexibility 
grounded in mathematics and logic, Peirce treads a middle path between the extremes of 
positivism and anti-positivism. Peircean pragmatism provides an alternative to critical 
realism for those that prefer an approach that while realist, constructionist, and critical, avoids 
complex ontological commitments. Pragmatism provides epistemological justification for 
research that contributes to practice.  
5.2.1 Epistemology 
Theory of meaning 
Peirce published a set of six papers in Popular Science Monthly during the period from 1877-
1878. Of these, his article, How to Make our Ideas Clear (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a 
para.388-410), in which he set out his scientific theory of meaning, is usually taken to be the 
genesis of pragmatism (Misak, 2013a). In this article he explained not only how to be clear 
                                                 
15 Chauncey Wright  died in 1875 and his work exists only in fragments (Misak, 2013a). 
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about what is meant by a particular thought or idea, but also how to identify ideas that are 
worthy of effort. As action follows thought, he believed that time should not be wasted on 
thoughts that are ultimately meaningless; meaningless because there is no way of inquiring 
into them (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.401). At the time Peirce was writing, it was 
assumed by most philosophers that the meaning of an idea was clear if it could be defined 
analytically and identified in operation (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958b para.481).16 Peirce 
extended this requirement in his pragmatic maxim, 
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object (Hartshorne & Weiss, 
1931-1958a para.402). 
The pragmatic maxim therefore adds that a concept is understood by exploring its 
connections with the practical world, and any idea that does not or cannot have a practical 
effect is without scientific meaning (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.401). Unlike the 
logical positivists, Peirce’s criterion of ‘effect’ is not limited to the five senses, but includes 
anything that does or could impinge upon cognition, either directly or indirectly (Burks, 
1931-1958 para.623). This has implications for methodology. 
Theory of knowledge 
In his article, The Fixation of Belief (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.358-387), Peirce  
set out a conception of inquiry that led to his account of truth. Doubt, Peirce believed, makes 
people uncertain about how to think or act. Not knowing how to think or act causes anxiety 
and drives people to find resolution by making inquiries; therefore, the purpose of inquiry is 
                                                 
16 This is the Aristotelian concept of induction: that in order to know about something, it is necessary to observe 
and examine instances of it (Gaffikin, 2008). 
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to settle genuine doubts that paralyse action (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.375). 
The settlement of doubt becomes the natural end of inquiry and eliminates the need for 
absolute proof (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.375). This is the doubt-belief model of 
inquiry: 
We have in our various inquiries and deliberations a multiplicity of local aims 
- empirical adequacy, coherence with other beliefs, simplicity, explanatory 
power, getting a reliable guide to action, fruitfulness for other research, greater 
understanding of others, increased maturity, and the like. When we say that we 
aim at the truth, what we mean is that, were a belief really to satisfy all of our 
local aims in inquiry, then that belief would be true (Misak, 2013a, p. 63). 
Belief is the end of inquiry because Peirce held to the essentially Kantian position that “all 
our knowledge is, and forever must be, relative to human experience and to the nature of the 
human mind” (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.95). However, Peirce rejected 
scepticism, strongly defending the existence of an in-principle ultimate truth. 
Nothing can be more completely false than that we can experience only our 
own ideas. That is indeed without exaggeration the very epitome of all falsity. 
Our knowledge of things in themselves is entirely relative, it is true; but all 
experience and all knowledge is knowledge of that which is, independently of 
being represented (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.95: emphasis in 
original). 
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Philosopher Clarence Lewis held views similar to those of Peirce.17 To those that would 
argue knowledge and reality are entirely constructions of the mind and cannot be known, 
Lewis explained that to the contrary, “relativity is not incompatible with, but requires an 
independent character in what is thus relative” (Lewis, 1956 [1929], p. 172 emphasis in 
original). Conversely, against the position that there is a direct line between observation and 
truth, Lewis observed that “we cannot both of us see reality as it is when we do not see it 
alike” (Lewis, 1956 [1929], p. 166). Pragmatism therefore draws a distinction between 
immediate data, or that which is simply observed, and belief about or interpretation of that 
data, arguing that sensory observation is not knowledge and cannot justify belief (Lewis, 
1956 [1929], p. 54). 
A constructionist approach to knowledge leads to fallibilism, where the results of all inquiry 
are open to question and revision as indicated by the evidence available at any given time. 
Inquiry, Peirce said, “is not standing upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and 
can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give 
way” (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.589). Any seeker of knowledge must always be 
open to criticism, willing to change their mind and understand that what they now believe to 
be true could change in the future.  
Applying fallibilism to the concept of truth, it follows that while the purpose of inquiry is to 
move closer to truth, actual truth exists notionally (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a 
para.565). In the mean time, beliefs may be held if they seem plausible to the community of 
inquirers (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.265), and in the absence of evidence to the 
                                                 
17 Clarence Irving Lewis, like Peirce, was a logician, and as a contemporary of John Dewey, had studied under 
William James as an undergraduate. When Lewis first arrived at Harvard as a faculty member he obtained the 
collected manuscripts that had been left to Harvard in a state of disarray by Peirce’s widow, and so was able to 
benefit from access to Peirce’s significant body of unpublished work (Misak, 2013a). 
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contrary, may be operated upon as if they are true (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a 
para.38). 
Methodological approach 
Peirce was an empiricist. He argued comprehensively in his article The Fixation of Belief  
(Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.358-387) that this is the only method by which 
people can hope to obtain evidence not affected by their own thinking, and is the only method 
that will eventually allow everyone to reach the same conclusion based upon an accumulated 
evidence of experience (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.384). Peirce wrote of the 
experimental method, however, he did not understand ‘experiment’ in the narrow sense of 
manipulating variables in a laboratory, and described what might be called an experimental 
mind-set that could be applied in any discipline (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a 
para.168).18 The central theme from Peirce’s writings on the subject of scientific method is 
best encapsulated by his injunction to “only proceed from tangible premises which can be 
subjected to careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments 
than to the conclusiveness of any one” (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.265). A 
rigorous approach together with replication logic and examination from different perspectives 
and world-views is the key to understanding the nature of evidence that leads to justified 
belief.19 
In terms of what constitutes evidence, Peirce rejected positivists’ closed system of 
knowledge, making clear that evidence may “come from any kind of cognition, virtual, 
symbolic or whatever it might be” (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.181). Peirce 
                                                 
18 For example, Peirce explained how his approach could be applied to establishing the truth or otherwise of 
claims made in ancient documents (Burks, 1931-1958 paras.162-255).  
19 This is similar to the concept of critical multiplism associated with post positivism (e.g. Letourneau & Allen, 
1999; Shadish, 1993). 
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specifically accepted mathematical (Burks, 1931-1958 para.186) and diagrammatic proofs 
(Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.162), and did not reject the scientific nature of 
subjects such as cosmology and physics, or what he referred to as the normative sciences: 
logic, ethics, and aesthetics (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.39).  
Causation is also important to pragmatism. One of Peirce’s contributions to logic was his 
identification of a third mode of reasoning, in addition to deduction and induction (Misak, 
2013a). Peirce called his third kind of reasoning abductive inference. Abduction is a 
fundamentally creative and ampliative process, and it is only through abduction that new 
ideas can be introduced into a body of belief (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.171). 
The abductive suggestion comes to us in a flash. It is an act of insight, 
although of extremely fallible insight. It is true that the different elements of 
the hypothesis were in our mind before; but it is the idea of putting together 
what we had never before dreamed of putting together which flashes the new 
suggestion before our contemplation (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a 
para.181 emphasis in original).  
That is, new theories are developed through the creative or intuitive application of 
observations to the background body of knowledge and beliefs (regulative assumptions). 
Research begins with a theory (hypothesis) formed from the deduction of the practical effects 
that might be observed if that theory were true or false. Those practical effects are then 
observed to see how closely they agree with the theory, followed by abduction and a return to 
theorising (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.170).  
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Peircean pragmatism is also associated with a critical mind-set.20 That Peirce was seeking a 
critical philosophy is evidenced by his insistence that “pragmatism is not a Weltanschauung 
but is a method of reflexion having for its purpose to render ideas clear” (Hartshorne & 
Weiss, 1931-1958a para.13 emphasis in original). As Crotty (1998, p. 218) explained, 
“Weltanschauung means ‘worldview’; that is, the way one understands the world to be. For 
the most part, this is an implicit understanding and, as Peirce is suggesting, not a critical 
process.” 
5.2.2 The nature of reality 
Pierce was dismissive of philosophical arguments concerning metaphysics, and particularly 
the ontological debate with an argument based on “one word being defined by other words, 
and then by still others, without any real conception ever being reached” (Hartshorne & 
Weiss, 1931-1958a para.423). Like many of his contemporaries, he focused on epistemology 
and largely left ontology and its close relation theology alone (Misak, 2013a). On the nature 
and existence of reality, his views were a logical extension of his detailed epistemology. 
Peirce believed that people must at least assume that there is a reality, for without it people 
would be unable to think, know, and act (Misak, 2013a). A belief in reality is prerequisite to a 
belief in the scientific method, and he was scathing of those who claimed to doubt the 
existence of reality, accusing them of self-deception, “let us not pretend to doubt in 
philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts” (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-1958a para.265). 
He argued that if nothing were real, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction, and that 
an instinctive belief in reality “is one which every mind admits” (Hartshorne & Weiss, 1931-
1958a para.384).   
                                                 
20 Critical research recognises that knowledge is socially constructed. All critical research must therefore include 
a self-reflexive or reflective component (Carspecken, 2008).  
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For Peirce, reality is what does not change when it is observed. It is what impinges upon us 
and constrains us (Misak, 2013a). Or, as Lewis explained, the fountain pen held in his hand 
would no doubt be perceived differently by an infant, but its essential character would remain 
unchanged, whoever held it (Lewis, 1956 [1929]). This separates Peircean pragmatism from 
the later pragmatism of James and Dewey, who appeared to share the belief that nothing 
stands, apart from the interpretation of it (Misak, 2013a). 
5.3 Implications for Research 
How a piece of research will be carried out and analysed is influenced by both the 
philosophical stance underpinning the research (Carson et al., 2001; Crotty, 1998; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1998), as well as questions of methodological fit (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). 
The realist approach of Peircean pragmatism is suited to research that answers the call for 
accounting research more closely aligned with the needs of practice (Arnold, 2009; Bricker & 
Previts, 1990; Carlin, 2011; Fülbier et al., 2009; Granof & Zeff, 2008; Holthausen & Watts, 
2001; Leisenring & Johnson, 1994; Schipper, 1994; Stevenson, 2011; Tilt, 2010) while 
pragmatism’s constructionist epistemology is suited to the research of a complex issue. Both 
qualitative and quantitative research is possible in this paradigm. However, qualitative 
research is suited to answering how and why questions concerning complex social phenomena 
in an exploratory setting (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). A qualitative approach was 
therefore the best fit for the present research.  
5.4 Summary 
This chapter introduced the theoretical perspective that informed the research. The 
pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce is ontologically realist and epistemologically 
constructionist. It supports an empirical approach. Chapter 6 describes the research methods 
utilised in this thesis. 
   67
CHAPTER 6 RESEARCH METHODS 
Chapter 5 introduced the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce, which provided the 
theoretical perspective used in the research. The perspective is ontologically realist and 
epistemologically constructivist. This chapter sets out the research methods that answer the 
research questions in Section 1.4. Section 6.1 shows how the two studies answer the research 
questions and together meet the research objective. The research methods for the two studies 
are then explained in detail in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. 
6.1 Overview 
The objective of this research was to explore whether the derivatives disclosures required by 
IFRS 7 provide users with information that is decision-useful, and to the extent that they do 
not, identify possible reasons.  
Academic and practitioner literature discussed in Chapter 4 identified possible reasons for 
why the disclosures provided under IFRS 7 may not be useful to users and led to the research 
questions. First, there is evidence that companies implement the disclosure requirements for 
derivatives in a perfunctory and boilerplate way, although the extent to which financial 
statement users are adversely affected is unknown. Similarly, archival research provides 
mixed evidence regarding the value-relevance or risk-relevance of quantitative disclosures 
required under IFRS 7, but does not evaluate the qualitative risk management disclosures, 
without which the quantitative disclosures lack context. Archival research also does not 
evaluate whether a different disclosure would be more relevant to users than what is there. 
The first two research questions addressed these limitations through the first study (Section 
6.2) that comprised in-depth interviews with bank analysts. 
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A different strand of literature provided a different perspective, suggesting that the 
disclosures for derivatives might not be decision-useful if IFRS 7 was not designed with users 
in mind. This would be the case if the standard setter had been ‘captured’ by one or more of 
its other stakeholders, as predicted by economic theories of regulation. This possibility led to 
the third research question and sub-research question, which were answered through the 
second study (Section 6.3) that comprised a content analysis of IFRS 7 and related 
documents. 
6.2 Study One - Research Design and Method21 
This section presents the research design and method for the first study, which comprised in-
depth interviews with bank analysts.  
6.2.1 Overview of research design and method
6.2.2 Sample
Bank analysts
6.2.3 Data collection
Semi-structured interviews
6.2.4 Data analysis
 
6.2.1 Overview of research design and method 
The aim of the first study was the same as the overarching research objective: To explore 
whether the derivatives disclosures required by IFRS 7 provide users with information that is 
decision-useful, and to the extent that they do not, identify possible reasons. The first 
                                                 
21 This section contains material published in Bean and Irvine (2015). 
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research question asked whether the disclosures for derivatives made under IFRS 7 fulfil their 
stated purpose in meeting the decision-making needs of users. To the extent that users found 
these disclosures less than useful, they were asked for reasons. The first research question 
therefore limited users’ responses to what is in IFRS 7, including how companies apply the 
disclosure requirements in their annual reports. The second research question asked whether 
different disclosures might improve usefulness, which is concerned with the design of IFRS 
7. The research questions were: 
RQ1 Do the disclosures for derivatives made under IFRS 7 fulfil their purpose by meeting 
the decision making needs of users, and if not, why not? 
RQ2 To the extent that the disclosures for derivatives required by IFRS 7 are not useful, 
what disclosures would be more useful? 
Sixteen analysts from Australia’s four largest banks were interviewed. Semi-structured 
interviews were recorded and transcribed, then coded based upon the responses of the 
analysts. Through the identification of similar or related comments, codes were refined, 
categories and sub-categories emerged, and the common views of the analysts were revealed. 
6.2.2 Sample 
The Conceptual Framework recognises that the primary users of financial information are 
investors, lenders, and other creditors (IASB, 2010a). Sophisticated users were selected for 
this phase of the research, as derivatives are complex and the intention was to understand 
whether the disclosures are capable of being useful, rather than whether they are used.22 
Acknowledging evidence of poor disclosure quality, research on this topic suggested 
                                                 
22 The population of experts includes institutional investors and fund managers (buy-side analysts), equity 
analysts and brokers (sell-side analysts) and banks and ratings agencies (credit-side analysts). 
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sophisticated users are willing to search through an annual report for the information they 
need (Durocher & Gendron, 2010; Thinggaard, 1996).  
This study used semi-structured interviews with 16 analysts from Australia’s four largest 
banks.23 Given these banks’ market dominance, it was expected that the majority of listed and 
large private companies that prepare general-purpose financial reports have relationships with 
them. Although the sample was Australian, the research objective was not limited to 
Australia. Research into disclosure quality under international standards has investigated the 
relationship between countries’ institutions and financial reporting outcomes, finding that 
disclosure quality is significantly influenced by economic and institutional frameworks (Leuz 
& Wysocki, 2008). Although Australia is much smaller than the major capital markets of the 
UK and the US, it fully converged with IFRS in 2005, its accounting is sophisticated, its 
institutions are advanced, and its larger companies make significant use of derivatives 
(Heaney & Winata, 2005).  
Very little is known about the specific disclosure preferences of bank lenders (Armstrong et 
al., 2010), although their observations are particularly informative for this research as they 
place a strong emphasis on risk and risk management (Armstrong et al., 2010; Kothari et al., 
2010). The bank analysts interviewed were also knowledgeable about derivatives and 
financial statement disclosures. Lenders want to know if a company will be able to meet its 
future obligations with regard to principal and interest repayments, or in the worst case, 
liquidation of collateral (AICPA, 1994; Kothari et al., 2010). Lenders are therefore less 
interested in valuation than investors are. However, informational requirements of both 
                                                 
23 The Australian banking sector is dominated by four banks that also comprise four of Australia’s top five listed 
companies by market capitalisation: Commonwealth Bank of Australia (A$145 billion), Westpac Banking 
Corporation (A$111 billion), Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (A$95 billion), and National Australia 
Bank (A$89 billion) (ASX 2015).  
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investors and lenders remain similar across many dimensions (Kothari et al., 2010), and 
insights offered by the analysts interviewed in this research extend the existing literature on 
the usefulness of IFRS 7 disclosures. To the extent that the sampling frame is not 
representative of the population of all users, there will be sampling frame bias.  
The analysts were recruited using industry contacts. According to Patton (2002), all 
qualitative sampling is purposeful and its aim is to select cases that provide a rich source of 
information for the study. The use of industry contacts is a form of snowball sampling and is 
a useful way to pursue purposive sampling in situations where there are no lists or other 
obvious sources for locating members of the population of interest (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
Snowball sampling can also be helpful in accessing the elite where some degree of trust is 
required (Atkinson & Flint, 2004) and is an accepted method in exploratory research (Arksey 
& Knight, 1999). Drawing the sample across four banks mitigated the risk inherent in this 
sampling method of capturing a biased subset of the population of potential participants. 
Although generalising to the population was not possible, the selection of a sample that 
allowed for the subject to be viewed from different possible perspectives has the effect of 
increasing validity (Arksey & Knight, 1999; Shenton, 2004). 
The analysts in this study assessed risk, either incidental to granting credit (credit analyst), or 
to the provision of risk advisory services for existing clients of their bank (risk advisor). All 
confirmed they had clients who used derivatives and, for both categories, the majority were 
actively involved in recommending derivatives to clients, either to mitigate risk prior to the 
granting of credit, or as part of advising clients on financial risk management. In either case, 
the analysts’ roles were to maximise their bank’s return on capital by providing independent 
credit analysis on the companies and industries to which the bank has exposure. For this 
Chapter 6: Research Methods  72 
 
research, both types of analyst confirmed they used their clients’ audited annual reports when 
making their initial assessments of risk.  
Table 6.1 summarises the characteristics of the analysts interviewed in this study. To 
maintain confidentiality, information on the banks or branches associated with individuals is 
not tabulated. Analyst experience ranged from four to over 30 years, with 11 having greater 
than 10 years’ experience. Each analyst was allocated a number between one and 16 with a 
prefix: A for analyst or SA for senior analyst, which denotes greater than 10 years’ 
experience. As the analysts were from small teams within the banks, there was little sector 
concentration evident in the sample, although their clients excluded other banks. 
Table 6.1 Participant profiles 
Interview 
designation 
Years of 
employment Role in Bank Sector/s 
A1 5-9 Credit analyst Telecommunications 
A2 5-9 Credit analyst Mining and mining services 
SA3 20-24 Credit analyst Government, education, telecommunications 
SA4 20-24 Credit analyst All sectors 
SA5 20-24 Credit analyst All sectors 
SA6 20-24 Credit analyst All sectors 
SA7 25-29 Credit analyst Financial services (ex-banks) and government 
A8 <5 Risk advisor Financial services (ex-banks) 
A9 <5 Risk advisor All sectors 
A10 5-9 Risk advisor All sectors 
SA11 10-14 Risk advisor All sectors 
SA12 10-14 Risk advisor All sectors 
SA13 15-19 Risk advisor All sectors 
SA14 15-19 Risk advisor Engineering and mining services 
SA15 15-19 Risk advisor All sectors 
SA16 30-34 Risk advisor Financial services (ex-banks) 
Note. Years of employment denotes years in the workplace, which is not the same as years in current role. A = 
analyst, SA = senior analyst with greater than 10 years of experience. 
6.2.3 Data collection 
An ethical clearance application to conduct interviews was submitted to the QUT Ethics 
Committee in December 2012. Approval was issued on 21 January 2013 and has been 
renewed until 21 January 2016, with approval number 1300000030. All QUT policy 
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guidelines were adhered to and followed, and this information was included in all 
correspondence with the analysts.  
For interviewing experts, semi-structured interviews most closely mimic how they conduct 
meetings within their professional organisations, and thus are a recommended format 
(Bogner, Littig, & Menz, 2009; Kolb, 2008). Semi-structured interviews also allow research 
questions to be asked, while not limiting the subjects’ own reflections on the research 
question. All interviews were conducted either face-to-face or by telephone during January, 
February, and July of 2013 and were recorded. Interviews lasted between 30 and 45 minutes. 
The interview guide is in Appendix B. Information about the background of the analysts was 
first obtained. The first interview question then addressed the first research question and 
followed the tradition of evaluating the usefulness of accounting standards against their own 
stated objectives (Schipper, 2007). The focus therefore, was on how, and to what extent, the 
objectives of the disclosures in both the Conceptual Framework (IASB, 2010a para.OB2) and 
IFRS 7 (IASB, 2005 para.1) were met in the annual reports the analysts evaluated. Aligned 
with the second research question, the second interview question asked the analysts if they 
had any suggestions for improvement to the requirements of IFRS 7. Analysts were asked to 
consider their own informational needs, but be constrained by what, in their opinion, could 
reasonably be included in an annual report.  
Semi-structured interviews are susceptible to low reliability, as questions are not consistently 
asked and there is a risk of interviewer bias (Gray, 2009). An unobtrusive attitude was 
therefore adopted throughout the interviews, clarifying the requirements of the accounting 
standard where necessary, but allowing the analysts to respond to the questions on their own 
terms and to raise and discuss issues that were most important to them. The initial interview 
strategy was adapted when necessary to explore emerging categories (Mason, 2002). New 
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categories ceased to emerge after approximately 12 of the 16 interviews, indicating data 
saturation or informational redundancy, with little to be gained from additional interviews 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1994). This seemed reasonable given the relatively homogeneous 
characteristics of the analysts, and is consistent with evidence that minimum sample sizes for 
this kind of research fall somewhere between eight and 12 (Arksey & Knight, 1999; 
Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007). 
The most likely risks to the validity of these interviews were social desirability bias, the risk 
of the analyst not having an opinion, and the risk of contamination (Corbetta, 2003). That the 
analysts were experts speaking to their area of expertise tended to reduce these risks. As 
analysts were interviewed from four different banks and three different cities, the likelihood 
of significant contamination caused by analysts discussing the research with each other was 
low.  
6.2.4 Data analysis 
Seven interviews conducted during January and February of 2013 formed the basis of a pro-
forma codebook, developed ex post, based upon the responses of the analysts. There was no 
ex ante theorising in this study, as the aim was to obtain the views of the analysts, not the 
views of the researcher. Coding was systematic, with a code initially created for each 
observation. Through the identification of similar or related comments, codes were refined 
and categories and sub-categories emerged. This preliminary data, grouped by category, was 
then displayed on a spread-sheet that aided the identification of relationships between the 
categories, leading to a return to the data and the codes in an iterative process (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). In establishing these relationships, a search for rival explanations and 
negative cases was undertaken (Patton, 2002). The first seven interviews were transcribed by 
hand and a professional transcription service transcribed the second tranche of nine 
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interviews. At this time, the pro-forma codebook and all interview transcripts were uploaded 
into NVivo, a software program designed to manage and analyse non-numerical, unstructured 
data. The manual process described above was repeated using the software, which served to 
improve the reliability of the coding (Durocher et al., 2007; Krippendorff, 2013).  
Yin (2009) recommended the creation of a case database and the clear provision of a chain of 
evidence, sometimes referred to as an audit trail (Shenton, 2004). The chain of evidence 
provides assurance that the evidence originally collected connects with what is in the final 
report. In the opposite direction, it provides assurance that no original evidence has been lost 
through carelessness or bias. Yin’s (2009) recommendation was followed and a cross-
referenced ‘audit file’ was created. An experienced academic colleague reviewed the audit 
file, and verified the data, coding, and conclusions of the analysis on a sample basis.  
6.3 Study Two - Research Design and Method 
This section presents the research design and method for the second study, which comprised 
a content analysis of IFRS 7 and related documents.  
6.3.1 Overview of research design and method
6.3.2 Context
Propositions and analytical constructs
6.3.3 Sample
Relevant texts
6.3.4 Data collection
Coding and recording
6.3.5 Data analysis
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6.3.1 Overview of research design and method 
The aim of the second study was to explore usefulness from the perspective of the design of 
IFRS 7. That is, whether IFRS 7 is designed to meet the needs of users and should therefore 
be expected to provide decision-useful information. The research question was: 
RQ3 Is IFRS 7 designed to meet the needs of users, or does it preference the needs of other 
stakeholder groups?  
In order to answer the third research question, it was necessary to identify the information 
needs of users and other stakeholder groups that may have influenced or captured the 
standard setting process. Accordingly, a sub-research question was added to support question 
3: 
SRQ3.1 What disclosure characteristics do different stakeholder groups prefer? 
The third research question and sub-research question were answered through a content 
analysis of documents. These documents were IAS 32, IFRS 7, four exposure drafts, and 
related stakeholder comment letters, covering the ten-year period from 2004 to 2014.  
6.3.2 Context 
Documents acquire their significance in the context of their use by the content analyst 
(Krippendorff, 2013). Therefore, the context is what connects the contents of the documents 
selected for analysis to possible answers to the research question. This research followed the 
analytical methods of Saemann (1999), who used what was known about the preferences of 
stakeholders in the United States standard setting process to infer influence from the 
characteristics of changes made to accounting standards. Therefore, what is currently known 
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about the preferences of stakeholders and the characteristics of disclosure items provides the 
context for this research. 
Propositions and analytical constructs 
Although the interests of stakeholders may vary on particular issues, three groups: users, 
preparers, and audit firms have a direct economic interest in the outcome of the standard 
setting process that should ultimately dictate their preferences. Other stakeholders are 
expected to support one of more of these vested interests (Saemann, 1999).  
Section 4.5 identified three disclosure characteristics expected to provoke lobbying activity 
from stakeholders due to their economic effect. The three disclosure characteristics were 
uniform disclosure, complex disclosure, and commercially sensitive disclosure. Each of the 
three disclosure characteristics is an analytical construct defined for use in the analysis. 
Uniform disclosures are quantitative and contain specific rules based requirements that 
reduce managerial choice (prescriptive). Complex disclosures are also prescriptive and 
quantitative, but involve estimation or judgement. Complex disclosures are usually future 
oriented. Commercially sensitive disclosures are future oriented, revealing future strategies 
and plans that have not yet occurred (complex), or provide detailed operational information 
(uniform). Commercially sensitive disclosures may be either complex or uniform disclosures, 
but are not narrative disclosures. 
Six propositions were developed in Section 4.5 using the analytical constructs individually 
and in combination that described the expected lobbying of each stakeholder on proposed 
disclosures with those characteristics. The propositions were: 
P1 Users will support new disclosures that increase transparency. 
P2 Preparers will oppose disclosures that increase processing costs. 
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P3 Preparers will oppose disclosures that may be commercially sensitive. 
P4 Audit firms will support increases in disclosures that are uniform. 
P5 Auditors will oppose disclosures that are complex. 
P6 Regulators will support the disclosure preferences of preparers. 
 
Table 6.2 summarises the propositions for each stakeholder category by analytical construct. 
Table 6.2 Summary of propositions by analytical construct 
Full disclosure Users Preparers Audit firms  Regulators 
Uniform disclosure Support Oppose Support Oppose 
Complex disclosure Support Oppose Oppose Oppose 
Commercially sensitive disclosure Support Oppose Support a Oppose 
a Audit firms have no in principle opposition to commercially sensitive disclosure, but will oppose if it is a 
complex disclosure.  
 
Section 6.3.5 explains how the analytical constructs and propositions were used at each stage 
of the analysis. 
6.3.3 Sample 
In content analyses, a document is relevant if it provides meaningful evidence linking the 
context (propositions and analytical constructs) with answers to the research question 
(Krippendorff, 2013). The documents should therefore provide information about the 
disclosure characteristics of IFRS 7, changes to those characteristics, and the disclosure 
preferences of stakeholder groups. The documents selected were IAS 32, IFRS 7, four 
exposure drafts, and comment letters written by stakeholders during public consultation on 
the exposure drafts.  
The period of analysis was the ten year period from 2004 to 2014. As explained in Section 
2.3, a new disclosure standard for financial instruments was exposed for public comment in 
2004, which led to the issue of IFRS 7 in 2005. Following the 2007/8 financial crisis, two 
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exposure drafts were issued that had implications for the disclosure of derivatives. Then, in 
late 2010, changes proposed for hedge accounting had significant flow-on effects for the 
disclosure requirements. The response of stakeholders to these four exposure drafts provided 
sufficient evidence of their lobbying behaviour and their influence on the design of IFRS 7 in 
respect to derivatives. Appendix A shows all amendments to IFRS 7 from 2004 to 2014 and 
highlights the four exposure drafts selected for this study. All exposure drafts that 
substantially affected the disclosure of derivatives were selected.  
When the IASB issues an exposure draft it invites the public to make written comment on 
matters proposed in the draft. The invitation is presented as a series of questions for 
stakeholders to answer. In the four exposure drafts identified for this research, each question 
was assessed for its applicability to the disclosure of derivatives transactions and for its 
ability to provide evidence of stakeholder preferences on the analytical constructs. 
Accordingly, questions about how items are classified, mandatory guidance and proposed 
effective dates were not selected. All other questions identified as relevant to derivatives were 
included in the analysis. Comment letters for each exposure draft were obtained from the 
IASB. Duplicates and letters incorrectly filed by the IASB were not counted in the sample. 
Table 6.3 shows the documents that comprise the sample and the wording of the questions 
selected from each exposure draft.  
The sample comprised proposals by the IASB that substantively amended the disclosures 
relevant to derivatives. The relevant disclosures were identified and explained in Section 4.1. 
There was a risk that disclosures identified as relevant to derivatives were also relevant to 
other financial instruments. Letters from stakeholders concerning these disclosures may 
therefore not be in relation to derivatives. That there was no way to reliably identify and 
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remove such respondents from the sample is a limitation. However, such a stakeholder is also 
arguing for an outcome that will affect companies that disclose in relation to their derivatives. 
Table 6.3  Sample for document analysis 
Date a Document Questions b 
March 2004 IAS 32 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosure and Presentation 
 
Questions 3: Is the proposed disclosure of a 
sensitivity analysis practicable for all entities?  
If not, why not?  
Question 6: Do you agree that the disclosures 
proposed by the draft IFRS should be part of the 
financial statements? If not, why not? 
July 2004 
 
Exposure Draft ED 7 Financial 
Instruments: Disclosures 
 
 
Comment letters (99 letters) 
 
 
August 2005 
 
IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures issued 
 
October 2008 Exposure draft ED/2008/10 
Improving disclosures about 
financial instruments 
Questions 3(a): Do you agree with the proposals in 
paragraph 27B to require expanded disclosures 
about the fair value measurements recognised in the 
statement of financial position? If not, why? 
Question 4: Do you agree with the proposal in 
paragraph 39(a) to require entities to disclose a 
maturity analysis for derivative financial liabilities 
based on how the entity manages the liquidity risk 
associated with such instruments? If not, why?  
 
  
 
 
Comment letters (88 letters) 
 
 
March 2009 
 
 
 
Improving Disclosures about 
Financial Instruments 
(Amendments to IFRS 7) issued 
 
April 2009 Exposure draft ED/2009/3 
Derecognition 
Question 11: Do you agree with the proposed 
amendments to IFRS 7? If not, why?  
  
 Comment letters (114 letters) 
   
October 2010 
 
Disclosures – Transfers of 
Financial Assets (Amendments to 
IFRS 7) issued 
 
 
December 2010 Exposure draft ED/2010/13 
Hedge Accounting 
 
 
Comment letters (216 letters) 
 
Question 13(a): Do you agree with the proposed 
disclosure requirements? Why or why not?  
Question 13(b): What other disclosures do you 
believe would provide useful information (whether 
in addition to or instead of the proposed 
disclosures) and why? 
November 2013 
 
IFRS 9 Financial Instruments 
(Hedge Accounting and 
amendments to IFRS 9, IFRS 7 
and IAS 39) issued 
Note. This table identifies the documents that comprise the sample for the second study. a Date is the date the 
document was issued. b Questions show the exact wording of questions in the respective exposure drafts selected 
for analysis. 
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6.3.4 Data collection 
Accounting standards and exposure drafts 
Tables were prepared to compare the applicable disclosure standard (IAS 32 or IFRS 7) 
before each exposure draft, the proposed changes to disclosure in each exposure draft, and the 
disclosure standard after amendments from each exposure draft. Disclosure items were 
identified at the lowest level the IASB describes in an exposure draft or standard, a sub-
paragraph. Each change proposed and/or made to IFRS 7 over the ten-year period was coded 
in accordance with the three analytical constructs, as complex, uniform or commercially 
sensitive. No attempt was made to weight individual disclosure items. Tables are provided in 
the appendices as follows: 
1. Appendix C tabulates the relevant requirements of IAS 32 before ED 7 Disclosures, the 
changes proposed in ED7, and the requirements of IFRS 7 immediately after amendments 
resulting from ED7. 
2. Appendix D tabulates the relevant requirements of IFRS 7 before ED/2008/10 Improving 
Disclosures about Financial Instruments, the changes proposed in ED/2008/10, and the 
requirements of IFRS 7 immediately after amendments resulting from ED/2008/10. 
3. Appendix E tabulates the relevant requirements of IFRS 7 before ED/2009/3 
Derecognition, the changes proposed in ED/2009/3, and the requirements of IFRS 7 
immediately after amendments resulting from ED/2009/3. 
4. Appendix F tabulates the relevant requirements of IFRS 7 before ED/2010/13 Hedge 
Accounting, the changes proposed in ED/2010/13, and the requirements of IFRS 7 
immediately after amendments resulting from ED/2010/13.    
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Comment letters 
As there were 517 comment letters in the initial sample, NVivo, a software program designed 
to manage and analyse non-numerical, unstructured data (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013) was 
selected as it increases speed and improves coding reliability (Krippendorff, 2013). NVivo 
has been successfully used in similar research (e.g. Bamber & McMeeking, 2015).  
A case-file was created in NVivo for each exposure draft and related comment letters were 
attached. Variables of interest called attributes in NVivo were added to each case-file. Each 
attribute had a range of possible values that were stakeholder responses in the comment 
letters. This approach facilitated the analysis, as results could be downloaded into Excel, and 
stakeholder responses to questions sorted and filtered in different combinations. Table 6.5 
shows the NVivo coding attributes and values.  
Identifying information was collected for each comment letter to establish the type of 
stakeholder and country of origin. Following established practice (e.g. Hodder & Hopkins, 
2014), a classification hierarchy was used to resolve unclear or contradictory identifying 
information: (1) letterhead, (2) self-reference in the letter, and (3) signatory identifiable as an 
officer of a firm. In most instances, an internet search of the above clarified the classification. 
Individuals that responded but provided no affiliation were coded as ‘other/individuals.’ It is 
usual for researchers to add an additional category for respondents that may be individual 
accountants, consultants, or academics (e.g. Giner & Arce, 2012). This category does not 
form part of the analysis. Although country information was collected, it was not used, as it 
did not prove relevant to the analysis. 
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Table 6.4 NVivo coding attributes and values 
Attributes Values 
Stakeholder category Preparer – financial services  
 Preparer – non-financial services 
 Preparer industry body 
 Audit firm 
 Accounting industry body 
 User 
 Regulator 
 Individual/other 
  
Do you agree with the proposed disclosure? Yes 
 No 
Reasons for disagreement  
Responses for ED7 (Q3) Cost of disclosure a 
 No comment/other 
 
Responses for ED7 (Q6) Risk disclosures should be in MD&A b 
 No comment/other 
 
Responses for ED/2008/10 (Q3(a)) Cost of disclosure 
 Disagree with para 27B(c) 
 No comment/other 
 
Responses for ED/2009/3 Cost of disclosure 
 Disagree with para 42D(d)-(g) 
 No comment/other 
 
Responses for ED/2010/13 Cost of disclosure 
 Disagree with para 44-46 
 No comment/other 
Note. This table shows NVivo coding attributes (variables of interest) and possible values (stakeholder 
responses) about each attribute. Coding attributes and values were created separately for each exposure draft. 
aStakeholders described the proposed disclosures variously as too extensive, excessive, voluminous, 
prescriptive, onerous, or encouraging a checklist mentality. Stakeholders asked for quantitative uniform 
disclosures to be made narrative or discretionary. All such comments were concerned with the cost of providing 
the disclosures, as were direct mentions of cost. b MD&A = management discussion and analysis. 
 
The questions in each exposure draft (see Table 6.3) first asked stakeholders whether they 
agreed with proposed changes to the disclosures. Therefore, the first step was to code for 
agreement or disagreement. For three of the four exposure drafts, agreement or disagreement 
meant agreeing or disagreeing with a large suite of new disclosures. The respondents stated 
position did not always coincide with their subsequent comments. Therefore, unclear or 
contradictory responses were coded based upon whether a stakeholder’s qualification or 
disagreement was of a minor nature or seemed sufficient to indicate lack of support. This is 
Chapter 6: Research Methods  84 
 
an established approach (e.g. Bamber & McMeeking, 2015), although it is acknowledged that 
for complex issues, coding requires considerable time and judgement (Bamber & 
McMeeking, 2015). In this case, the researcher has significant experience with derivatives, 
including their disclosure. In this research, minor qualifications included requests for 
clarification or application guidance. Major qualifications that indicated disagreement 
included disagreement with a specific disclosure item, requests to make quantitative 
disclosures qualitative or optional, and comments that the proposed disclosures were overly 
prescriptive, excessive, onerous, burdensome, etc. Five examples of decisions that required 
judgement and reasons for the decisions are provided in Appendix G. 
The second part of each question in the exposure drafts (see Table 6.3) asked respondents 
why they agreed or disagreed with the proposed disclosures. Following established practice 
(e.g. Bamber & McMeeking, 2015), reasons for disagreement were identified by reading 
through the first twenty comment letters for each exposure draft, identifying commonalities, 
and creating attributes and values in NVivo to record these common viewpoints. If a common 
viewpoint emerged later in the coding, a new attribute was added and all letters were re-
coded. It is therefore likely that majority or significant minority viewpoints were identified.  
One limitation of this coding approach was that the IASB might change an exposure draft 
based on a single comment letter. The IASB might also make changes unrelated to comment 
letters. The approach taken in this research does not identify the reasons for such changes, 
had they occurred. A second limitation was that while the manual coding approach had high 
validity, it risked low reliability. However, having one person code all of the responses 
mitigated this risk, as judgement was consistently applied (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). 
Detailed coding notes were prepared for each exposure draft, documenting observations and 
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reasoning (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This also served to increase coding reliability, as 
decisions were consistently applied.24  
Some researchers have identified letter writing campaigns where large numbers of 
stakeholders have copied the response of a representative body onto their own letterhead (e.g. 
Hodder & Hopkins, 2014). No such campaigns were identified in this research. 
6.3.5 Data analysis 
Coded comment letters were downloaded from NVivo into Excel. This created a display 
matrix for each exposure draft that showed each attribute or variable of interest with a value 
(stakeholder response) entered for each comment letter. The analysis then proceeded in four 
stages. The first stage analysed lobbying behaviour and the response of the IASB to lobbying 
for each exposure draft. The second stage analysed lobbying behaviour by stakeholder 
category across the four exposure drafts. The third stage analysed types of arguments made 
by lobbyists and their effectiveness. The fourth stage identified stakeholder influence on 
IFRS 7 over the ten-year period of the analysis. 
The first stage of the analysis was by exposure draft. Proposed new disclosure items in each 
exposure draft were assessed for their relation to one or more of the three analytical 
constructs. Agree/disagree responses from stakeholders to questions asked in each exposure 
draft identified lobbying activity. Stakeholder reasons for opposition to disclosures were 
summarised. Changes to proposed disclosures following public consultation were identified 
and associated, where appropriate, to lobbying activity. 
                                                 
24 Inter-coder reliability is often tested in team research. For interpretive research with only one coder there is 
little benefit in having a second person code data as a test of reliability (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013; Krippendorff, 
2013). Instead, what becomes important is “that the coder records the way he or she is thinking about the data, 
keeps track of decisions made, and builds a case supported by the data for the conclusions reached” (Bazeley & 
Jackson, 2013, p. 93).  
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The second stage of the analysis was by stakeholder category. For each stakeholder category, 
agree/disagree responses identified in the first analysis were summarised. Reasons given for 
disagreement with proposed disclosures in each exposure draft were identified and connected 
to the propositions and analytical constructs. This analysis answered sub-research question 
3.1, which asked which disclosure characteristics different stakeholder groups preferred. 
Where necessary, comment letters were re-read and detailed notes and summaries were 
prepared to support the analyses.  
For the third stage of the analysis, the reasons stakeholders gave for disagreement with 
proposed disclosures from the first and second analysis, were identified as either technical (to 
do with implementation), conceptual (to do with Conceptual Framework principles), or 
economic consequences (to do with cost) (e.g. Giner & Arce, 2012). The effectiveness of 
each type of argument was assessed for influencing the IASB. 
For the fourth and final stage of the analysis, changes to the disclosure characteristics of IFRS 
7 over the period (see coding in Appendices C to F) were summarised and compared to the 
propositions validated in the second stage of analysis. This answered research question 3, 
which asked whether the disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 were designed to meet the needs 
of users or preferred the needs of another stakeholder group. All documents used in the 
analysis were uploaded into NVivo and securely backed up on the QUT server.  
6.4 Summary 
This chapter explained the research design and methods for the two studies that comprise this 
research. Chapter 7 provides the results of the first study, which used interviews with bank 
analysts. Chapter 8 provides the results of the second study, a content analysis of IFRS 7 and 
related documents. 
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CHAPTER 7 STUDY ONE - RESULTS25 
Chapter 6 described the research methods for the two studies that together answer the 
research questions and meet the objective of this research: to explore whether the derivatives 
disclosures required by IFRS 7 provide users with information that is decision-useful, and to 
the extent that they do not, identify possible reasons. This chapter presents the results of the 
first study in which bank analysts were interviewed to obtain their views. Section 7.1 reviews 
the research questions and interview questions. Sections 7.2 presents the analysts’ responses 
to the first interview question, Section 7.3 presents the analysts’ responses to the second 
interview question, and Section 7.4 discusses the implications of the findings.    
7.1 Research Questions 
In the first study, 16 bank analysts were interviewed to answer two research questions. The 
first research question concerned what is presently required under IFRS 7. The second 
research question concerned what is not in IFRS 7 that might be useful to users. The research 
questions were: 
RQ1 Do the disclosures for derivatives made under IFRS 7 fulfil their purpose by meeting 
the decision making needs of users, and if not, why not? 
RQ2 To the extent that the disclosures for derivatives required by IFRS 7 are not useful, 
what disclosures would be more useful? 
                                                 
25 Material presented in this chapter has been published in Bean and Irvine (2015). 
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The first interview question corresponded to the first research question and defined the 
decision-usefulness of the disclosures in accordance with IFRS 7. The interview question 
therefore paralleled the two high level objectives of IFRS 7 described in Section 4.1.  
 Objective 1
Significance of 
derivatives for financial 
position and 
performance
Objective 2
Nature and extent of off- 
balance sheet risk and 
how those risks are 
managed
 
Analysts were asked, ‘To what extent do the disclosures in annual reports allow you to (1) 
evaluate the significance of derivatives to an entity’s financial position and performance, (2) 
understand the nature and extent of their risk, and (3) understand an entity’s practices and 
processes for managing that risk?’ The second interview question corresponded to the second 
research question and analysts were asked, ‘How do you think the disclosures required in 
IFRS 7 for derivatives could be improved, if at all?’ 
7.2 First Interview Question 
In response to the first interview question, analysts saw the disclosures produced in 
accordance with IFRS 7 as a useful starting point, and all confirmed that they do read their 
clients’ annual reports. At a minimum, the accounts show open positions at year-end, which 
nine of the analysts believed provided some idea of the significance of derivatives to a 
company’s operations, consistent with the first objective of IFRS 7. These analysts 
considered the ability to identify the significance of derivatives for financial position and 
performance to be important, even subject to the limitations later identified. For example, it 
allows them to identify whether the derivatives a company holds at year-end seem 
appropriate for its business model. It enables them to look for red flags, that is, things that 
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don’t stack up. One senior analyst (SA14) observed that sometimes there was sufficient 
information for preliminary benchmarking of a client against its industry peers and 
competitors. 
The majority of analysts identified two limitations affecting the usefulness of the disclosures 
in response to the first interview question. Both relate to the second objective of IFRS 7, 
which states that users should be able to understand an entity’s risk and their practices and 
processes for managing that risk. These issues are discussed in the next three sub-sections. 
Sub-section 7.2.1 addresses the issue the analysts spent the most time discussing, the generic 
nature of the disclosures about risk and risk management usually provided by companies. The 
second limitation, analysts’ identification of a potentially misleading end-of-year focus in 
many annual reports is discussed in sub-section 7.2.2. The analysts also talked about why 
they believed their clients did not provide disclosures that were more useful. This is discussed 
in sub-section 7.2.3. 
7.2.1 The disclosures are generic 
The majority of the analysts (14) were dissatisfied with the superficial or generic nature of 
disclosures.  
Part of the reason why I was interested in having this interview with you was 
because we actually do find it quite difficult to work out what the risks are for 
companies, just purely from public disclosures. (SA13) 
…the financial statements in general, are a very poor reflection of the risk 
management practices that are actually being used. (A10) 
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I don’t think they’re particularly useful because of them being quite the same 
across different businesses. (A9) 
Analysts emphasised that reading about companies’ policies and processes for identifying, 
measuring, and managing risks provides them with some idea of management’s 
understanding and sophistication in this area, which is important when dealing with 
derivatives. Further, analysts considered narrative disclosures essential to their ability to 
understand the quantitative information provided about risk exposures. 
In terms of quantitative risk disclosures, six analysts noted that for sensitivity analyses of 
market risk most companies use a 1%, 5%, or 10% change in the risk variable irrespective of 
how realistic these changes might be. Of these, two said they still found this disclosure useful 
and four did not. 
I’ve seen 10% and I think I’ve seen 5% but they’re generally – look it’s an 
exercise for them, they need to tick a box. (A2) 
These comments by analysts about generic disclosures are consistent with concern from 
practitioners identified in Section 4.1, that disclosures are growing in length while decreasing 
in informativeness (FRC, 2009, 2011; Hoogervorst, 2013; IASB, 2008a, 2008b; KPMG, 
2011). The analysts’ comments also support the IASB’s disclosure recommendations in the 
discussion paper, A Review of the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (IASB, 
2013b). The discussion paper called for preparers to see financial statements as a form of 
communication guided by standards, as opposed to a “mechanism whose sole purpose is 
compliance with specific requirements of Standards” (IASB, 2013b para. 7.49). 
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7.2.2 Misleading end of period focus 
The second limitation to the usefulness of the disclosures identified by nine of the 16 analysts 
was a perception that companies tend not to properly disclose their intra-period activity. The 
analysts believed that if or when activity during the year differed from year-end positions, 
companies in many cases either ignored these differences or else addressed them using 
generic narrative. Nine analysts said they had direct knowledge of companies doing this.   
For all you know, the day before, they’ve reduced their positions dramatically 
for their end of year reporting and then the following day, put them all back on 
again – and this absolutely happens. Companies manage their derivatives. 
(SA6) 
… if I looked at any type of public company, probably 80% of the time I’d 
presume they only use very vanilla derivatives, but the reality is … [the] non-
vanilla stuff it’s not there at year end, and that’s common practice in 
companies; to use those other instruments in between period-ends. (SA11) 
Some analysts linked this issue to the strict definitions of hedges in IAS 39 that may not 
match companies’ economic reality, explaining that they had observed clients closing out 
positions before year-end to avoid disadvantageous accounting treatments.  
I think that behaviour is driven more by the restrictions in the current hedge 
accounting standards. Meaning that some businesses – no, not just some – 
many businesses that hedge look to the accounting standards to determine 
what sort of hedging they can use … Those tools might not get them the 
economic outcomes they want so they utilise different derivatives throughout 
the year to provide them with the exposure they really want. (A9) 
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… a lot of our clients are happy to use purchase options … often this is 
considered the best form of risk management because you are protected [from 
losses greater than the premium paid] with only gain on the upside. But a lot of 
them will not have the options unexpired at year end. They clearly tell us we 
don’t want this at year-end. So they would transact options during the year and 
a couple of days before year end … close out everything. (SA12) 
The high-level aim of the new hedge accounting model in IFRS 9 is to better align 
companies’ risk management practices with accounting outcomes, which may alleviate this 
problem. However, while it is possible that companies will find the new model more 
responsive to their needs, onerous hedging rules were not the sole reason given for the end of 
year focus of the accounts. Active decisions by audited companies to avoid disclosure were 
also mentioned by analysts. 
There’s also strategy … [for example, using] the benefits of optionality to 
enhance a rate and then they close that out to ensure they don’t carry any of 
these structured products over the year-end. (SA12) 
We do a bit of work with a very innovative treasury in the manufacturing 
sector and they're very aggressive. They do a lot of things like selling 
optionality … to boost their hedge rates and all that. They've got a policy 
around it, so they’re not just [being] all very gung-ho about it. It's all within 
policy. But when you contrast that with what's disclosed in the financial 
statements, it's a far cry from that. So it's very innocuous in the financial 
statements, but in practice, and in reality, they're progressive, very aggressive. 
(A10) 
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If these perceptions accurately reflect practice, the non-disclosure of intra-period activity is 
concerning, whatever the reason. IFRS 7 specifically states that users must be able to evaluate 
“the nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments to which the entity is 
exposed during the period and at the end of the reporting period” (IASB, 2005 para.1(b) 
emphasis added). Prior research has suggested that non-bank companies’ use of derivatives 
for risk management is affected by the accounting treatment (Bodnar & Gebhardt, 1999; 
Glaum & Klöcker, 2011; Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 2011), and year-end window dressing for 
various reasons has been observed with banks (Allen & Saunders, 1992; Jones, 2011; Owens 
& Wu, 2014). However, existing research does not appear to identify that non-banks may be 
using derivatives, either for risk management or for speculation intra-period, without 
disclosing them.  
When asked how they think companies avoid making these required disclosures, analysts 
blamed the use of generic descriptions in the narrative. 
They will just cover that by saying ‘we sometimes transact FX options.’ 
(SA11) 
That's what those one-liners around ‘the company has used FX forwards and 
options to manage such and such risk, no such derivatives are outstanding at 
year end’, that's where that comes from. But literally, those are one-liners in 
my experience. (SA13) 
If these comments by analysts accurately portray practice, effectively avoiding disclosure by 
the use of broad-brush statements is not in the spirit of the accounting standard. By not 
making these activities clear, companies are essentially either overstating or understating 
their risk. For example, if companies are not disclosing that they are economically hedging a 
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portion of their budgeted foreign currency revenue, they are implicitly overstating their 
exposure to foreign exchange risk. As one analyst pointed out, it would not be a particularly 
onerous requirement to ask companies to disclose information such as notional amounts 
bought and sold by type of instrument during the year, and would not require any change to 
the accounting standard. (SA11) 
7.2.3 Reasons for uninformative disclosures 
Many of the analysts offered opinions based upon their interactions with clients as to why 
they believed companies seem to have so much difficulty with the disclosures required by 
IFRS 7. Most commonly mentioned was companies’ over-use of audit firms’ example 
financial statements, which they variously linked to companies’ belief that risk information is 
commercially sensitive; that companies may lack formal risk management policies, meaning 
they have nothing specific to disclose; and poor understanding of derivatives and risk by 
auditors and company accountants.  
Over-use of audit firms example financial statements 
Eight analysts suggested that audit firms allow companies to use boilerplate statements and 
mentioned companies copying the Big 4 example financial statements in this context. 
The accounting firms let companies get away with being so generic … I can 
tell you word for word what’s in their disclosures … and it’ll be something 
pulled out of the standard financial accounts. (SA11) 
It's almost like there's a cut and paste club amongst a lot of the financial 
reporting fraternity [laughs] that say, yes, these are the words that we can use 
to satisfy the requirements. (SA15) 
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That “financial reports provide evidence of auditors not being willing to exercise professional 
judgment” is an issue previously raised with the IASB (IASB, 2013a, p. 7). In turn, the IASB 
has suggested risk aversion may explain a compliance focused approach by auditors and 
preparers (Hoogervorst, 2013). 
Information may be considered commercially sensitive 
Nine analysts talked about the potential commercial sensitivity of risk information. Of these, 
eight believed that companies restrict information on risk management in the notes if or when 
they consider it commercially sensitive.  
…but I'm sure there's a degree of commercial practice in so far as you want to 
protect what your strategies might be. (A10) 
…most companies we deal with, they'll just keep to the standard and, I mean, 
they'll keep the full proper disclosure, but some of these matters might be 
commercially sensitive as well as, uncompetitive, so it's… (SA7) 
However, there is an alternative view that at the high level such information could 
conceivably be included in an annual report, the information is not likely to be proprietary 
(Lee, 2012; Ryan, 2012). In several cases where the interviewer suggested this possibility, the 
analysts retreated from their sympathy with this viewpoint, agreeing that:  
I think there is, there's definitely a gap there that needs to be filled in, and I 
think it is possible to do that without giving away internal intellectual property. 
(SA5) 
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Companies lack formal risk management policies 
Six analysts observed they did not believe many companies actually had detailed risk 
management policies and offered this as a possible reason for over reliance upon generic 
wording from audit firms’ example financial statements. 
One thing that continues to surprise us is the number of companies whose 
boards actually don’t have a formal treasury policy – and I’d say it’s 
increasing. (SA14) 
We can't discount the situation where clients actually don't have any policies in 
place. You'd be very surprised … So the ambiguous disclosures you get in the 
financial statements may actually be accurate! (A10) 
This is consistent with previous evidence that of Australia’s top 100 companies, the top 50 
are more likely to have properly documented policies and internal controls over derivatives 
than the bottom 50 (Matolcsy & Petty, 2001), potentially leaving any number of smaller 
listed companies without appropriate documentation of their strategies for risk management.  
Accountants and auditors don’t understand derivatives 
Four analysts suggested that the use of generic templates, perhaps based upon standard 
financial statements, occurs because members of audit teams do not understand derivatives 
and risk any more than the corporate accountants who prepare the notes.   
I must admit I see … [our] amateur clients sitting with the auditor, and they 
seem to be very young, fresh-faced people who are not sure what sort of 
questions they're asking. [I don’t know] whether they're just … ticking boxes. 
(SA15) 
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Concerning, but not necessarily surprising, is the possibility that accountants and auditors are 
out of their depth as derivatives increase in complexity. This has previously been raised in the 
literature (Le Guyader, 2013; Sikka, 2009). 
7.3 Second Interview Question 
The second interview question asked whether the analysts had any views on how they would 
like to see the disclosures improved beyond the current requirements of IFRS 7. In most 
cases, analysts referred back to matters already discussed, such as wanting better quality 
disclosures that are more company specific and informative. However, one new issue did 
stand out: analysts’ inability to identify overall or economic risk from the current disclosures. 
7.3.1 Disclosure of material economic risks and risk management 
Seven of the analysts believed that IFRS 7 should require disclosures that provide a better 
view of companies’ material risk and risk management activities. As outlined in Section 4.1, 
IFRS 7 requires disclosure of risk arising from financial instruments and separate disclosures 
on hedging arrangements that qualify for hedge accounting treatment. What IFRS 7 does not 
specifically require, however, is the disclosure of economic hedges or natural hedges. When a 
company enters into a transaction using derivatives for the purpose of risk management that 
does not qualify under the strict rules for hedge accounting, this is an economic hedge. Any 
such derivative would be classified as ‘held for trading’ under IAS 39 and it can be very 
difficult to identify its purpose as an economic hedge (Ernst & Young, 2008). A natural 
hedge arises when in the ordinary course of its business a company has positions that offset 
each other. A simple example might be foreign currency bank accounts naturally offsetting 
the currency risk of foreign currency accounts payable. Own contracts, forecasted 
transactions, and firm commitments, as well as net assets and profits and losses of foreign 
subsidiaries are also excluded, as they are outside of the scope of IAS 39 (Ernst & Young, 
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2008). There is consequently no requirement for a company to disclose the extent of its risk 
and risk management activities in any economic sense. Under current IFRS, risks, and 
especially hedging, are primarily accounting constructs. 
Three of the analysts used foreign exchange risk as an example of a risk that they were 
interested in because it is often material for Australian companies. 
From our point of view we have to talk to the customer to get a full 
understanding of what FX exposures they’ve actually got – that company may 
have payables and receivables, [which] equals [a] natural hedge, but it 
certainly won’t be 100% offset. There’ll still be some FX exposure and I don’t 
believe when I look at the notes I can tell what that is. Then they’ve got other 
currencies and cross currencies, and then AUD as functional currency … 
looking at this very small note that talks about some FX hedging or FX swaps 
that are currently entered into at the balance date; that doesn’t give you a 
perspective of the year. It gives you no perspective of what the FX risk is on 
an on-going basis without going to the customer. Gives no idea what … 
they’re doing to protect against volatility during the year. (SA14) 
Others made the point that risk is not just about derivatives and financial instruments that are 
within the scope of IAS 39 and IFRS 7: 
A transport company for example, uses a lot of diesel, so they're exposed to 
diesel price risk, but what if, in their transport contracts with customers, they 
pass that diesel price risk through contractually. They've effectively hedged 
that risk and that might be – that might turn up in the notes to the accounts. It 
might not. (SA16) 
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What is particularly interesting about these comments, which were unprompted by the 
interviewer, is how closely they align with views expressed in research conducted by 
practice. For example, Ernst & Young (2008) noted that reconciling market risk disclosures 
with economic risk is difficult due to transactions falling outside the scope of IFRS 7. The 
CFA Institute in the UK (Papa & Peters, 2011, p. 2) recommended that companies “should 
provide an executive summary that distils key information on entity-wide risk exposures and 
effectiveness of risk management practices across different risk types.” Standard setters must 
use judgement to strike a balance between sufficient levels of mandatory disclosure and 
imposition of costs. However, the adoption of IFRS 9, with its expanded hedging model and 
hedging disclosures based upon type of risk rather than type of hedge, perhaps provides an 
opportunity for companies to reflect on how they might link the disclosure of their hedging 
activities to their disclosure of financial risks. 
7.4 Discussion and Implications 
In response to the first research question, analysts identified poor disclosure quality limited 
the usefulness of information provided by companies in their annual reports. In particular, the 
analysts were dissatisfied with information provided about off balance sheet risk. In response 
to the second research question, the analysts again drew attention to companies’ disclosure of 
off balance sheet risk and asked that IFRS 7 mandate a more integrated disclosure of 
economic risk. In both cases, the analysts identified issues connected to the second objective 
of IFRS 7, which requires companies to provide information about the nature and extent of 
risks arising from financial instruments. 
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Objective 2
Nature and extent of off- 
balance sheet risk and 
how those risks are 
managed
 Objective 1
Significance of 
derivatives for financial 
position and 
performance
P Î
 
The first interview question sought perceptions from sophisticated users of financial 
statements about the usefulness of the disclosures for derivatives. The analysts interviewed 
indicated that although the disclosures are useful to some extent, they tend to be prepared in a 
way that is generic and uninformative and focuses upon year-end positions to the detriment of 
any real understanding of risk and risk management practices. The analysts’ responses to this 
question suggest that preparers may increase user satisfaction by making their existing 
disclosures less generic and more company specific. Given that concerns about the high cost 
of financial instruments disclosures have been identified in previous research (Johansen & 
Plenborg, 2013), this research may serve to alleviate those concerns. The interviews with 
analysts revealed little demand for non-banks to increase quantitative disclosure or undertake 
more advanced modelling that would be complex and therefore costly. 
The perception that companies tend to disclose only end of year positions that may not be 
representative of transactions during the year was the second key issue identified in response 
to the first interview question. This problem was highlighted as one aspect in the collapse of 
Lehmann Bros and has been well-documented for samples of banks (Allen & Saunders, 1992; 
Owens & Wu, 2014). To the extent that companies do hold different positions during the year 
than at year-end, the inclusion of notional amounts by type of instrument traded may be a 
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partial solution, and for most companies it would be relatively simple to provide this 
information.26 It would also not require any change to IFRS 7. 
In order to encourage companies to improve the informativeness of their disclosures, it is 
helpful to identify possible sources of resistance. Identifying an over reliance upon the 
example financial statements promulgated by audit firms, some analysts suggested that 
resistance to more informative disclosure might revolve around perceptions that information 
is commercially sensitive. The responses of the analysts when challenged on this viewpoint 
indicate potential benefits from educating preparers. Some analysts claimed that they 
observed their clients using derivatives without clearly documented strategies, limits, and 
internal controls. This would presumably have an effect upon a company’s ability to explain 
its risk management strategy in the footnotes, and if widespread, could have important 
implications for company directors and auditors (e.g. Drummond, 2005). Some analysts 
believed a lack of understanding of derivatives and risk by both auditors and company 
accountants is a reason for companies to favour generic disclosures that are overly reliant 
upon audit firms’ example financial statements. The audit of derivatives frequently focuses 
on review procedures (Gniewosz, Fargher, & Simnett, 2001), which are likely to be 
ineffective if not conducted by an auditor with the relevant knowledge of the area.  
The response by the analysts in this study to the second interview question provides support 
to research conducted by practice (Ernst & Young, 2008; Papa & Peters, 2011, 2013) and 
indicates that usefulness could be improved if companies disclose their material risks in a 
more integrated way than is currently required under IFRS 7. While suggesting a need for 
                                                 
26 An alternative sometimes suggested is for companies to report average positions during the period; however, 
not all companies currently revalue their positions regularly (Matolcsy & Petty, 2001) or update their hedge 
accounting, which might increase the cost of this approach. 
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further research in this area, these findings reinforce the conclusion of Johansen and Plenborg 
(2013) that companies should not underestimate user demand for this information. 
This research also provides insights into how banks use the disclosures for derivatives. Most 
notable is the extent to which the analysts seem to focus upon qualitative disclosures. They 
use them to draw preliminary conclusions about the competence and sophistication of 
managements’ risk strategies. Analysts made it clear that the numbers mean little without an 
information ecosystem to support them (Lee, 2012). This is different to studies that suggest 
analysts prefer quantitative, tabular disclosures (Campbell & Slack, 2008; Papa & Peters, 
2011) and may reflect the dominant view of sell-side analysts in other research. Within 
financial risk, analysts focused on particular material risk categories, such as foreign 
currency, and identified the need for disclosures that provide insight into the overall risk in 
these areas. Analysts also used disclosures to identify red flags, that is, excessive or 
insufficient hedging, instruments that are inconsistent with other companies in the industry, 
or speculation.  
7.5 Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the first study that answered the first two research 
questions. Chapter 8 presents the results of the second study, an analysis of IFRS 7 and 
related documents, and answers the third research question and sub-research question.
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CHAPTER 8 STUDY TWO - RESULTS 
Chapter 7 presented the results of the first study based upon interviews with bank analysts. 
This chapter presents the results of the second study, a content analysis of documents relating 
to IFRS 7. Section 8.1 reviews the research questions. Section 8.2 provides a description of 
the characteristics of the stakeholders that responded to invitations to comment on the 
exposure drafts for IFRS 7. Section 8.3 presents the results of the first stage of analysis 
explained in Section 6.3.5, the analysis by exposure draft. Section 8.4 discusses the results of 
the second stage, the analysis by stakeholder category. Section 8.5 examines the results of the 
third stage, the analysis by type of argument and effectiveness. Section 8.6 presents the 
results of the fourth and final stage, the analysis of the characteristics of IFRS 7. Section 8.7 
provides an overall discussion of the results and Section 8.8 considers their implications.  
8.1 Research Questions 
The objective of the second study was to identify whether IFRS 7 is designed to meet the 
needs of users, or by design, preferences the needs of another stakeholder group. The 
research comprised a content analysis of exposure drafts and comment letters written to the 
IASB by stakeholders over the ten-year period from 2004 to 2014. The research question 
was: 
RQ3 Are the disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 designed to meet the needs of users, or do 
they preference the needs of another stakeholder group? 
Relatively little is known about the specific disclosure preferences of some stakeholder 
categories. In order to answer research question 3, a sub-research question was added, 
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SRQ3.1 What disclosure characteristics do different stakeholder groups prefer? 
8.2 Stakeholder Characteristics 
As shown in Table 6.3, the IASB received 517 comment letters in response to the exposure 
drafts included in the analysis. Of these, 459 respondents answered the six questions about 
disclosure also shown in Table 6.3.27 Table 8.1 shows the 459 comment letters grouped by 
stakeholder category.  
Table 8.1 Descriptive information for comment letters by stakeholder affiliation 
Affiliation subgroup Number 
Overall 
percent 
(%) 
ED7 ED/2008/10 ED/2009/3 ED/2010/13 
Preparers 
    
  Financial firms 87 19% 17 10 24 36 
Non-financial firms 69 15% 5 10 5 49 
Industry groups 100 22% 33 16 15 36 
Sub-total 256 56% 55 36 44 121 
   
    Users 
    
  Investors/advisors 11 2% 1 5 2 3 
     
  Accounting profession 
  Audit firms 28 6% 5 6 7 10 
Industry groups 75 17% 20 19 16 20 
Sub-total 103 23% 25 25 23 31 
       
Regulators 78 17% 15 20 20 23 
     
 
 
Other/individuals 11 2% 1 1 0 9 
       TOTAL 459 100% 97 87 89 186 
Note. This table reports information about the affiliations of 459 stakeholders that answered questions regarding 
disclosures affecting derivative financial instruments in ED7, ED/2008/10, ED/2009/3, and ED/2010/13. 
 
  
                                                 
27 No assumptions were made about the views of respondents that did not answer questions on proposed 
disclosure amendments and they were excluded from the analysis. 
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Users have tended not to contribute to the formal standard setting process for reasons of cost 
(Georgiou, 2010; Sutton, 1984), but also because they rely upon their professional bodies to 
represent them (Georgiou, 2010). Users submitted only 2% of letters in this study, and all 
were industry bodies representing either analysts or institutional investors. 
Preparers were much more likely to write comment letters, submitting 56% of letters. This is 
consistent with prior literature (Chatham et al., 2010; Giner & Arce, 2012; Hodder & 
Hopkins, 2014; Jorissen et al., 2012, 2013). Preparers were the listed, often multi-national 
companies that prepare their financial statements in accordance with international accounting 
standards. Although financial companies (banks, insurance companies etc.) wrote more 
letters than non-financial companies, both categories were well represented at 19% and 15% 
respectively. 
Letters from audit firms were from the Big 4 firms that responded to each exposure draft, and 
some mid-tier firms. There is little research evidence on audit firms’ choice to participate in 
standard setting, although it would be reasonable to presume that they consider cost-benefit, 
as well as their expectation of influencing outcomes (Durocher & Fortin, 2011). It therefore 
follows that larger firms have the expertise required to participate in a complex subject such 
as financial instruments and it is also larger firms that are most affected by the requirements 
of international standards through their listed clients. Audit firms and accounting industry 
bodies represented 23% of letters written. 
The majority of regulators that submitted letters were national standard setters, although this 
group also included stock exchanges, central banks, securities commissions, and 
supranational bodies such as the IOSCO and EFRAG. Regulators wrote 17% of all letters. 
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Those categorised as individuals and others provided no information about their affiliations. 
Representing 2% of letters, internet searches provided no conclusive results on name 
searches. 
8.3 Results by Exposure Draft 
This section presents the results of the first stage of analysis explained in Section 6.3.5, the 
analysis by exposure draft. Proposed new disclosure items in each exposure draft were 
assessed for their relation to one or more of the three analytical constructs.28 Agree/disagree 
responses from stakeholders to questions asked in each exposure draft identified the direction 
of lobbying activity. Stakeholder opposition to specific disclosures and stated reasons were 
summarised. Changes to proposed disclosures following public consultation were identified 
and compared to lobbying activity.  
8.3.1  ED 7 Financial instruments: Disclosures 
From 1998, IAS 32 had been the disclosure standard for financial instruments, supplemented 
by industry standard IAS 30 for banks and regulated financial institutions. Recognising the 
increasing exposure of non-banks to the kind of risks traditionally associated with the 
financial services sector (IASB, 2004), in 2004 the IASB exposed ED 7 Financial 
Instruments: Disclosures. ED 7 was a proposed new standard that would replace both IAS 32 
and IAS 30. ED 7 increased the disclosure of risk and risk management for all companies, 
and reduced flexibility and disclosure choice. One substantial new disclosure proposed in ED 
7 was a sensitivity analysis of market risk. The proposed sensitivity analysis of market risk 
was a complex disclosure that required estimation and judgement.  
                                                 
28 The analytical constructs are uniform, complex and commercially sensitive disclosures (Section 6.3.2). 
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Of the 99 responses to the exposure draft, 97 respondents answered two questions concerning 
the disclosure of market risk. The IASB asked questions about the sensitivity analysis and 
about its location within the annual report. Question 3 in the exposure draft asked whether 
stakeholders agreed that the proposed sensitivity analysis of market risk was practicable for 
all entities. Question 6 asked whether risk disclosures, including the proposed sensitivity 
analysis, should be part of the audited financial statements. Table 8.2 combines the responses 
from question 3 and question 6 to show the number of stakeholders that agreed/disagreed 
there should be a sensitivity analysis of market risk and that it should be in the audited notes 
of the financial statements.  
Table 8.2 Comment letter responses for ED 7 
Stakeholder category Number 
Overall 
percent (%) 
Agree % Disagree % 
Preparers       
Financial firms 17 18% 2 12% 15 88% 
Non-financial firms 5 5% 1 20% 4 80% 
Industry groups 33 34% 6 18% 27 82% 
Sub-total 55 57% 9 16% 46 84% 
       
Users       
Investors/advisors 1 1% 1 100%  0% 
       
Accounting profession 
Audit firms 5 5% 1 20% 4 80% 
Industry groups 20 21% 3 15% 17 85% 
Sub-total 25 26% 4 16% 21 84% 
       
Regulators 15 15% 8 53% 7 47% 
       
Individuals/other 1 1%  0% 1 100% 
       
TOTAL 97 100% 22 23% 75 77% 
Note. This table reports information by stakeholder affiliation for 97 comment letters submitted to the IASB that 
responded to questions 3 and 6 in exposure draft ED7. Results are for combined responses to question 3 and 6 in 
ED 7. Question 3 asked whether respondents agreed that the proposed sensitivity analysis of market risk was 
practicable for all entities. Question 6 asked whether risk disclosures, should be part of the audited financial 
statements. Question 3 x 6 therefore identifies how many respondents agreed/disagreed that there should be a 
sensitivity analysis of market risk and that risk information should be included in the audited financial 
statements. 
 
Table 8.2 shows that a majority of preparers (84%) opposed the inclusion of a sensitivity 
analysis in the financial statements. Audit firms aligned with their clients in opposing a 
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disclosure that was complex, requiring estimation and judgment (80%). Accounting industry 
groups shared this view (85%). One user responded to the invitation to comment and 
supported the new disclosure. Regulators supported the new disclosure (53%) taking a user 
perspective in favour of increased transparency.   
Analysis of the reasons why stakeholders opposed the disclosures showed that of the 75 
(77%) respondents across all categories that opposed the proposals 52 (53%) said that the 
sensitivity analysis would be impractical, if not irrelevant, for entities that do not use this 
method as part of their internal management process, and/or requested a less prescriptive 
approach. These objections referenced the cost of the disclosure.29 Fifty-nine (79%), believed 
that risk disclosures should not be audited. 
While we understand the users’ needs for a sensitivity analysis, we consider 
that the Board should recognise that such analysis is cumbersome to prepare 
for industrial and commercial enterprises that generally do not have the same 
sophisticated systems and staff nor the same analysis methods and formats as 
financial institutions. Therefore, such disclosures should be limited to a 
summary of the sensitivity analysis prepared internally for management. If an 
enterprise does not prepare a sensitivity analysis, it should disclose this fact. 
(CL40 Nestlé S.A., Vevey Switzerland) 
IASB response following ED7 
Appendix C compares the disclosure requirements of IAS 32 with the proposals contained in 
ED 7, and IFRS 7 when it was issued in 2005. For the sensitivity analysis of market risk, one 
                                                 
29 In comment letters, stakeholders variously described proposed disclosures as too extensive, excessive, 
voluminous, prescriptive, onerous, or encouraging a checklist mentality. They asked for quantitative uniform 
disclosures to be made narrative or discretionary. The usefulness of disclosures to users was questioned (a 
cost/benefit argument). All such comments are concerned with the cost of providing the disclosures, as are 
direct mentions of cost. 
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substantive change made by the IASB following public comment was to replace a 
requirement to quantify the effect when the analysis is unrepresentative of the risk inherent in 
financial instruments (a complex disclosure item) with a requirement to explain (a narrative 
disclosure item). This is connected to one of the limitations of the disclosures identified by 
bank analysts in the first study: that year-end balances are not necessarily representative of 
intra-period transactions and companies may not clearly disclose this. The change does not 
appear to be associated with the comment letters. The IASB did not respond to significant 
opposition to the proposed sensitivity analysis from preparers (84%) and the accounting 
profession (84%). Arguments that market risk disclosure requirements were not practicable or 
that risk information was more suited to the unaudited management commentary were not 
effective.  
8.3.2  ED/2008/10 Improving disclosures about financial instruments 
In October 2008, the IASB issued exposure draft ED/2008/10 Improving Disclosures about 
Financial Instruments. Its primary objective was to improve IFRS 7 to enhance disclosures 
about valuations, methodologies, and the uncertainty associated with fair value measurements 
identified during the 2007/8 financial crisis (IASB, 2008c). Proposed changes centred upon 
the introduction of a three-level fair value disclosure hierarchy that distinguished between the 
observability of inputs used in calculating fair value.  
Of the disclosures proposed in ED/2008/10, some were existing disclosures made consistent 
with the new disclosure hierarchy. New disclosures in ED/2008/10 applicable to derivatives 
were in section 27B and included a requirement for a reconciliation of items measured using 
Level 3 inputs, a requirement to disclose movements between levels in the fair value 
hierarchy, and a requirement to disclose realised and unrealised gains and losses separately. 
The first two disclosures were uniform disclosures; however, the third requirement to 
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disclose realised and unrealised gains and losses was less clear, as it introduced questions 
about what realised and unrealised actually mean. For example, companies may not be able to 
identify realised and unrealised amounts for a derivative that has periodic exchanges of cash 
prior to settlement. This proposed disclosure was therefore complex.  
Unrelated to the fair value project, in ED/2008/10 the IASB also proposed a change to the 
disclosure of liquidity risk. Where a contractual maturity analysis had been required, the 
IASB proposed that for derivatives, the maturity analysis be prepared based upon 
management expectations. Changing one uniform disclosure to a different uniform disclosure 
prepared from information used internally by management would reduce incremental 
processing costs for preparers, without changing the nature or extent of the disclosure for 
audit purposes. If the disclosure better reflected the management of liquidity risk and 
management expectations about future cash flows, then it would also increase transparency 
for users.  
Of the 88 responses to the exposure draft, 87 answered the questions about disclosure. Table 
8.3 provides information about the comment letter responses for ED/2008/10. Panel A reports 
the results from question 3(a) which asked stakeholders whether they agreed with disclosures 
in section 27B of the exposure draft, for items measured at fair value using Level 3 inputs. 
Overall, preparers opposed the disclosures (64%) however, only 30% of non-financial firms 
opposed them, perhaps because non-financial firms have fewer Level 3 valuations (Gebhardt, 
2012) and would not bear the cost. Of six audit firms that responded, three (50%) opposed 
and three (50%) supported all of the proposed disclosures. Accounting industry groups 
(74%), users (100%), and regulators (90%) supported the disclosures. 
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Table 8.3 Comment letter responses for ED/2008/10  
Stakeholder category Number 
Overall 
percent (%) 
Agree % Disagree % 
Panel A: Comment letter responses for Q3(a) 
Preparers       
Financial firms 10 11% 3 30% 7 70% 
Non-financial firms 10 11% 7 70% 3 30% 
Industry groups 16 20% 3 19% 13 81% 
Sub-total 36 42% 13 36% 23 64% 
       
Users       
Investors/advisors 5 6% 5 100%  0% 
       
Accounting profession 
Audit firms 6 7% 3 50% 3 50% 
Industry groups 19 21% 14 74% 5 26% 
Sub-total 25 28% 17 68% 8 32% 
       
Regulators 20 23% 18 90% 2 10% 
       
Individuals/other 1 1% 1 100%  0% 
       
TOTAL 87 100% 54 63% 33 38% 
Panel B: Comment letter responses for Q4 
Preparers       
Financial firms 10 11% 10 100%  0% 
Non-financial firms 10 11% 7 70% 3 30% 
Industry groups 16 20% 15 94% 1 6% 
Sub-total 36 42% 32 89% 4 11% 
       
Users       
Investors/advisors 5 6% 4 80% 1 20% 
       
Accounting profession 
Audit firms 6 7% 6 100%  0% 
Industry groups 19 21% 17 89% 2 11% 
Sub-total 25 28% 23 92% 2 8% 
       
Regulators 20 23% 15 75% 5 25% 
       
Individuals/other 1 1% 1 100%  0% 
       
TOTAL 87 100% 75 86% 12 14% 
Note. This table reports information by stakeholder affiliation for 87 comment letters received by the IASB for 
questions 3(a) and 4 in ED/ 2008/10. Panel A reports information for question 3(a) that asked if respondents 
agreed with disclosures contained in section 27B of the exposure draft. Panel B reports information for question 
4 that asked if respondents agreed with a proposal to disclose a maturity analysis of derivative financial 
instruments. 
 
Analysis of the reasons why stakeholders opposed the disclosures showed that of the 33 
(38%) respondents across all categories that opposed the proposals, 25 (76%) requested they 
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be reduced or made less prescriptive and 16 (48%) disagreed with paragraph 27B(c) that 
required the separate disclosure of unrealised gains and losses.  
There is currently no definition in IFRSs of “realised” versus “unrealised” 
gains or losses and therefore it may be unclear which items would be included 
in the total amount of unrealised gains or losses for the period… Furthermore, 
we believe that for financial instruments with periodic cash settlements (e.g., 
interest rate swaps), these interpretive issues may be particularly pronounced 
and preparers may encounter practical difficulties and cost... (CL44 KPMG 
IFRG Limited, London UK) 
Panel B of Table 8.3 reports the results from question 4, which asked if respondents agreed 
with the proposal to disclose a maturity analysis of derivative financial instruments based on 
how companies manage liquidity risk. Preparers supported a disclosure that had lower 
incremental processing costs (89%).30 There was no economic effect for auditors from the 
proposed change and they supported their clients (100%) as did accounting industry groups 
(89%). Users (80%) and regulators (75%) supported the disclosure. Of five (25%) regulators 
that disagreed with the change, all identified a potential reduction in informativeness, 
particularly in an illiquid market such as occurred during the 2007/8 financial crisis. These 
regulators wanted information on contractual maturities retained.  
We support the proposal to disclose expected maturities of derivative financial 
liabilities on the basis that it will provide insights to users about how 
management manages liquidity risk. [However] … where markets are 
fluctuating and unstable, management’s expected values may be unrealistic 
                                                 
30 This shows preparers differentiate between disclosures that increase transparency and disclosures that increase 
processing costs, and that it is increased processing costs to which they object. 
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and, therefore, in the interests of transparency, information about maximum 
exposure may be of particular relevance. (CL3 Accounting Standards Board, 
London UK) 
IASB response following ED/2008/10 
Appendix D provides a comparison of IFRS 7 before and after exposure draft ED/2008/10. 
There were two substantive changes following public consultation on ED/2008/10, both of 
which seemed associated with lobbying. First, the IASB modified the requirement of 
paragraph 27B(c) so that companies did not have to separate unrealised gains and losses from 
total gains and losses for fair value measurements categorised within Level 3 of the fair value 
hierarchy.31 Second, in respect to question 4 on liquidity risk, the IASB added a requirement 
for companies to include information on contractual maturities of derivative financial 
liabilities where it is necessary to understand the timing of the cash flows. For question 3(a) 
the IASB did not respond to requests that the fair value disclosures in section 27B be reduced 
or made less prescriptive. 
8.3.3  ED/2009/3 Derecognition 
In April 2009, the IASB issued exposure draft ED/2009/3 Derecognition, which proposed 
amendments to both IAS 39 and IFRS 7. The exposure draft was a response to problems 
identified during the 2007/8 financial crisis particularly with regard to asset securitisations 
(IASB, 2009a). In ED/2009/3, the IASB invited comment on a number of new disclosures for 
assets that are derecognised but for which a company has continuing involvement. Contained 
in sections 42D and 42E of the exposure draft, these were mainly uniform disclosures. Two 
subsections were notable, in that they required companies to present information on 
derecognised assets as if they had not been derecognised. Companies would be required to 
                                                 
31 The IASB later reinstated this requirement in IFRS 13 (para.93 (f)). 
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disclose fair values and the methods and assumptions used in arriving at fair value (section 
42D(d)), and also provide a sensitivity analysis of the risk variables used in estimating fair 
value (section 42D(g)). Obtaining this information for assets no longer controlled would be 
potentially costly. Both of these proposed disclosures were complex, requiring estimation.  
Of the 114 responses to the exposure draft, 89 answered the question on disclosures. Table 
8.4 provides information on the comment letter responses for question 11 of ED/2009/3, 
which asked whether stakeholders agreed with the proposed disclosures for derecognised 
assets.  
Table 8.4 Comment letter responses for ED/2009/3 
Stakeholder category Number 
Overall 
percent (%) 
Agree % Disagree % 
Preparers       
Financial firms 24 27% 1 4% 23 96% 
Non-financial firms 5 5% 1 20% 4 80% 
Industry groups 15 17% 1 7% 14 93% 
Sub-total 44 49% 3 4% 41 93% 
       
Users       
Investors/advisors 2 2% 2 100%  0% 
   
Accounting profession 
Audit firms 7 8% 3 43% 4 57% 
Industry groups 16 18% 6 37% 10 63% 
Sub-total 23 26% 9 39% 14 61% 
       
Regulators 20 23% 7 35% 13 65% 
       
TOTAL 89 100% 21 24% 68 76% 
Note. This table reports information by stakeholder affiliation for 89 comment letters in response to question 11 
of exposure draft: ED/2009/3. Question 11 asked respondents if they agreed with proposed amendments with 
respect to derecognised financial assets. 
 
Preparers objected to the proposed disclosures (93%). Of seven audit firms that responded, 
three (43%) agreed with the disclosures and four (57%) disagreed. Two users that responded 
supported the disclosures (100%). Unlike previous exposure drafts, regulators did not align 
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with users in favour of increased transparency. Sixty-five percent of regulators opposed the 
disclosures, which was a preparer perspective. 
Analysis of the reasons why stakeholders opposed the disclosures showed of the 68 (76%) 
stakeholders across all categories that opposed the proposals, 62 (91%) said the disclosures 
were too extensive. Thirty respondents (44%) criticised one or both of subsections 42D (d) 
and (g). 
Although we think the disclosures should focus on the nature and extent of the 
risks associated with the entity’s continuing involvement in assets and on the 
main judgement calls made in preparing the financial statements, our 
assessment is that the proposed disclosures go beyond that. … In our view the 
proposed disclosures give the impression that they are trying to make up for a 
derecognition model that is flawed. … We do not understand why the 
disclosures about transferred financial assets that have been derecognised are 
so much more extensive than those required for transferred assets that are not 
derecognised … [We] are concerned that what then follows seems like a long 
list of disclosures, only some of which are likely to provide useful information 
in any particular circumstance. In our view lists of this kind encourage a 
checklist mentality in exactly the circumstances in which thoughtful 
implementation is needed. (CL47 European Financial Advisory Group, 
Brussels Belgium) 
IASB response following ED/2009/3 
Appendix E provides a comparison of IFRS 7 before and after exposure draft ED/2009/3. 
Following public consultation there were two substantive changes that seemed associated 
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with lobbying. These were the removal of the proposed requirement for companies to provide 
the fair value of derecognised financial assets in which they have a continuing involvement 
(section 42D (d)), and removal of the sensitivity analysis showing the possible effects of 
changes in the risk variables on those fair values (section 42D (g)). The IASB did not respond 
to objections that the proposed disclosures were too extensive. 
8.3.4  ED/2010/13 Hedge accounting 
ED/2010/13 Hedge Accounting proposed fundamental changes to the hedge accounting 
model in IAS 39 and made significant consequential changes to IFRS 7. The aim of the new 
hedge accounting model was to better align companies risk management practices with 
accounting outcomes (IASB, 2014a). To this end, the proposed model significantly expanded 
the scope of risk management activities that would qualify for hedge accounting. The 
proposed disclosures that followed from this were fundamentally different to existing 
requirements in that their starting point was the type of risk exposure rather than the type of 
hedge. The IASB also substantially increased the volume of disclosures (Figure 2.3). 
While most of the proposed new disclosures were uniform in nature, two disclosures were of 
note. First, IFRS 7 had always required companies to explain their risk management strategy. 
ED/2010/13 added a specific requirement for companies to explain their risk management 
strategy where hedge accounting was adopted (paragraph 44). Although strategic information 
can be commercially sensitive, narrative disclosures are not usually commercially sensitive 
because managers have discretion over what they say. However, ED/2010/13 added a further 
requirement in paragraph 45 for companies to quantify their risk exposures, the extent to 
which those exposures are hedged, and the effect on hedging strategy for each risk exposure. 
Taken together with paragraph 44, paragraph 45 proposed the disclosure of information that 
could be commercially sensitive for some companies. This disclosure was commercially 
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sensitive, but was uniform rather than complex, as estimation and judgement were not 
required. Second, paragraph 46 required companies to provide quantitative forward estimates 
of cash flows over the term of their hedges, which in some cases could span many years and 
could include estimating and disclosing plans for future sales, purchases, etc. Potentially 
requiring the disclosure of commercially sensitive information to competitors, paragraph 46 
was also complex, requiring estimation and judgement.  
Of the 213 responses to the exposure draft, 186 answered two questions concerning 
disclosure. Table 8.5 provides information on the comment letter responses for ED/2010/13. 
Panel A reports the results from question 13(a), which asked whether respondents agreed 
with the proposed amendments to IFRS 7 for hedge accounting. Preparers opposed the new 
disclosures (75%). Of the 10 audit firms that responded, three (30%) agreed with all of the 
disclosures and seven (70%) disagreed. The accounting industry bodies were evenly divided 
(50%). Three users that responded supported the disclosures (100%); however, regulators 
aligned with preparers and a majority (57%) opposed the disclosures.  
Analysis of the reasons why stakeholders opposed the disclosures showed that of 123 (66%) 
respondents across all categories that opposed the disclosures, 92 (74%) said that the 
disclosures were too extensive. Sixty-nine (56%) singled out paragraphs 45 and/or 46 for 
requiring the disclosure of potentially commercially sensitive information.  
Most notably, we reject the proposals outlined [in paragraph 46]. As those 
disclosures should be made for ‘each subsequent period’ and are therefore of a 
strong prognostic character, we entirely reject the current proposal to present 
such extremely sensitive information … (CL39 Daimler AG, Stuttgart 
Germany) 
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Table 8.5 Comment letter responses for ED/2010/13 
Stakeholder 
category 
Number 
Overall 
percent (%) 
Agree % Disagree % 
Panel A: Comment letter responses for Q13(a) 
Preparers       
Financial firms 36 19% 11 31% 25 69% 
Non-financial firms 49 27% 11 22% 38 78% 
Industry groups 36 19% 8 22% 28 78% 
Sub-total 121 65% 30 25% 91 75% 
       
Users       
Investors/advisors 3 2% 3 100%  0% 
   
Accounting profession 
Audit firms 10 6% 3 30% 7 70% 
Industry groups 20 11% 10 50% 10 50% 
Sub-total 30 16% 13 43% 17 57% 
       
Regulators 23 12% 10 43% 13 57% 
       
Other/individuals 9 4% 7 78% 2 22% 
       
TOTAL 186 100% 63 34% 123 66% 
Stakeholder 
category 
Number Agree  % Uniform 
Commercially 
sensitive 
 
Panel B: Comment letter responses for Q13(b) 
Preparers 
    
  Financial firms 36 1 3% 1 1  
Non-financial firms 49 4 8% 3 1  
Industry groups 36 
 
0% 
   
Sub-total 121 6 5% 4 2  
       
Users 
      
Investors/advisors 3 2 67% 
 
2  
      
Accounting profession      
Audit firms 10 5 50% 3 3  
Industry groups 20 4 20% 1 3  
Sub-total 30 10 33% 4 6  
       
Regulators 23 5 22% 3 3  
       
Other/individuals 9 2 22% 1 1  
       
TOTAL 186 25 19% 12 14  
Note. This table reports information by stakeholder affiliation for 186 comment letters for exposure draft 
ED/2010/13. Panel A reports the results to question 13(a) that asked whether stakeholders agreed with the 
proposed disclosure requirements for hedge transactions. Panel B reports results to question 13(b) that asked 
what additional disclosures respondents suggested would be useful. Additional disclosures are identified by 
analytical construct. For Panel B, numbers do not add across as some respondents requested more than one type 
of additional disclosure. 
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Question 13(b) asked respondents to suggest additional disclosures. Panel B of Table 8.5 
reports the type of disclosure requested by stakeholders in accordance with the analytical 
constructs. Requests for companies to provide more information when they rebalance a 
hedge, explain how they perform their hedge effectiveness testing, and to provide more 
information on partial hedges were all examples of requests from stakeholders for uniform 
disclosures. There were no requests for complex disclosures that require estimation and 
judgement. Stakeholder requests for commercially sensitive disclosures in Table 8.5 were for 
companies to disclose their overall risk management strategies and economic hedging 
arrangements in addition to the requirements of paragraphs 44 and 45. As expected, very few 
preparers wanted more disclosure (5%) and few regulators (22%). However, 50% of audit 
firms wanted more uniform disclosures and/or more risk management disclosures that 
companies may consider commercially sensitive, as did two of three (67%) users.  
… in paragraph 44 an entity should not only describe its risk management 
strategy for those risks it hedges but should do so for all risks - an entity that 
hedges should not have to provide more detailed disclosures. In this context, in 
the interests of producing a more cohesive framework, the IASB should 
consider disclosures in relation to financial instruments as a whole. (CL100 
Investment Management Association, London UK) 
IASB response following ED/2010/13 
Appendix F provides a comparison of IFRS 7 before and after ED/2010/13. Changes to IFRS 
7 will become effective for companies when they adopt IFRS 9 from 2018 or earlier. The 
IASB did not respond to claims from stakeholders that the proposed disclosures were too 
extensive and added more than 10 new uniform disclosure items following public 
consultation, including the disclosures requested by stakeholders in response to question 
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13(b). The IASB did not extend the risk management disclosures of paragraph 44 and 45 to 
include economic hedging activities as also requested by some stakeholders, and instead 
removed proposed paragraphs 45 and 46. The IASB replaced these paragraphs with a 
requirement to provide summary information on the notional amounts and timing of hedging 
instruments (a uniform disclosure).  
8.4 Results by Stakeholder Category 
This section presents the results of the second stage of the analysis explained in Section 6.3.5, 
the analysis by stakeholder category. For each stakeholder category, agree/disagree responses 
identified in the first analysis were summarised. Reasons given for disagreement with 
proposed disclosures in each exposure draft were analysed and connected to propositions and 
analytical constructs.  
8.4.1 Users  
In Section 4.5, the proposition was developed that users would support all uniform, complex, 
and commercially sensitive disclosures that increase transparency (P1). All of the exposure 
drafts tested this proposition. Table 8.6 summarises the results for P1, which was supported. 
Table 8.6 User responses to comment letters on P1 
Users Number Agree % Disagree % 
ED7 1 1 100% 
 
0% 
ED/2008/10 (Q3(a)) 5 5 100% 
 
0% 
ED/2008/10 (Q4) 5 4 80% 1 20% 
ED/2009/3 2 2 100% 
 
0% 
ED/2010/13 3 3 100% 
 
0% 
    
  TOTAL 11 10 91% 1 9% 
Note. This table reports information about 11 letters from users on on P1 that users would support all disclosures 
that increase transparency, in ED7, ED/2008/10, ED/2009/3, and ED/2010/13.  
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For each exposure draft, users showed support for all increases in disclosure except for 
question 4 of ED/2008/10. In this case, one user opposed a proposed maturity analysis for 
liquidity risk, as they preferred a more sophisticated duration analysis. From analysis of the 
comment letters, there were no instances of a user suggesting fewer disclosures, or that a 
particular disclosure might not be necessary. Users did not mention the cost or difficulty for 
preparers of providing information. Of 11 letters submitted by users to the IASB for the four 
exposure drafts, seven (64%) requested more disclosure than was in the exposure draft.  
8.4.2 Preparers 
In Section 4.5, the proposition was developed that preparers would oppose increases in both 
uniform and complex disclosures that increased their processing costs (P2). All of the 
exposure drafts tested this proposition. Table 8.7 Panel A, shows P2 was supported with a 
majority of preparers opposing all increases in disclosure (79%). 
Table 8.7 Preparer responses to comment letters on P2 and the analytical construct 
complex disclosure 
Preparer Number Agree % Disagree % 
Panel A: Preparers response on P2 
   ED7 55 9 16% 46 84% 
ED/2008/10 36 13 36% 23 64% 
ED/2009/3 44 3 7% 41 93% 
ED/2010/13 121 30 25% 91 75% 
      TOTAL 256 55 21% 201 79% 
  Disagree 
Oppose 
complex 
% 
  Panel B: Opposition to complex disclosure 
 ED/2008/10 23 12 52% 
  ED/2009/3 41 16 39% 
  ED/2010/13 91 52 57% 
  
      TOTAL 155 80 52% 
  Note. Panel A reports information about 256 letters from preparers and their industry bodies in ED7, 
ED/2008/10 (Q3 (a)), ED/2009/3 and ED/2010/13 (Q13 (a)). Panel A shows preparers that opposed increased 
disclosures (P2). Panel B compares the extent of opposition to increases in disclosure, to the extent of opposition 
to specific complex disclosures for ED/2008/10 (Q3 (a)), ED/2009/3 and ED/2010/13 (Q13 (a)). 
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For three exposure drafts, stakeholders were asked to comment on the introduction of 
multiple disclosures with varying characteristics (uniform, complex and/or commercially 
sensitive). For these, preparers often identified specific disclosures that were of concern. 
These were always complex or commercially sensitive disclosures.32 Table 8.7 Panel B 
compares the extent of opposition to increases in disclosure, to the extent of opposition to 
specific complex disclosures. Panel B shows that preparers objected to increased disclosures 
more frequently than they objected to specific complex disclosures. 
Preparers were also expected to oppose commercially sensitive disclosures (P3). One 
exposure draft tested this proposition: ED/2010/13 required quantification of risk exposures 
and future cash flows associated with hedging. Table 8.8 summarises the results for P3, which 
was supported. 
Table 8.8 Preparer responses to comment letters on P3  
Preparers Number Agree % Disagree % 
Oppose 
commercially 
sensitive 
% 
ED/2010/13 
       
Financial firms 36 11 31% 25 69% 6 24% 
Non-financial firms 49 11 22% 38 78% 29 76% 
Industry groups 36 8 22% 28 78% 17 61% 
        
TOTAL 121 30 25% 91 75% 52 57% 
Note. This table reports information for 121 letters in response to ED/2010/13 on P3 that preparers would oppose 
commercially sensitive disclosures.  
 
Table 8.8 shows that of those that opposed the new disclosures, 52 of 91 (57%) disagreed 
with disclosures they identified as commercially sensitive. However, for non-financial 
companies, the number was higher, with 29 of 38 (76%) objecting to the disclosure of 
commercially sensitive information. This may reflect the competition that non-financial 
                                                 
32 As explained in Section 6.3.4, coding captured majority and significant minority viewpoints. 
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companies face from private companies compared to banks and insurance companies. Non-
financial companies may also be more likely to hedge future transactions they believe are 
commercially sensitive.  
8.4.3 Audit firms 
In Section 4.5 the proposition was developed that audit firms would support increases in 
uniform disclosure that would increase audit fees without any increase in audit risk (P4). 
Three of the four exposure drafts tested this proposition. Table 8.9 shows that P4 was 
supported with audit firms strongly supporting new uniform disclosures for all three exposure 
drafts at 67%, 71% and 70%. 
Table 8.9 Audit firm responses to comment letters on P4 
Audit firms Number Agree % Disagree % 
Support 
uniform 
disclosure 
% 
ED/2008/10 6 3 50% 3 50% 4 67% 
ED/2009/3 7 3 43% 4 57% 5 71% 
ED/2010/13 10 3 30% 7 70% 7 70% 
        TOTAL 23 9 39% 14 61% 16 70% 
Note. This table reports information about 23 letters from audit firms on on P4 that audit firms will support 
uniform disclosure, in ED/2008/10, ED/2009/3, and ED/2010/13.  
 
It was also proposed in Section 4.5 that auditors would align with their clients and oppose 
complex disclosures (including complex commercially sensitive disclosures) that required 
estimation and judgment (P5). All exposure drafts tested this proposition. Table 8.10 analyses 
the results for P5 and shows that when audit firms opposed a proposed disclosure, they were 
likely to refer to the high cost to preparers (61%) but directed attention to specific complex 
disclosures (72%), more frequently than to specific uniform disclosures (22%). P5 was 
therefore supported. 
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Table 8.10 Audit firm responses to comment letters on P5 
Audit firms Number Disagree % 
Oppose 
processing 
cost 
% 
Oppose 
uniform 
% 
Oppose 
complex 
% 
ED7 5 4 80% 3 75% 
  
4 100% 
ED/2008/10 6 3 50% 3 100% 2 67% 2 67% 
ED/2009/3 7 4 57% 2 50% 2 50% 3 75% 
ED/2010/13 10 7 70% 3 43% 
  
4 57% 
          TOTAL 28 18 64% 11 61% 4 22% 13 72% 
Note. This table reports information about 28 letters from audit firms in ED7, ED/2008/10, ED/2009/3, and 
ED/2010/13 on P5 that audit firms would oppose complex disclosure. Numbers do not add across as audit firms 
provided more than one reason for disagreement. 
 
8.4.4 Regulators 
In Section 4.5 the proposition was developed that regulators would support the interests of 
preparers (P6). This proposition was tested by all of the exposure drafts. Table 8.11 provides 
information showing the responses of regulators for each exposure draft which indicates P6 is 
not supported.  
Table 8.11 Regulator responses to comment letters on P6 
Regulators Number Agree %   
Panel A: Support proposed disclosures 
ED7 15 8 53%   
ED/2008/10 20 18 90%   
ED/2009/3 20 7 35%   
ED/2010/13 23 10 43%   
 
TOTAL 78 43 55%   
 
Number Disagree % 
Oppose 
processing 
cost 
% 
Oppose 
commercially 
sensitive 
% 
Panel B: Oppose proposed disclosures 
ED7 15 7 47% 4 57% 
  ED/2008/10 20 2 10% 2 100% 
  ED/2009/3 20 13 65% 12 92% 
  ED/2010/13 23 13 57% 11 85% 5 38% 
 
TOTAL 78 35 45% 29 
 
83% 5 6% 
Note. This table reports information for 78 letters submitted by regulators for ED7, ED/2008/10, ED/2009/3, 
and ED/2010/13. Panel A shows support for all proposed disclosures (a user perspective). Panel B shows 
opposition to disclosures that have high processing costs or are commercially sensitive (a preparer perspective). 
Panel B totals do not add across as regulators may give more than one reason or no reason for their 
disagreement, or give a different reason for disagreement. 
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As shown in Table 8.11 Panel A, for ED 7 and ED/2008/10 regulators took a user 
perspective, with 53% supporting the disclosures in ED 7 and 90% supporting those in 
ED/2008/10.  However as shown in Panel B, for ED/2009/3, 13 of 20 regulators (65%) 
opposed disclosures for derecognised assets and of these, 12 (92%) referenced the high cost 
of the proposals. For ED/2010/13, 13 of 23 regulators (57%) opposed the disclosures of 
which 11 (85%) referenced the high cost while 5 (38%) identified that some of the proposals 
could result in the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. Mixed results may 
reflect that as the disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 have grown longer and more detailed, 
regulators have increasingly taken a preparer perspective. 
8.5 Effectiveness of Stakeholder Arguments 
This section presents the results of the third stage of the analysis explained in Section 6.3.5, 
an analysis of the effectiveness of different types of argument made by stakeholders. The 
reasons stakeholders gave for disagreement with proposed disclosures were identified as 
either technical (to do with implementation), conceptual (to do with Conceptual Framework 
principles) or economic consequences (to do with cost).  
For ED7, most of the complaints about the sensitivity analysis referenced cost and had no 
effect on the position of the IASB. For ED/2008/10, objections to calculating realised and 
unrealised gains for some derivatives were mainly technical and the request by some 
regulators to reinstate information on contractual maturities of derivative financial liabilities 
was conceptual. Both of these resulted in amendments. For ED/2009/3, two disclosures that 
would allow users to unwind the effect of derecognised transactions were challenged and 
removed, probably on conceptual grounds. As some stakeholders pointed out, it seems 
unlikely that the objective of disclosure is to facilitate the unwinding of transactions 
accounted for in accordance with recognition and measurement standards. For ED/2010/13, 
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the source of objection was two paragraphs that required companies to quantify their risk and 
the effects of hedging arrangements, and disclose the effects of hedging on future cash flows. 
Stakeholders claimed these would require the disclosure of commercially sensitive 
information. Proprietary costs arguments are economic consequences arguments (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986). The IASB acknowledged complaints from preparers that the disclosures 
“would potentially provide competitors with insight into an entity’s costing structure” (IASB, 
2015j para. BC35X), and removed both paragraphs from the final standard. The greatest 
number of complaints across all exposure drafts concerned the increasing volume and cost of 
the disclosures, and these always had no effect. This is consistent with prior research that 
found economic consequences arguments ineffective (Giner & Arce, 2012). 
8.6 Changes to the Characteristics of IFRS 7 
This section presents the results of the fourth and final stage of the analysis explained in 
Section 6.3.5, the analysis of the changing characteristics of IFRS 7 over the period of 
analysis. Appendices C to F show the coding of disclosure items using the analytical 
constructs. Table 8.12 shows the number of new uniform, complex and commercially 
sensitive disclosure items in each exposure draft, and changes made by the IASB following 
public consultation. 
The IASB initially added 22 new quantitative uniform disclosure items in its’ four exposure 
drafts. One of the uniform disclosure items was withdrawn following public consultation and 
17 new uniform disclosure items were added.  Of six complex disclosure items proposed in 
the four exposure drafts, five were withdrawn following public consultation and none were 
added. Four commercially sensitive disclosure items were proposed in the exposure draft, 
ED/2010/13, and all were withdrawn following public consultation. 
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Table 8.12 Proposed and actual changes to IFRS 7 by analytical construct 
IASB 
 
TOTAL ED7 ED/2008/10 ED/2009/3 ED/2010/13 
Changes proposed in exposure draft 
    Uniform disclosure added 39 7 8 11 13 
Uniform disclosure (withdrawn) (17) (13)   (4) 
Sub-total 22 (6) 8 11 9 
Complex disclosure added 6 3 1 2  
Commercially sensitive disclosure 
added 
 
4    4 
Changes following public consultation      
Uniform disclosure added 17 3  1 13 
Uniform disclosure (withdrawn) (1) (1)    
Sub-total 16 2  1 13 
Complex disclosure (withdrawn) (5) (2) (1) (2)  
Commercially sensitive disclosure 
(withdrawn) 
(4)    (4) 
Note. This table reports information about the analytical constructs uniform disclosure, complex disclosure, and 
commercially sensitive disclosure, for amendments to disclosures in ED7, ED/2008/10, ED/2009/3, and 
ED/2010/13 before and after public consultation.  
 
As shown in Table 8.13, over the period, uniform disclosures substantially increased, while 
complex and commercially sensitive disclosures did not.  
Table 8.13 Summary of changes to IFRS 7 by analytical construct 
IFRS 7 Uniform Complex 
Commercially 
sensitive 
ED7 (4) 1  
ED/2008/10 8   
ED/2009/3 12   
ED/2010/13 22   
 
TOTAL 38 1  
Note. This table reports information about the analytical constructs uniform disclosure, complex disclosure, and 
commercially sensitive disclosure for ED7, ED/2008/10, ED/2009/3, and ED/2010/13. 
 
8.7 Discussion 
The objective of the third research question was to identify whether IFRS 7 is designed to 
meet the needs of users or preferences the needs of another stakeholder group. In order to 
achieve this, stakeholder preferences were identified from existing literature and confirmed 
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over the ten years of the analysis. The following discussion addresses each stakeholder 
category separately and evaluates the results using literature from Chapter 4 and the lens of 
economic theories of regulation from Chapter 3. 
8.7.1 Users 
Users of financial information are the capital markets participants that rely upon publically 
available information to make resource allocation decisions (IASB, 2010a). Research has 
consistently shown that users do not participate strongly in the IASB’s formal consultations, 
(Giner & Arce, 2012; Jorissen et al., 2012, 2013; Larson, 2007). This is confirmed in the 
present research that shows for the four exposure drafts, users submitted 11 letters or an 
average 2% of all comment letters.  
Nevertheless, in a study of the UK standard setter, Georgiou (2010) found that for users, 
comment letters may not proxy participation via other channels, which can lead to research 
underestimating the extent of user participation. In 2003, the IASB set up its first formal user 
advisory group (Botzem & Quack, 2009). This Capital Markets Advisory Committee 
comprises 20 volunteer members, mainly financial analysts, representing a user perspective 
(IASB, 2015c). In recent years, the IASB has also begun publishing summaries of 
stakeholder outreach activities on its website, which makes it easier to discover user 
participation via the other channels identified by Georgiou. For example, in connection with 
the recently completed project on financial instruments, users were consulted on each phase 
of the project. Relevant to the present research, for the third phase on hedge accounting, the 
IASB communicated with over 30 individual analysts and two user groups: the Analyst 
Representative Group and the Corporate Reporting Users Forum (IASB, 2010c). Neither of 
these user groups submitted comment letters on the hedge accounting exposure draft. This 
makes it difficult to argue that users are the abstract concept of earlier times (Hopwood, 
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1994; Young, 2006) and would indicate the IASB has direct knowledge of what disclosures 
users want from IFRS 7. 
The present research confirms that, as predicted, users lobby in favour of full and transparent 
disclosure (Table 8.6). There were no instances of a user suggesting less information was 
preferable to more information. In terms of the outcome of the standard setting process, 
users’ needs are partly, but not fully, satisfied by developments in IFRS 7. As shown in Table 
8.13, although the volume of uniform disclosures has substantially increased, few of the 
disclosures affecting derivatives in IFRS 7 are complex or commercially sensitive, which are 
both disclosure characteristics users value. For example, complex and commercially sensitive 
disclosures were requested by analysts in the IASB user outreach program on hedge 
accounting (IASB, 2010c para.23) and their requests were subsequently included in 
ED/2010/13 as paragraphs 45 and 46. Paragraphs 45 and 46 required the quantification of 
risk exposures and estimation of future cash flows associated with hedge accounting. During 
public consultation on ED/2010/13, users approved these paragraphs and asked that they be 
extended to include all risk management activities. This was connected to the second 
objective of IFRS 7 that requires companies to disclose information to enable users of 
financial statements to evaluate the nature and extent of risks arising from financial 
instruments. 
Objective 2
Nature and extent of off- 
balance sheet risk and 
how those risks are 
managed
 Objective 1
Significance of 
derivatives for financial 
position and 
performance
P Î
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This request for a more integrated, economic view of risk and risk management was also 
made in research conducted by practitioners (e.g. Ernst & Young, 2008; Papa & Peters, 2013) 
and was the request made by bank analysts in the first study when asked how the disclosures 
required by IFRS 7 could be improved. That both paragraph 45 and 46 were withdrawn by 
the IASB following public consultation demonstrates the influence of other interests. 
Economic theories of regulation do not predict that users will be the main beneficiaries of 
standard setting, because compared to the regulated industries users have a lower individual 
stake in the product of regulation and are unlikely to place the highest value upon it. Users 
are diffuse and diverse and their preference for accounting information is not homogeneous. 
Evidenced by their low levels of participation, many users are free riders that do not share the 
cost of participation. Nevertheless, as a private sector standard setter with no governmental 
authority, transparent standard setting in the interests of users is a key element of the IASB’s 
acceptability and legitimacy (Jorissen et al., 2012).  
8.7.2 Preparers 
Preparers are the large, often multi-national companies that prepare their accounts using 
international standards. They consistently submitted the majority of comment letters 
(Chatham et al., 2010; Giner & Arce, 2012; Hodder & Hopkins, 2014; Jorissen et al., 2012, 
2013), which is suggestive of both the size of their stake and their expectation of being able 
to influence the outcome of the standard setting process (Sutton, 1984).  
The few studies that have examined influence in international standard setting used data from 
before the widespread adoption of international standards. This was a time when the IASB 
and its predecessor the IASC, as private-sector standard setters with no elected or other 
governmental authority, were particularly reliant upon the participation of constituents as a 
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key element of building and maintaining legitimacy (Kenny & Larson, 1993; Whittington, 
2005). Taking this into account, earlier research has broadly found the development of 
international accounting standards to be a pluralistic process (Bamber & McMeeking, 2015; 
Giner & Arce, 2012), notwithstanding that preparers were most likely to secure changes to 
standards in accordance with their preferences (Cortese & Irvine, 2010; Kwok & Sharp, 
2005). As Kwok and Sharp (2005, p. 95) observed, “in reality, it is difficult for the process to 
promulgate a standard adverse to the preferences of preparers.”  
The present research proposed and found that preparers objected to new disclosures that 
increase their processing costs or may require the exposure of commercially sensitive 
information. Drawing a distinction between uniform disclosures that increase processing 
costs, and specific complex disclosures that increase processing costs, more preparers 
objected to the large number of mainly uniform disclosures added to IFRS 7 over the period, 
than identified and objected to particular complex disclosures (Table 8.7). This distinction 
was unexpected, as complex disclosures are usually more costly than uniform disclosures, 
and may reflect the substantial increase in uniform disclosures throughout the period. 
Nevertheless, as shown in Table 8.12, following public consultation the IASB almost 
exclusively withdrew complex disclosures, while the overall volume of uniform disclosures 
increased, indicating that the preferences of preparers were partly met.  
Economic theories of regulation do not predict that preparers will capture the regulatory 
process. The international standard setting process has two regulated groups with direct 
economic interests in the regulation: audit firms and preparers. Compared to audit firms, 
preparers have a lower individual stake in the product of regulation and are unlikely to place 
the highest value upon it. Preparers are also diffuse and diverse and their preference for 
accounting information is not homogeneous. For example, as shown in Table 8.8, the 
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majority of non-financial companies rejected disclosures about risk exposures and future cash 
flows for hedged transactions, believing them commercially sensitive, while a majority of 
financial companies did not.  
8.7.3 Audit firms 
Audit firms are the Big 4 and second tier firms that contribute to the standard setting process. 
Prior to international harmonisation, there was a consensus that audit firms did not exhibit 
undue influence on standard setting organisations (at least, not on the FASB) (Kenny & 
Larson, 1993). However, this consensus disappeared with the rise of the IASC and IASB. 
Some researchers have focussed on the politics of international standard setting and believe it 
to be dominated by audit firms and the principle of expertise (Botzem & Quack, 2009; 
Cooper & Robson, 2006; Hopwood, 1994; Martinez-Diaz, 2005; Perry & Nölke, 2005; 
Suddaby et al., 2007). Through audit firms’ ability to “define expertise” it is even argued that 
they have marginalised the accounting industry bodies that historically provided funding and 
support for the IASB (Botzem & Quack, 2009, p. 995). Only one empirical study has 
identified the influence of audit firms during public consultations and found the IASB is 
actually more likely to ignore the view of audit firms in its deliberations compared to other 
stakeholders (Bamber & McMeeking, 2015). However, this was a study of a single exposure 
draft and there remains a lack of evidence-based research. 
The present research proposed and found that auditors lobby in their own economic interest. 
As shown in Table 8.9, support for the proposition auditors would support new uniform 
disclosure was strong, with 70% of audit firms supporting increased uniform disclosures. As 
explained in Section 4.5.3 auditors are expected to favour increased uniform disclosures as 
they lead to higher audit fees. Uniform disclosures are suited to the use of checklists which 
enable junior staff to perform more of the audit work (McBarnet, 2001; McBarnet & Whelan, 
Chapter 8: Study Two Results  133 
 
1991). Opposition to complex disclosure was also evident with 72% of objections to 
proposed disclosures identifying specific complex disclosures as a reason (Table 8.10). 
Complex disclosures have a higher risk of misstatement and are not suited to disclosure 
checklists, requiring an auditor to exercise judgement and have knowledge of the audit client.  
Table 8.13 shows the volume of uniform disclosures has substantially increased since 2004. 
At the same time, five of six complex disclosure items proposed in the four exposure drafts 
were withdrawn by the IASB following public consultation (Table 8.12). Over time, IFRS 7 
has therefore developed to suit the auditing professions’ preference for uniform disclosure, 
with fewer disclosures that are complex.  
Economic theories of regulation predict that audit firms are most likely to capture the 
standard setting process as Big 4 audit firms are small in number and homogeneous in their 
economic interests. They also have a large stake in the outcome of the standard setting 
process. In most countries listed companies prepare accounts in accordance with IFRS and 
the Big 4 firms audit most listed companies (Suddaby et al., 2007).  
8.7.4 Regulators 
Regulators are unlike other stakeholders, as they have no direct economic interest in the 
outcome of standard setting. They are the powerful outsiders admitted to the standard setting 
process (Stigler, 1971). Little research has focussed upon the influence of regulators in 
relation to the IASB although their role is both important and new in the context of 
supranational standard setting. Their role is important due to the place national standard 
setters hold, together with regional and supranational regulatory bodies, within the network of 
stakeholders that built, supported, and still surround the IASB (Zeff, 2012). Their role is new 
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as for the first time national standard setting bodies are both stakeholders and lobbyists in the 
standard setting process.  
The present research found regulators sometimes lobby in favour of full disclosure and 
transparency but take a preparer perspective when they believe that the cost of providing 
disclosure exceeds the benefit to the market (Table 8.11). This contradicts earlier research 
that found regulators made technical or conceptual arguments in their comment letters but not 
economic consequences arguments (Giner & Arce, 2014). This difference may reflect that the 
earlier research focussed upon recognition and measurement, or it may be the lobbying 
behaviour of regulators has changed since 2002, when data was collected for the earlier 
study. The latter view is consistent with the observation that as IFRS 7 has become longer 
and more prescriptive through time, regulators have increased their objections to proposed 
disclosures based on economic consequences (high processing costs). 
Economic theories of regulation do not predict that regulators will capture the international 
standard setting process. Compared to other stakeholders, they have no direct economic 
interest and are unlikely to place the highest value upon the product. Indirectly, however, 
regulatory bodies are motivated by increasing their own power and wealth, so there may be 
times when individually, or in groups, regulators place a very high value upon a particular 
outcome. This occurred most recently during the 2007/8 financial crisis when standard setting 
for financial instruments became highly politicised. During the crisis, the FSB (2008) gave 
directions to the IASB that resulted in a rushed due process for two exposure drafts on 
financial instruments. Bengtsson (2011) has also documented the role of the European Union 
in forcing the IASB to waive due process on rules for valuing financial instruments in late 
2008. The increased formalisation of the role of regulators since the financial crisis, described 
in Section 2.2, may serve to either increase or set the boundaries of future influence. 
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However, although these incidents show that regulators have power and will use it when an 
issue becomes sufficiently salient, this is not regulatory capture. Most of the time, regulators 
do not place the highest value on a specific outcome of the standard setting process, and due 
to their diversity, the cost of organisation would tend to preclude the formation of coalitions 
(Stigler, 1971). As the present research shows, regulators are not univocal in their lobbying 
and, consistent with earlier research (Giner & Arce, 2012), the IASB has shown no evidence 
of consistent or undue influence from regulators, whether they take a user perspective or a 
preparer perspective on any particular disclosure issue. 
8.8 Implications 
Table 8.14 shows how the economic interests of audit firms intersect across one (different) 
dimension for both users and preparers.  
Table 8.14 Stakeholder disclosure preferences by analytical construct 
Full disclosure Users Preparers Audit firms  
Uniform disclosure Support Oppose Support 
Complex disclosure Support Oppose Oppose 
Commercially sensitive disclosure Support Oppose Support a 
a Audit firms have no in principle opposition to commercially sensitive disclosures but will oppose them if they 
are complex.   
 
Like users, audit firms strongly support increased uniform disclosures, and like preparers, 
tend to oppose complex disclosures. As shown in Table 8.13, in the ten years since IFRS 7 
was proposed, the disclosure requirements for derivatives have developed to favour the 
economic interests of large audit firms with substantial increases in uniform disclosures. This 
finding is not inconsistent with earlier research that observed a pluralistic process or preparer 
influence, as examining influence over a short time-period cannot rule out longer term 
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“patterns of outcomes … could more or less consistently support some specific interest above 
those of others” (Kwok & Sharp, 2005, p. 95).  
As shown in Table 8.12, the pattern observed in this study is of increases in uniform 
disclosures, with some new complex or commercially sensitive disclosures proposed and 
withdrawn by the IASB following public consultation. This means that preparers tend to win 
on complex and commercially sensitive disclosures, but lose on quite large increases in 
uniform disclosures that increase their costs. At the same time, users are, to some extent, 
satisfied with the increase in uniform disclosures, but do not receive the complex or 
commercially sensitive disclosures they value. As Kwok and Sharp (2005, p. 95) observed, 
“other groups did not believe they lost out, since elements of their preferences were still in 
the final standard. In other words, the outcomes seemed to be a win-win situation to the 
different groups.” This describes a pluralist understanding of international standard setting, 
where stakeholders believe different views must be accommodated within a framework none 
will deem perfect, but all can live with (Rescher, 1993). In this case, pluralism may not be the 
best explanation for the development of derivatives related disclosures in IFRS 7 that favour 
the economic interests of audit firms. 
8.9 Summary  
This chapter presented the results of the second study, which asked whether IFRS 7 was 
designed to meet the needs of users or was suited to the needs of a different stakeholder 
group. Chapter 9 draws conclusions from the results of the two studies presented in Chapter 7 
and Chapter 8 to answer the overarching research objective, and identifies contributions, 
limitations, and opportunities for future research.  
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CHAPTER 9 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 8 set out the findings of the second study and completed this research. This chapter 
brings together the two studies that comprise the thesis to answer the overarching research 
objective and draw conclusions. Section 9.1 re-examines the research objective and Section 
9.2 reviews the methodology and method. Section 9.3 discusses the findings of the two 
studies in the context of the overall research objective. Section 9.4 sets out the contribution of 
the research to accounting literature and practice. This is followed in Section 9.5 with the 
limitations of the research and Section 9.6 with opportunities for future research. 
9.1 Research Objective 
As explained in Chapter 1, financial engineering involving derivatives has challenged 
standard setters around the world to keep pace with new developments and their implications 
for reporting financial risk. That IFRS 7 had not properly reflected the transactions of multi-
national investment banks was clear in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007/8. That 
financial scandals involving derivatives seem to take market by surprise was also indicative 
of a problem with the transparency of corporate disclosure. This led to the objective of this 
research: to explore whether the derivatives disclosures required by IFRS 7 provide users 
with information that is decision-useful, and to the extent that they do not, identify possible 
reasons.  
Through academic and practitioner literature discussed in Chapter 4, possible reasons why 
the disclosures provided under IFRS 7 may not be useful to users were identified, and led to 
the research questions. First, there is evidence that companies implement the disclosure 
requirements for derivatives in a perfunctory and boilerplate way, although the extent to 
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which financial statement users are adversely affected by poor disclosure quality was 
unknown. Similarly, archival research provided mixed evidence regarding the value-
relevance or risk-relevance of quantitative disclosures required under IFRS 7, but did not 
evaluate the qualitative risk management disclosures, without which the quantitative 
disclosures lack context. Archival research also cannot identify whether a different disclosure 
would be more relevant to users than what is there. This would be indicative of a design issue 
with IFRS 7. The first two research questions addressed these limitations and were: 
RQ1 Do the disclosures for derivatives made under IFRS 7 fulfil their purpose by meeting 
the decision making needs of users, and if not, why not? 
RQ2 To the extent that the disclosures for derivatives required by IFRS 7 are not useful, 
what disclosures would be more useful? 
A different strand of literature provided a different perspective, suggesting the disclosures for 
derivatives might not be decision-useful if IFRS 7 was not designed with users in mind. This 
would be the case if the standard setter had been ‘captured’ by one or more of its other 
stakeholders as predicted by economic theories of regulation. This possibility led to the third 
research question and sub-research question, which were: 
RQ3 Are the disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 designed to meet the needs of users, or do 
they preference the needs of another stakeholder group? 
SRQ3.1 What disclosure characteristics do different stakeholder groups prefer? 
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9.2 Methodology and Methods 
As explained in Chapter 5, the theoretical perspective taken in this research was one of 
ontological realism and epistemological constructivism. The major contribution of Peircean 
pragmatism was to ground the research in an empirical mind-set, while using interpretive 
research methods suitable for exploratory research.  
Two qualitative studies were undertaken to meet the research objective and are described in 
detail in Chapter 6. The first study answered the first two research questions using semi-
structured interviews with analysts from Australia’s four largest banks. The second study 
answered the third research question and sub-research question through an analysis of IFRS 7 
and related documents.  
9.3 Discussion and Conclusions 
Prior to conducting this research there were indications that the disclosures provided by 
companies about their derivative transactions may not be useful to users. If this was found to 
be the case, the objective of this research was to find a plausible reason or reasons. As 
explained in Section 4.1, IFRS 7 requires the disclosures for financial instruments to satisfy 
two broad objectives. The first objective is to provide users with an understanding of the 
significance of financial instruments for companies’ financial position and performance, that 
is, an explanation of recognised amounts. For derivatives, companies substantially meet this 
first objective. The second objective is to provide users with information about companies’ 
exposure to the risks associated with the recognised amounts, and to provide an 
understanding of why management enter into those risks and how they are managed. As 
explained in Section 2.1, risk reporting is particularly important for derivatives, and both of 
the studies that comprise this research indicated that the second objective is not met. 
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Objective 2
Nature and extent of off- 
balance sheet risk and 
how those risks are 
managed
 Objective 1
Significance of 
derivatives for financial 
position and 
performance
P Î
 
In order to meet the second objective of IFRS 7, companies provide narrative and summary 
quantitative disclosures for risk exposures arising from financial instruments based upon 
internal management reporting (IASB, 2005 para.33-34). Under this general provision, 
companies should explain the nature and source of the financial risks they are exposed to; 
management’s objectives, policies, and processes for managing these risks; and provide 
sufficient quantitative information to support the narrative. In the case of derivatives, 
companies hold them as part of their policy for managing existing financial risks (hedging), 
or for speculation. Where derivatives are held for hedging, a company may or may not adopt 
hedge accounting and this can be disclosed under the general provisions. Therefore, in 
principle, IFRS 7 provides a flexible framework for companies to explain and quantify their 
financial risk. To the extent that companies do not voluntarily provide sufficient disclosures 
under the general provisions, IFRS 7 mandates a number of minimum disclosures such as a 
sensitivity analysis for market risk, maximum exposures for credit risk, and a maturity 
analysis for liquidity risk. While reporting flexibility has the advantage of allowing 
companies to provide information in a way that best reflects their use of financial 
instruments, it also makes it possible for companies to restrict information provided they 
meet the minimum disclosure requirements. As explained in Section 4.1, research has shown 
companies seem to take the latter option, with risk disclosures described as perfunctory and 
boilerplate. 
Bank analysts interviewed in the first study confirmed that perfunctory and boilerplate 
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explanations of risk management strategies and risk exposures were their primary 
dissatisfaction with existing disclosures. User demand for, and company resistance to, the 
disclosure of risk management strategies and risk exposures was also explicit in the second 
study. In outreach sessions prior to the issue of ED/2010/13 Hedge Accounting, users told the 
IASB they wanted more information on risk management and the effect of hedging on risk 
exposures (IASB, 2010c para.23). The IASB responded with paragraphs 44 and 45 of 
ED/2010/13. Paragraph 44 required a narrative description of risk management strategies and 
exposures where hedge accounting was adopted, and paragraph 45 required quantification of 
risk exposures before and after hedging. During public consultation on the exposure draft, 
users approved these (uniform) disclosures, as did a majority (70%) of audit firms. Preparers, 
especially non-financial firms, opposed paragraph 45 on the basis it required the disclosure of 
commercially sensitive information. 
When ED/2010/13 asked what additional or different disclosures stakeholders would find 
useful for hedged transactions, all users, and 30% of audit firms, requested an extension of 
paragraph 44 and 45 to include all financial risk and economic hedges. Similar requests for a 
more integrated view of risk have been made in research conducted by practitioners (e.g. 
Ernst & Young, 2008; Papa & Peters, 2011; Papa & Peters, 2013). Bank analysts in the first 
study of this research also asked for this information when asked what additional or different 
disclosures they would like included in IFRS 7. The IASB rejected this request on the basis 
that it was outside the scope of IFRS 7; however, the IASB also noted individual companies 
have the option to provide this information under the general risk provisions (IASB, 2015j 
para.BC35J). 
That paragraph 45 was withdrawn by the IASB following public consultation demonstrates 
the influence of preparers when the objection concerns commercially sensitivity. The IASB 
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“acknowledged that [paragraph 45] would potentially provide competitors with insight into 
an entity’s costing structure” and “decided not to require information to be disclosed about 
the total risk exposure because of the potential forward looking nature of this information” 
(IASB, 2015j para.BC35X). 33 
However, it is possible to question whether a uniform disclosure requiring quantification of 
risk exposures at year-end, even including disclosure of the hedged rate with its implications 
for future periods, is likely to cause significant competitive disadvantage. Further, losses 
companies incur from the disclosure of commercially sensitive information are proprietary 
costs and opposition to disclosure on this basis is an economic consequences argument. That 
this argument was accepted by the IASB is perhaps a reflection that proprietary costs are 
believed to be much “larger in proportion” than processing costs (Suijs, 2005, p. 1425). There 
is an alternative view, however, that proprietary costs are not costs, but are a consequence of 
providing the market with more nearly complete information (Schipper, 2010).  
In either case, there is no clear evidence that proprietary costs affect disclosure practices 
(Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010). However, there is evidence that companies conceal 
information for both proprietary motives and agency motives and that the two motives may 
be connected (Berger, 2011). Drawing upon bank analysts’ comments in the first study, 
companies may not want to disclose their risk management strategies and quantify risk 
exposures because they believe competitors will use this information against them (a 
proprietary cost motive), or because they know that their risk management is inadequate, or 
more risky than the market knows (agency motives). It has even been suggested that the very 
                                                 
33 Paragraph 45 was accompanied by paragraph 46, which required detailed breakdowns of the information in 
paragraph 45 for each future period that a hedging relationship covers. This was a complex disclosure, and as 
explained in Section 4.5.2, would usually be considered more commercially sensitive than a uniform disclosure 
such as paragraph 45.Users supported paragraph 46 (100%) while audit firms opposed it (57%). Paragraph 46 
was withdrawn with paragraph 45. 
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plausibility of the proprietary cost argument allows agency motives to exist (Bens, Berger, & 
Monahan, 2011). That is, the proprietary cost argument provides ‘cover’ for companies that 
do not wish to disclose for other reasons. The decision of the IASB to withdraw a disclosure 
highly demanded by users based on a proprietary cost argument from preparers deserves 
further examination. This is especially the case given poor risk management practices were 
implicated in the 2007/8 financial crisis (Ryan, 2008) and other scandals involving 
derivatives. As Deegan (2014, p. 95) pointed out: 
Any consideration of possible economic consequences … necessarily involves 
a trade-off between the various consequences. For example, if 
neutrality/representational faithfulness are sacrificed to reduce potential 
negative impacts on some parties (for example, preparers who might otherwise 
have been required to disclose proprietary information …), this may have 
negative consequences for users seeking to make decisions on the basis of 
information provided. 
The evidence, therefore, is that users want better information about companies risk 
management strategies and risk exposures. Although the second study concluded that IFRS 7 
has evolved to suit the economic interests of audit firms, on this issue, audit firms supported 
uniform risk management and risk disclosures and their interests partly coincided with the 
interests of users. Companies’ resistance to providing informative disclosure ostensibly for 
reasons of commercial sensitivity, combined with the IASB’s reluctance to provide more 
prescriptive disclosure requirements in this area, may be the reason that the decision-
usefulness of IFRS 7 is limited.  
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9.4 Contributions 
The first study makes three contributions. First, this study extends the findings of empirical 
archival research and recent survey research that indicated preparers should prioritise their 
financial instrument disclosures. It extends this research by suggesting how preparers might 
increase user satisfaction without significantly increasing their processing costs. This could 
be achieved by providing more informative, company specific information about risk 
management policies and processes. 
By providing bank analysts’ insights into points of resistance by preparers to the provision of 
informative disclosures, a second contribution is made by suggesting ways in which the 
effectiveness of the IASB’s recommendations on disclosures in ED/2015/3 Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting might be enhanced for IFRS 7. In this exposure draft, the 
IASC reminds companies that “entity-specific information is more useful than ‘boilerplate’ 
language” (IASB, 2015d para.7.18). 
The third contribution of the research is providing new evidence on the use and limitations of 
the disclosures for derivatives for credit-side analysts, a key user group about whose 
informational needs relatively little is known (Armstrong et al., 2010). Most notable is the 
extent to which the analysts focus upon qualitative disclosures. They use them to draw 
preliminary conclusions about the competence and sophistication of managements’ risk 
strategies. They provide necessary context for quantitative disclosures. This study also 
supports calls from practice for companies to provide better information concerning their 
material economic risks.  
The second study makes three contributions. First, the disclosure preferences of four key 
stakeholder groups were identified based upon expected economic incentives and tested over 
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a ten-year period. This has increased knowledge about the disclosure preferences of 
stakeholders, particularly large audit firms and accounting regulators in the international 
standard setting arena. Where earlier research had shown that on matters of recognition and 
measurement, regulators and the accounting profession supported the preferences of users 
(Giner & Arce, 2012) for disclosure, this research shows distinct differences. 
Second, lobbying research has identified international standard setting as a pluralistic process 
(Bamber & McMeeking, 2015; Giner & Arce, 2012), although preparers may have significant 
influence (Cortese & Irvine, 2010; Kwok & Sharp, 2005). However, it is a criticism of 
lobbying research that “each study tends to treat lobbying as a single-issue, single-period 
decision, when it actually may be a multiple-issue, multiple-period decision” (Kenny & 
Larson, 1993, p. 550). The present research takes into account changes over a longer period 
and is the first study to incorporate changes in disclosure initiated by the IASB. In doing so, it 
identifies that over the ten-year period, IFRS 7 has evolved to suit the preference of audit 
firms for uniform disclosures, and it is only because the economic interests of audit firms 
coincide with users and preparers that the standard setting process appears pluralistic.  
Third, earlier research had found that the IASB responded to stakeholder lobbying that used 
conceptual or technical arguments, but did not respond to economic consequences arguments 
(Giner & Arce, 2012). The present research confirms the IASB is responsive to conceptual 
and technical arguments. However, although the IASB does not respond to complaints about 
the high processing cost of disclosure, they do respond to objections concerning the 
commercial sensitivity of disclosure, also an economic consequences argument. 
The overarching research objective required an identification of the reasons why disclosures 
provided by companies under IFRS 7 may not be decision-useful. The research makes a 
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practical contribution by identifying that poor disclosure quality around risk management and 
risk exposures are limiting the usefulness of derivatives disclosures under IFRS 7. It 
highlights to the IASB that these disclosures are strongly demanded by users and resisted by 
companies, particularly non-financial companies. It reminds the standard setter that when 
they make cost/benefit evaluations for new disclosures, proprietary cost motives may be 
mixed with agency motives. Potential proprietary costs should be considered in conjunction 
with the benefit of companies providing information to the market that is more complete. 
9.5 Limitations 
All research should be interpreted in light of its limitations. For the first study, the evidence 
comprised interviews with credit-side analysts across four major Australian banks. While 
these analysts were highly experienced in both derivatives and risk, their responses reflected 
their opinions and beliefs and may not be generalisable to all bank analysts or all users. 
However, given the experience of the analysts and the difficulty in gaining access to them, 
their views do expand knowledge in this area and highlight issues worthy of further research. 
Second, while the research questions were framed using the IASB’s own construction of 
usefulness, the analysts were encouraged to discuss their own views within this framework. 
Although this approach benefits from its ability to identify what is most important to the 
people interviewed, rather than what is most important to the researcher, and while there was 
significant commonality across the analysts’ views, not all analysts discussed or identified the 
same things, which reduces reliability. Third, the analysts’ opinions regarding the reasons for 
companies’ reliance upon generic disclosures, while based on direct experience with their 
clients, involved elements of speculation and should be interpreted accordingly.  
For the second study, the evidence comprised an analysis of IFRS 7, exposure drafts, and 
comment letters over the ten-year period from 2004 to 2014. While addressing limitations of 
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earlier research that examined influence for a single issue or single exposure draft, this study 
examined the disclosure requirements of one standard. It is therefore unknown if results are 
generalisable to other standards. The method of manual coding and analysis used in this study 
required the researcher to apply technical knowledge to be able to interpret the meaning of 
often lengthy comments, which was time consuming and involved judgement. This has 
implications for reliability. Linked to this, the detailed level of the analysis made statistical 
methods less employable and the results of the analysis less robust.  
9.6 Future Research 
Several avenues for future research are suggested by the results of this research. First, the 
results of the first study suggest the development of a survey to test ideas raised by the 
analysts. The views of audit firms on their clients’ use of boilerplate disclosures would be one 
example, and could be compared to the views of companies. The question of commercial 
sensitivity that arose in both studies could be addressed with either interviews or survey 
methods. 
Second, lobbying research that examines stakeholder influence has, to date, analysed changes 
in discussion papers and exposure drafts over a short period. Although this was necessary 
during the early years of the IASB, it is now possible to address this limitation. It is also 
important for lobbying research to take into account changes initiated by the IASB, if the goal 
is to identify indirect, as well as direct influence. An economic incentives approach reduces 
the impact of researcher bias in interpreting changes to standards by making underlying 
assumptions explicit. Accordingly, future research should evaluate a second disclosure 
standard to determine if the results of this research are generalisable. A similar, longitudinal 
economic incentives approach could help to understand influence on standards concerned 
with recognition and measurement.   
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Third, more evidence based research on the lobbying behaviour of regulators is warranted 
given their importance in the international standard setting framework. Existing research 
combines national and supranational regulators and has found they support users (Giner & 
Arce, 2012). The present research has found that this is not always the case. In the same way, 
audit firms and accounting industry bodies have previously been found to support users 
(Giner & Arce, 2012; Saemann, 1999), which deserves further analysis as their views may 
have changed or may not be univocal. Country differences may be relevant, as these 
stakeholder categories are likely to include respondents that represent national interests. 
Fourth, how the IASB evaluates cost/benefit should be further investigated, including how it 
evaluates proprietary cost arguments by preparers. Although the issue of cost/benefit in 
standard setting has been discussed (e.g. Schipper, 2010), there is a lack of evidence based 
research. 
9.7 Summary 
This  chapter  concludes  the  PhD  thesis  titled:  An  Exploration  of  the  Usefulness  of  the 
Disclosures for Derivatives in Company Annual Reports. Chapter 9 summarised the 
motivation for this research and identified the research questions derived from academic and 
other literature. This chapter brought together the findings from two separate qualitative 
studies to answer the overarching research objective. Contributions and limitations were then 
discussed and opportunities for future research identified. 
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Appendix B Interview guide 
 
Background information 
 How long have you worked as an analyst and in what kind of roles?  
 What companies or sectors do you mainly work with? 
 What is your particular interest in or experience with derivatives? 
 
1. To what extent do the disclosures in annual reports allow you to (a) evaluate the significance 
of derivatives to an entity’s financial position and performance, (b) understand the nature 
and extent of their risk, and (c) understand an entity’s practices and processes for managing 
that risk? (RQ1) 
 
2. How do you think the disclosures required by IFRS 7 for derivatives could be improved, if at 
all i.e. disclosures not currently required under IFRS 7? (RQ2) 
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Current requirements of IFRS 7 (2015) IAS 32 (2004) ED 7 (2004) AC a IFRS 7 (2005) AC a 
Significance for financial position and 
performance 
     
Carrying amount for items mandatorily 
recognised at FV, either line item in the 
balance sheet or in the notes (para.8) 
 Yes (para.10) 
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recognised at FV, either line item in the P&L 
or in the notes (para.20) 
 Yes (para.21) 
 
+U Yes (para.20)  
Terms and conditions of instruments Para.60-66     
 For each class of instrument, the extent 
and nature of the financial instruments, 
including significant terms and conditions 
that may affect the amount, timing and 
certainty of future cash flows (para.60) 
    
 For each class, whether trade or 
settlement date accounting is used 
(para.61) 
 -U   
 If no single instrument is individually 
significant to the future cash flows of the 
entity, the essential characteristics of the 
instruments are 
Described (para.62) 
 -N   
 When financial instruments either 
individually or as a class, create a 
potentially significant risk exposure the 
following terms and conditions are 
disclosed (para.63): 
- The principal, face or notional value 
- date of maturity, expiry or execution 
- availability of early settlement options 
- option to convert or exchange and 
timing 
- amount and timing of scheduled 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-U 
 
-U 
 
-U 
 
-U 
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Current requirements of IFRS 7 (2015) IAS 32 (2004) ED 7 (2004) AC a IFRS 7 (2005) AC a 
future cash receipts or payments of 
the principal 
- stated rate or amount of any periodic 
return on principal and the timing of 
payments 
- collateral 
- any foreign currency cash flows 
- where an instrument is acquired in an 
exchange, the above information for 
the instrument acquired 
- significant conditions or covenants 
 
-U 
 
 
-U 
 
-U 
 
-U 
 
 
-U 
 
-U 
 When the balance sheet presentation of a 
financial instrument differs from the 
instrument’s legal form, it is desirable for 
an entity to explain in the notes the nature 
of the instrument. (para.64) 
  
 
 
 
-N 
  
 The extent to which a risk exposure is 
altered by the relationship among the 
assets and liabilities may be apparent to 
financial statement users from 
information of the type described in 
paragraph 63, but in some circumstances 
further disclosure is necessary (para.65) 
  
 
 
 
-N 
  
Hedge disclosures (para.22-24) (para.56-59) (para.24-25)  (para.22-23)  
 An entity shall describe its financial risk 
management objectives and policies, 
including its policy for hedging each main 
type of forecast transaction for which 
hedge accounting is used (para.56) 
 -N   
An entity shall disclose the following 
separately for each type of hedge described in 
IAS 39 (i.e. fair value hedges, cash flow 
hedges, and hedges of net investments in 
Yes (para.58) Yes (para.24)  Yes (para.22)  
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Current requirements of IFRS 7 (2015) IAS 32 (2004) ED 7 (2004) AC a IFRS 7 (2005) AC a 
foreign operations):  
- a description of each type of hedge Yes  Yes  Yes  
- a description of the financial 
instruments designated as hedging 
instruments and their fair values at 
the end of the reporting period 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
- the nature of the risks being hedged Yes  Yes  Yes  
For cashflow hedges the following is 
disclosed: 
     
- the periods when the cash flows are 
expected to occur and when they are 
expected to affect profit or loss 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
- a description of any forecast 
transaction for which hedge 
accounting had previously been used, 
but which is no longer expected to 
occur 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
- the amount that was recognised in 
other comprehensive income during 
the period (or taken to equity pre OCI 
statements) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
- the amount that was reclassified from 
equity to profit or loss for the period, 
showing the amount included in each 
line item in the statement of 
comprehensive income 
Yes Yes  Yes  
- the amount that was removed from 
equity during the period and included 
in the initial cost or other carrying 
amount of a non-financial asset or 
non-financial liability whose 
acquisition or incurrence was a 
Yes Yes 
 
 Yes 
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hedged highly probable forecast 
transaction 
Additional hedge disclosures:    (para.24)  
- in fair value hedges, gains or losses 
on the hedging instrument and on the 
hedged item attributable to the 
hedged risk 
   Yes 
 
+U 
- the ineffectiveness recognised in 
profit or loss that arises from cash 
flow hedges 
   Yes 
 
+U 
- the ineffectiveness recognised in 
profit or loss that arises from hedges 
of net investments in foreign 
operations 
   Yes +U 
Nature and extent of financial risks arising 
from financial instruments 
     
Qualitative disclosures (para 33)  (para.34)  (para.33)  
Disclose for each financial risk:      
- nature of the exposures to risk and 
how they arise (by risk) 
 Yes +N Yes  
- objectives, policies and processes for 
managing the risk and the methods 
used to measure the risk 
 Yes +N Yes  
- any changes to the above from the 
previous period 
 Yes +N Yes  
Providing qualitative disclosures in the context 
of quantitative disclosures enables users to link 
related disclosures and hence form an overall 
picture 
     
Quantitative disclosures (para.34)  (para.35-45)  (para.34-35)  
Disclose for each financial risk:      
- summary quantitative data about each  Yes (para.35) +U Yes (para.34)  
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exposure at the end of the reporting 
period based upon information 
provided internally e.g. to the board 
and CEO 
- if the quantitative data disclosed as at 
the end of the reporting period are 
unrepresentative of an entity’s 
exposure to risk during the period, an 
entity shall provide further 
information that is representative 
 Yes (para.36) 
 
+U Yes (para.35)  
  When an entity uses several 
methodologies in managing a risk 
exposure, the entity shall disclose 
information using the method(s) 
that provide the 
most relevant and reliable 
information (para.37) 
+N  -N 
- quantitative information on 
concentrations (if not provided 
below) 
Yes (76(b)) Yes (para.35) +U Yes (para.34)  
- explanation of how management 
determines concentrations 
 Yes (para.38) +N  -N 
  A description of shared 
characteristic that determines 
concentrations (para.38) 
+N  -N 
  The amount of risk exposure for 
all financial instruments that share 
that characteristic (para.38) 
+U  -U 
Credit risk (para.36) (para.76-85) (para.39-41)  (para.36-38)  
- maximum exposure to credit risk 
excluding collateral or other credit 
enhancements, and information about 
credit quality 
Yes (para.76(a)) Yes (para.39(a))  Yes (para.36)  
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- information about collateral  Yes – plus fair value of collateral 
unless impracticable (para.39(b)) 
+N 
+C 
Yes (para.36) -C 
- information about credit quality on 
assets neither past due or impaired 
 Yes (para.39(c)) +N Yes  
Liquidity risk (para.39)  (para.42)  (para.39)  
- a maturity analysis for financial 
liabilities that shows the remaining 
contractual maturities 
 Yes +U Yes  
- a maturity analysis for derivative 
financial liabilities 
     
- a description of how liquidity risk is 
managed 
 Yes +N Yes  
Market risks (para.40-42)  (para.43-45)  (para.40-42)  
 Interest rate risk (para.67). 
- Contractual maturity/re-pricing 
dates 
- Effective interest rates 
-  Optional sensitivity analysis; 
and expected maturity/re-pricing 
dates 
  
-U 
 
-U 
  
- a sensitivity analysis for each type of 
market risk variable to which the 
entity is exposed at the end of the 
reporting period, showing how profit 
or loss and equity would have been 
affected by changes in the relevant 
risk variable that were reasonably 
possible at that date 
 Yes +C Yes  
- the methods and assumptions used in 
preparing the sensitivity analysis 
 Yes +N Yes  
- changes from the previous period in  Yes +N Yes  
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the methods and assumptions used, 
and the reasons for such changes 
When the sensitivity analyses are 
unrepresentative of a risk inherent in a 
financial instrument (for example because the 
year-end exposure does not reflect the 
exposure during the year), the entity shall 
disclose that fact and the reason it believes the 
sensitivity analyses are unrepresentative 
 When the sensitivity analysis is 
unrepresentative of a risk inherent 
in a financial instrument that risk 
should be explained and 
quantified (para.45) 
+C Yes – explain only -C 
+N 
Note. Disclosures relevant to derivative financial instruments and affected by the applicable exposure draft are shown. All versions of IFRS 7 are from the IASB’s blue book, 
which does not include any amendments that are not yet effective. a AC = analytical construct. Each disclosure proposed in the exposure draft and subsequently adopted or 
withdrawn is coded as U = uniform, C = complex or CS = commercially sensitive. Narrative disclosures are coded ‘N’ for information purposes. Objectives or non-
operational paragraphs are not included in the analysis. 
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Appendix D IFRS 7 before and after exposure draft ED/2008/10 
Fair value disclosures, IFRS 7 (2015) and IFRS 13 
(2015) 
IFRS 7 (2009) ED/2008/10 AC a IFRS 7 (2010) ACa 
IFRS 7 (para.25-30) (para.25-30)     
Except as set out below, for each class of financial assets 
and financial liabilities, an entity shall disclose the fair 
value of that class of assets and liabilities in a way that 
permits it to be compared with its carrying amount 
(para.25) 
 
Yes (para.25) Yes (para.25)  Yes (para.25)  
Disclosures of fair value are not required for an 
investment in equity instruments that do not have a 
quoted price in an active market for an identical 
instrument (i.e. a Level 1 input), or derivatives linked to 
such equity instruments, that is measured at cost in 
accordance with IAS 39 because its fair value cannot 
otherwise be measured reliably (para.29) 
 
Yes (para.29) Yes (para.29)  Yes (para.29)  
In the cases described above an entity shall disclose 
information to help users of the financial statements 
make their own judgments about the extent of possible 
differences between the carrying amount of those 
financial assets or financial liabilities and their fair value 
(para.30) 
Yes (para.30) Yes (para.30)  Yes (para.30)  
IFRS 13 (para.90-99)      
In some cases, the inputs used to measure the fair value 
of an asset or a liability might be categorised within 
different levels of the fair value hierarchy. In those 
cases, the fair value measurement is categorised in its 
entirety in the same level of the fair value hierarchy as 
the lowest level input (i.e. least observable) that is 
significant to the entire measurement (para.73) 
 
 Yes (para.27A)  Yes (para.27A)  
An entity shall disclose information that helps users of 
its financial statements assess both of the following 
(para.91): 
     
- the valuation techniques and inputs used to Yes (para.27) Yes (para.27)  Yes (para.27)  
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Fair value disclosures, IFRS 7 (2015) and IFRS 13 
(2015) 
IFRS 7 (2009) ED/2008/10 AC a IFRS 7 (2010) ACa 
develop fair value measurements 
- for fair value measurements using significant 
unobservable inputs (Level 3), the effect of the 
measurements on profit or loss or other 
comprehensive income for the period 
Yes (para.27) Yes (para.27)  Yes (para.27)  
To meet the objectives in paragraph 91, an entity shall 
consider all the following (para.92): 
     
- the level of detail necessary to satisfy the 
disclosure requirements 
Yes (para.B3 mandatory 
application guidance) 
Yes (para.B3 mandatory 
application guidance) 
 Yes (para.B3 mandatory 
application guidance) 
 
- how much emphasis to place on each of the 
various requirements 
Yes (para.B3 mandatory 
application guidance) 
Yes (para.B3 mandatory 
application guidance) 
 Yes (para.B3 mandatory 
application guidance) 
 
- how much aggregation or disaggregation to 
undertake 
Yes (para.B3 mandatory 
application guidance) 
Yes (para.B3 mandatory 
application guidance) 
 Yes (para.B3 mandatory 
application guidance) 
 
- whether users of financial statements need 
additional information to evaluate the 
quantitative information disclosed 
Yes (para.B3 mandatory 
application guidance) 
Yes (para.B3 mandatory 
application guidance) 
 Yes (para.B3 mandatory 
application guidance) 
 
If the disclosures provided in accordance with this IFRS 
and other IFRSs are insufficient to meet the objectives in 
paragraph 91, an entity shall disclose additional 
information necessary to meet those objectives 
Yes – objectives of 
standards (para.7 & 31) 
Yes – objectives of standards 
(para.7 & 31) 
 Yes – objectives of standards 
(para.7 & 31) 
 
To meet the two objectives in para.91, the following 
must be disclosed at a minimum (para.93): 
     
- the fair value measurement at the end of the 
reporting period 
Yes (para.25) Yes (para.25)  Yes (para.25)  
- the level of the fair value hierarchy within 
which the fair value measurements are 
categorised in their entirety (Level 1, 2 or 3) 
 Yes (para.27B(a)) +U Yes (para.27B(a))  
- the amounts of any transfers between Level 1 
and Level 2 of the fair value hierarchy, the 
reasons for those transfers and the entity’s 
 Yes (para.27B(e)) +U Yes (para.27B(b))   
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Fair value disclosures, IFRS 7 (2015) and IFRS 13 
(2015) 
IFRS 7 (2009) ED/2008/10 AC a IFRS 7 (2010) ACa 
policy for determining when transfers between 
levels are deemed to have occurred 
Additionally, for fair value measurements categorised 
within Level 2 and Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy 
(para93(c)(d)): 
- a description of the valuation technique and the 
inputs used in the fair value measurement 
Yes (para.27) Yes (para.27)  Yes (para.27)  
- if there has been a change in valuation 
technique (e.g. changing from a market 
approach to an income approach or the use of 
an additional valuation technique), the entity 
shall disclose that change and the reason(s) for 
making it 
 Yes (para.27) +U Yes (para.27)  
- for fair value measurements categorised within 
Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy, an entity 
shall provide quantitative information about the 
significant unobservable inputs used in the fair 
value measurement 
     
- an entity is not required to create quantitative 
information to comply with this disclosure 
requirement if quantitative unobservable inputs 
are not developed by the entity when measuring 
fair value (e.g. when an entity uses prices from 
prior transactions or third-party pricing 
information without adjustment). However, 
when providing this disclosure an entity cannot 
ignore quantitative unobservable inputs that are 
significant to the fair value measurement and 
are reasonably available to the entity 
     
Additionally for fair value measurements categorised 
within Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy (para93(e)): 
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Fair value disclosures, IFRS 7 (2015) and IFRS 13 
(2015) 
IFRS 7 (2009) ED/2008/10 AC a IFRS 7 (2010) ACa 
A reconciliation from the opening balances to the 
closing balances, disclosing separately changes during 
the period attributable to the following: 
 Yes (para.27B(b))  Yes (para.27B(c))  
- total gains or losses for the period recognised in 
profit or loss, and the line item(s) in profit or 
loss in which those gains or losses are 
recognised 
 Yes  +U Yes  
- total gains or losses for the period recognised in 
other comprehensive income, and the line 
item(s) in other comprehensive income in 
which those gains or losses are recognised 
 Yes  +U Yes   
- purchases, sales, issues and settlements (each of 
those types of changes disclosed separately) 
 Yes - shown net (para.27B 
(b)(iii)) 
+U Yes – shown gross (para.27B 
(b)(iii)) 
 
- the amounts of any transfers into or out of 
Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy, the reasons 
for those transfers and the entity’s policy for 
determining when transfers between levels are 
deemed to have occurred. Significant 
movements shown gross. 
 Yes – shown net (para. 
27B(b)(iv)) 
Reasons and policies para.27B(e) 
+U Yes –shown gross (para.27B 
(b)(iv)) 
Reasons and policies now in 
this section 
 
For recurring fair value measurements categorised 
within Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy the amount of 
the total unrealised gains or losses for the period in 
included in profit or loss (para.93(f)) 
Total gains and losses for 
items held at end of period 
(para.27(d)) 
Total unrealised gains or losses 
for the period in included in profit 
or loss (para.27B(c)) 
+C Total gains and losses for 
items held at end of period 
(para.27B(d)) 
-C 
For recurring and non-recurring fair value measurements 
categorised within Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy 
description of the valuation processes used by the entity 
(including, for example, how an entity decides its 
valuation policies and procedures and analyses changes 
in fair value measurements from period to period 
(para.93(g)) 
     
For recurring fair value measurements categorised 
within Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy (para.93(h)) 
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Fair value disclosures, IFRS 7 (2015) and IFRS 13 
(2015) 
IFRS 7 (2009) ED/2008/10 AC a IFRS 7 (2010) ACa 
- A narrative description of the sensitivity of the fair 
value measurement to changes in unobservable 
inputs if such changes may be significant 
(para.93(h)(i)) 
     
- If changing one or more of the unobservable inputs 
to reflect reasonably possible alternative 
assumptions would change fair value significantly, 
an entity shall state that fact and disclose the effect 
of those changes (para.93(h)(ii)) 
Yes (para.27) Yes (para.27B(d))  Yes (para.27B(e))  
An entity shall present the quantitative disclosures 
required by this IFRS in a tabular format unless another 
format is more appropriate (para.99) 
 Yes (para.27B)  Yes (para.27B)  
Nature and extent of financial risks arising from 
financial instruments 
     
Liquidity risk (para.39)      
An entity shall provide a maturity analysis for derivative 
financial liabilities. Include the remaining contractual 
maturities for those derivative financial liabilities for 
which contractual maturities are essential for an 
understanding of the timing of the cash flows 
Maturity analysis with 
contractual maturities 
required for all financial 
liabilities (para.39(a) 
A maturity analysis for derivative 
financial liabilities based upon 
how management manage 
liquidity risk (para.39(a)) 
+U An entity shall provide a 
maturity analysis for 
derivative financial liabilities. 
Include the remaining 
contractual maturities for 
those derivative financial 
liabilities for which 
contractual maturities are 
essential for an understanding 
of the timing of the cash flows 
(para.39(b)) 
 
- a description of how liquidity risk is managed Yes Yes  Yes  
Note. Disclosures relevant to derivative financial instruments and affected by the applicable exposure draft are shown. The fair value disclosures from IFRS 7 moved to IFRS 
13 effective from January 2013 except for scope exceptions that remain in IFRS 7. All versions of IFRS 7 are from the IASB’s blue book, which does not include any 
amendments that are not yet effective. a AC = analytical construct. Each disclosure proposed in the exposure draft and subsequently adopted or withdrawn is coded as U = 
uniform, C = complex or CS = commercially sensitive. Narrative disclosures are coded ‘N’ for information purposes. Objectives or non-operational paragraphs are not 
included in the analysis. 
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Appendix E IFRS 7 before and after exposure draft ED/2009/3 
Current requirements of IFRS 7 (2015) IFRS 7 (2009) ED/2009/3 AC a IFRS 7 (2012) AC a 
Transfers (para.42) (para.13) (para.42A-H)  (para.42A-H)  
An entity shall provide the required disclosures for 
all transferred financial assets that are not 
derecognised and for any continuing 
involvement in a transferred asset, existing at the 
reporting date, irrespective of when the related 
transfer transaction occurred 
 
   Yes (para.42A)  
For the purposes of applying the disclosure 
requirements in those paragraphs, an entity 
transfers all or a part of a financial asset (the 
transferred financial asset) if, and only if, it either 
   Yes (para.42A)  
- transfers the contractual rights to receive 
the cash flows of that financial asset 
   Yes (para.42A(a))  
- retains the contractual rights to receive the 
cash flows of that financial asset, but 
assumes a contractual obligation to pay 
the cash flows to one or more recipients in 
an arrangement. 
   Yes (para.42A(b))  
An entity shall disclose information that enables 
users of its financial statements: 
- to understand the relationship between 
transferred financial assets that are not 
derecognised in their entirety and the 
associated liabilities; 
- to evaluate the nature of, and risks 
associated with, the entity’s continuing 
involvement in derecognised financial 
assets 
   Yes (para.42B(a)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes (para.42B(b)) 
 
For the purposes of applying the disclosure 
requirements in paragraphs 42E–42H, an entity has 
continuing involvement in a transferred financial 
asset if, as part of the transfer, the entity retains any 
of the contractual rights or obligations inherent in 
  
Yes (para.42C) 
  
Yes (para.42C) 
 
 Appendix E   IFRS 7 before and after ED/2009/3       186 
 
Current requirements of IFRS 7 (2015) IFRS 7 (2009) ED/2009/3 AC a IFRS 7 (2012) AC a 
the transferred financial asset or obtains any new 
contractual rights or obligations relating to the 
transferred financial asset. 
An entity may have transferred financial assets in 
such a way that part or all of the transferred 
financial assets do not qualify for derecognition. 
The entity shall disclose at each reporting date for 
each class of transferred financial assets that are 
not derecognised in their entirety: 
 
Yes (para.13) 
 
Yes (para.42B) 
  
Yes (para.42D) 
 
- the nature of the transferred assets Yes (para.13(a)) Yes (para.42B(a)) +N Yes (para.42D(a))  
- the nature of the risks and rewards of 
ownership to which the entity is exposed 
Yes (para.13b)) Yes (para.42B(b)) +N Yes (para.42D(b))  
- a description of the nature of the 
relationship between the transferred assets 
and the associated liabilities, including 
restrictions arising from the transfer on the 
reporting entity’s use of the transferred 
assets 
 Yes (para.42B(d)) +N Yes (para.42D(c))  
- when the counterparty to the associated 
liabilities has recourse only to the 
transferred assets, a schedule that sets out 
the fair value of the transferred assets, the 
fair value of the associated liabilities and 
the net position (the difference between 
the fair value of the transferred assets and 
the associated liabilities). 
 Yes (para.42B(e)) +U Yes (para.42D(d))  
- when the entity continues to recognise all 
of the transferred assets, the carrying 
amounts of the transferred assets and the 
associated liabilities 
Yes (para.13c)) Yes (para.42B(c))   Yes (para.42D(e))  
- when the entity continues to recognise the 
assets to the extent of its continuing 
involvement the total carrying amount of 
the original assets before the transfer, the 
carrying amount of the assets that the 
entity continues to recognise, and the 
Part – just remaining carrying 
amount (para.13d)) 
Part – just remaining carrying 
amount (para.42B(c))  
 Yes (para.42D(f)) +U 
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Current requirements of IFRS 7 (2015) IFRS 7 (2009) ED/2009/3 AC a IFRS 7 (2012) AC a 
carrying amount of the associated 
liabilities 
 
When an entity derecognises transferred 
financial assets in their entirety but has 
continuing involvement in them, the entity shall 
disclose, as a minimum, for each type of continuing 
involvement at each reporting date: 
  
 
Yes (para.42D) 
  
 
Yes (para.42E) 
 
- the carrying amount of the assets and 
liabilities that are recognised in the 
entity’s statement of financial position and 
represent the entity’s continuing 
involvement in the derecognised financial 
assets, and the line items in which the 
carrying amount of those assets and 
liabilities are recognised 
 Yes (para.42D(a)) +U Yes (para.42E(a))  
- the fair value of the assets and liabilities 
that represent the entity’s continuing 
involvement in the derecognised financial 
assets. 
 Yes (para.42D(b)) +U Yes (para.42E(b))  
- the amount that best represents the entity’s 
maximum exposure to loss from its 
continuing involvement in the 
derecognised financial assets, and 
information showing how the maximum 
exposure to loss is determined 
 Yes (para.42D(c)) +U Yes (para.42E(c))  
  The FV of derecognised financial 
assets in which the entity has a 
continuing involvement, including a 
description of the methods and 
assumptions applied in determining 
fair value (para.42D(d)) 
 
 
 
 
 
+C 
  
 
 
 
 
-C 
- the undiscounted cash outflows that would 
or may be required to repurchase 
derecognised financial assets (e.g. the 
strike price in an option agreement) or 
  
Yes (para.42D(e)) 
 
+U 
 
Yes (para.42E(d)) 
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Current requirements of IFRS 7 (2015) IFRS 7 (2009) ED/2009/3 AC a IFRS 7 (2012) AC a 
other amounts payable to the transferee in 
respect of the transferred assets. If the 
cash outflow is variable then the amount 
disclosed should be based on the 
conditions that exist at each reporting date 
- a maturity analysis of the undiscounted 
cash outflows that would or may be 
required to repurchase the derecognised 
financial assets or other amounts payable 
to the transferee in respect of the 
transferred assets, showing the remaining 
contractual maturities of the entity’s 
continuing involvement. 
 Yes (para.42D(f)) +U Yes (para.42E(3))  
  A sensitivity analysis showing the 
possible effect on the FV of the 
continuing involvement in the risk 
variables reasonably possible at 
reporting date Describe methods 
and assumptions for sensitivity 
analysis (para.42D(g)) 
 
 
+C 
  
-C 
- qualitative information that explains and 
supports the quantitative disclosures 
required above 
 Yes (para.42D(h)) +N Yes (para.42E(f))  
- An entity may aggregate the information 
required above 
   Yes (para.42F)  
In addition, an entity shall disclose for each type of 
continuing involvement: 
  
Yes (para.42E) 
  
Yes (para.42G) 
 
- the gain or loss recognised at the date of 
transfer of the assets 
 Yes (para.42E(a)) +U Yes (para.42G(a))  
- income and expenses recognised, both in 
the reporting period and cumulatively, 
from the entity’s continuing involvement 
in the derecognised financial assets (e.g. 
fair value changes in derivative 
 Yes (para.42E(b)) +U Yes (para.42G(b))  
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instruments 
 
If the total amount of proceeds from transfer 
activity (that qualifies for derecognition) in a 
reporting period is not evenly distributed 
throughout the reporting period (e.g. if a substantial 
proportion of the total amount of transfer activity 
takes place in the closing days of a reporting 
period): 
  
Yes (para.42E(c)) 
  
Yes (para.42G(c)) 
 
- when the greatest transfer activity took 
place within that reporting period (e.g. the 
last five days before the end of the 
reporting period), 
 Yes (para.42E(c)) +U Yes (para.42G(c))  
- the amount (e.g. related gains or losses) 
recognised from transfer activity in that 
part of the reporting period, and 
 Yes (para.42E(c)) +U Yes (para.42G(c))  
- the total amount of proceeds from transfer 
activity in that part of the reporting period. 
 Yes (para.42E(c)) +U Yes (para.42G(c))  
An entity shall disclose any additional information 
that it considers necessary to meet the disclosure 
objectives of enabling users of its financial 
statements to understand the relationship between 
transferred financial assets not derecognised in 
their entirety and the associated liabilities; and to 
evaluate the nature of, and risks associated with, 
the entities continuing involvement in derecognised 
financial assets. 
  
Yes (para.42F) 
 
+N 
 
Yes (para.42H) 
 
Note. Disclosures relevant to derivative financial instruments and affected by the applicable exposure draft are shown. All versions of IFRS 7 are from the IASB’s blue book, 
which does not include any amendments that are not yet effective. a AC = analytical construct. Each disclosure proposed in the exposure draft and subsequently adopted or 
withdrawn is coded as U = uniform, C = complex or CS = commercially sensitive. Narrative disclosures are coded ‘N’ for information purposes. Objectives or non-
operational paragraphs are not included in the analysis.
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Appendix F IFRS 7 before and after exposure draft ED/2010/13 
IFRS 7 (2010) ED/2010/13 Hedge accounting  AC a IFRS 7 (effective 2018) AC a 
Hedge accounting (para.22-24)     
An entity shall disclose the following separately 
for each type of hedge described in IAS 39 
(para.22) 
    
- a description of each type of hedge  -N   
- a description of the financial instruments 
designated as hedging instruments and their 
fair values at the end of the reporting period; 
and 
 -U   
- the nature of the risks being hedged  -N   
 Objectives  (para.40)  (para. 21)  
 An entity shall apply the disclosure requirements to those risk 
exposures that an entity hedges and for which it elects to apply 
hedge accounting 
 Yes  
 1. an entity’s risk management strategy and how it is 
applied to manage risk 
 Yes  
 2. how the entity’s hedging activities may affect the 
amount, timing and uncertainty of its future cash 
flows 
 Yes  
 3. the effect that hedge accounting has had on the entity’s 
position and results 
 Yes  
 Can do in a single note or by cross reference (para.41)  Yes  
 Entity shall identify risk categories based on the risk exposures it 
decides to hedge and for which hedge accounting is applied. Risk 
categories must be consistent for all hedge accounting disclosures 
(para.42) 
 Yes  
 An entity can determine the level of aggregation it thinks 
appropriate but must be consistent with other IFRS 7 and IFRS 13 
disclosures (para.43) 
 Yes  
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IFRS 7 (2010) ED/2010/13 Hedge accounting  AC a IFRS 7 (effective 2018) AC a 
Risk management strategy (para.44) (para. 22) 
 An entity shall explain its risk management strategy for each risk 
category of risk exposures that it decides to hedge and for which 
hedge accounting is applied, including: 
 Yes  
 - how each risk arises +N Yes  
 - how the entity manages each risk; this includes whether the 
entity hedges an item in its entirety for all risks or hedges a 
risk component (or components) of an item and why 
+N Yes  
 - the extent of risk exposures that the entity manages +N Yes  
   As part of the risk management 
discussion required above, an entity 
must include (but not limited to): 
 
   - the hedging instruments that are 
used (and how they are used) 
+N 
   - how the entity determines the 
economic relationship between 
the hedged item and the hedging 
instrument for the purpose of 
assessing hedge effectiveness 
+N 
   - how the entity establishes the 
hedge ratio and what the sources 
of hedge ineffectiveness are 
+N 
   When an entity designates a specific 
risk component (a component 
comprises less than the entire fair 
value change or cash flow variability 
of an item), as a hedged item, it shall 
provide, in addition to the disclosures 
required in 22A and 22B qualitative 
or quantitative information about: 
 
   - how the entity determined the 
risk component that is designated 
+N 
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as the hedged item (including a 
description of the nature of the 
relationship between the risk 
component and the item as a 
whole 
   - how the risk component relates 
to the item in its entirety e.g. the 
designated risk component 
historically covered on average 
80 per cent of the changes in fair 
value of the item as a whole 
 
+N 
 
 
The amount, timing and uncertainty of future cash flows 
(para.45-48) 
 (para. 23)  
For cash flow hedges, the periods when the cash 
flows are expected to occur and when they are 
expected to affect profit or loss (para.23(a)) 
    
 For each category of risk exposure, an entity shall disclose 
quantitative information to enable users to evaluate the types of 
risk exposures being managed in each risk category, the extent to 
which each type of exposure is hedged and the effect of the 
hedging strategy on each type of risk exposure (para.45) 
+CS No -CS 
 An entity shall provide a breakdown for each subsequent period 
that the hedging relationship is expected to affect profit, the 
following (para.46) 
 No  
 - the monetary amount or other quantity to which the entity is 
exposed for each particular risk 
+CS No -CS 
 - the amount or quantity of the exposure being hedged +CS No -CS 
 - in quantitative terms how the hedging changes the exposure +CS No -CS 
   Unless exempted by para. 23C, an 
entity shall disclose by risk category 
quantitative information to allow 
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users of its financial statements to 
evaluate the terms and conditions of 
hedging instruments and how they 
affect the amount, timing and 
uncertainty of future cash flows of 
the entity (para.23A) 
   To meet the requirements above they 
must provide a breakdown that 
includes (para 23B): 
 
   - a profile of the timing of the 
nominal amount of the hedging 
instrument 
+U 
   - if applicable, the average price or 
rate (for example strike or 
forward prices etc.) of the 
hedging instrument 
+U 
   In situations in which an entity 
frequently resets (i.e. discontinues 
and restarts) hedging relationships 
because both the hedging instrument 
and the hedged item frequently 
change and entity does not apply 
para.23A-B but instead discloses 
(para 23C): 
 
   - information about what the 
ultimate risk management 
strategy is in relation to those 
hedging relationships 
+N 
   - a description of how it reflects its 
risk management strategy by 
using hedge accounting and 
designating those particular 
hedging relationships 
+N 
   - an indication of how frequently +N 
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the hedging relationships are 
discontinued and restarted as part 
of the entity’s process 
 An entity shall disclose by risk category a description of the 
sources of hedge ineffectiveness that are expected to affect the 
hedging relationship during its term  
+N Yes  
 If other sources of hedge ineffectiveness emerge in a hedging 
relationship, an entity shall disclose those sources by risk category 
and explain the resulting hedge ineffectiveness 
 
+N Yes  
For cashflow hedges, a description of any forecast 
transaction for which hedge accounting had 
previously been used, but which is no longer 
expected to occur (para.23(b)) 
Yes   Yes  
 The effects of hedge accounting on financial position and 
performance (para.49-52) 
 (para.24)  
 An entity shall disclose, in a tabular format, the following 
amounts related to items designated as hedging instruments 
separately by risk category for each type of hedge (fair value 
hedge, cash flow hedge or hedge of a net investment in a foreign 
operation (para.24A) 
 Yes  
 - the carrying amount of the hedging instruments (financial 
assets separately from financial liabilities 
+U Yes  
   - the line item in the statement of 
financial position that includes 
the hedging instrument 
+U 
   - the change in fair value of the 
hedging instrument used as the 
basis for recognising hedge 
ineffectiveness for the period 
+U 
 - the nominal amounts (including quantities such as tonnes or 
cubic metres) of the hedging instruments 
+U Yes  
 An entity shall disclose, in a tabular format, the following  Yes  
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amounts related to hedged items separately by risk category for 
the types of hedges as follows (para.24B): 
 For fair value hedges    
 - the carrying amount of the hedged item recognised in the 
statement of financial position (presenting assets separately 
from liabilities) 
+U Yes  
   - the accumulated amount of fair 
value hedge adjustments on the 
hedged item included in the 
carrying amount of the hedged 
item recognised in the statement 
of financial position (presenting 
assets separately from liabilities) 
+U 
   - the line item in the statement of 
financial position that includes 
the hedged item 
+U 
   - the change in value of the 
hedged item used as the basis for 
recognising hedge 
ineffectiveness for the period 
+U 
 - the accumulated amount of fair value hedge adjustments 
remaining in the statement of financial position for any 
hedged items that have ceased to be adjusted for hedging 
gains and losses 
+U Yes  
 For cash flow hedges and hedges of a net investment in a foreign 
operation 
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- the amount that was removed from equity 
during the period and included in the initial 
cost or other carrying amount of a non-
financial asset or non-financial liability whose 
acquisition or incurrence was a hedged highly 
probable forecast transaction (para.23(e)) 
 -U   
   - the change in value of the 
hedged item used as the basis for 
recognising hedge 
ineffectiveness for the period 
+U 
 - the balances in the cash flow hedge reserve and the foreign 
currency translation reserve for continuing hedges 
+U Yes  
 - the balances remaining in the cash flow hedge reserve and the 
foreign currency translation reserve from any hedging 
relationships for which hedge accounting is no longer applied 
+U Yes  
 An entity shall disclose, in a tabular format, the following 
amounts separately by risk category for the types of hedges as 
follows: 
 Yes  
For fair value hedges (para.24) For fair value hedges    
- Gains or loss on the hedging instrument 
(para.24(a)(i)) 
 -U   
 - hedge ineffectiveness recognised in profit or OCI +U Yes  
 - the line item in the statement of comprehensive income that 
includes the recognised hedge ineffectiveness 
+U Yes  
- Gain or loss on the hedged item attributable to 
the hedged risk (para.24(a)(ii)) 
 -U - change in the FV of the hedged 
item (para.51(b)) 
+U 
For cash flow hedges (para.23) For cash flow hedges and hedges of a net investment in a 
foreign operation 
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- the amount that was recognised in other 
comprehensive income during the period 
(para.23(c)) 
Yes  Yes  
- the ineffectiveness recognised in profit or loss 
that arises from cash flow hedges and hedges 
of a net investment (para.24(b)(c)) 
Yes  Yes  
 - the line item in the statement of comprehensive income that 
includes the recognised hedge ineffectiveness 
+U Yes  
- the amount that was reclassified from equity 
to profit or loss for the period, showing the 
amount included in each line item in the 
statement of comprehensive income 
(para.23(d)) 
- Yes  Yes  
 - the line item in the statement of comprehensive income that 
includes the reclassification adjustment 
+U Yes  
 - for hedges of net positions, the hedging gains or losses 
recognised in a separate line item in the statement of 
comprehensive income 
+U Yes  
   When the volume of hedging 
relationships to which the exemption 
in paragraph 23C applies (for 
hedging that discontinues and 
restarts) is unrepresentative of normal 
volumes during the period (i.e. the 
volume at the reporting date does not 
reflect the volumes during the period) 
an entity shall disclose that fact and 
the reason it believes the volumes are 
unrepresentative (para.24D). 
+N 
 An entity shall provide a reconciliation of each component of 
equity and an analysis of other comprehensive income in 
accordance with IAS 1 that, taken together: 
 Yes  
 An entity shall disclose the information required in paragraph    
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24E separately by risk category. This disaggregation by risk may 
be provided in the notes to the financial statements 
-  - differentiates, at a minimum, between the different amounts 
that relate items recognised in OCI for cash flow hedges 
+U Yes  
-  - differentiates between the amounts associated with the time 
value of options that hedge transaction related hedged items 
and the amounts associated with the time value of options 
that hedge time-period related hedged items 
+U Yes  
   - differentiates between the 
amounts associated with forward 
elements of forward contracts 
and the foreign currency basis 
spreads of financial instruments 
that hedge transaction related 
hedged items, and the amounts 
associated with forward elements 
of forward contracts and the 
foreign currency basis spreads of 
financial instruments that hedge 
time-period related hedged items 
+U 
   Option to designate a credit 
exposure as measured at fair value 
through profit or loss (para.24G) 
 
   If an entity designated a financial 
instrument, or a proportion of it, as 
measured at fair value through profit 
or loss because it uses a credit 
derivative to manage the credit risk of 
that financial instrument it shall 
disclose: 
 
   - for credit derivatives that have 
been used to manage the credit 
risk of financial instruments 
designated as measured at fair 
+U 
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value through profit or loss in 
accordance with paragraph 6.7.1 
of IFRS 9, a reconciliation of 
each of the nominal amount and 
the fair value at the beginning 
and at the end of the period 
   - the gain or loss recognised in 
profit or loss on designation of a 
financial instrument, or a 
proportion of it, as measured at 
fair value through profit or loss 
+U 
   - on discontinuation of measuring 
a financial instrument, or a 
proportion of it, at fair value 
through profit or loss, that 
financial instrument’s fair value 
that has become the new carrying 
amount in accordance with 
paragraph 6.7.4(b) of IFRS 9 and 
the related nominal or principal 
amount 
+U 
Note. Note. This table shows disclosure requirements deemed relevant for derivative financial instruments only. All versions of IFRS 7 are the IASB’s blue book version, 
which does not include any amendments that are not yet effective. a AC = analytical construct. Each disclosure proposed in the exposure draft and subsequently adopted or 
withdrawn is coded as uniform, complex or commercially sensitive. Narrative disclosures are coded ‘N’ for information purposes. Objectives or non-operational paragraphs 
are not included in the analysis. 
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Appendix G Coding examples 
The coding approach was applied consistently for all comment letters. Five examples are 
provided of coding decisions that required judgement. 
Example 1  ED 7  
 
CL17 Syngenta International AG, Basel Switzerland (preparer) Example of letter coded 
as disagree for question 3 in the exposure draft that asked whether respondents agreed the 
proposed sensitivity analysis of market risk was practicable for all entities. 
Respondent claimed to, “not disagree with the proposal to disclose a sensitivity analysis of 
market risk” however subsequently argues it would often not be useful to users and a 
qualitative market risk disclosure would be more suitable.  
Requests to reduce a proposed disclosure, make it optional or a make a quantitative 
disclosure qualitative, are coded as disagreement with the reason coded separately to 
facilitate additional analysis. 
Original extract from letter 
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Example 2 ED/2008/10  
 
CL42 International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., London UK (preparer 
industry body) Example of letter coded as disagree for question 3(a) which asked 
stakeholders whether they agreed with disclosures in section 27B of the exposure draft, for 
items measured at fair value using Level 3 inputs. This question concerned three substantive 
new disclosures contained in paragraph 27B: a requirement for a reconciliation of items 
measured using Level 3 inputs, a requirement to disclose movements between levels in the 
fair value hierarchy, and a requirement to disclose realised and unrealised gains and losses 
separately.  
Respondent agreed with one disclosure and disagreed with two disclosures (one outright 
disagreement and one should be qualitative). 
Disagreement with one or more substantive disclosures in a question about more than one 
substantive disclosure was coded as disagreement with the reason coded separately to 
facilitate additional analysis. 
Original extract from letter 
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Example 3 ED/2008/10  
 
CL78 the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, London UK 
(accounting industry body) Example of letter coded as agree for question 3(a) which asked 
stakeholders whether they agreed with disclosures in section 27B of the exposure draft, for 
items measured at fair value using Level 3 inputs (see example 2). 
Although raising quite strong cost/benefit concerns, and requesting clarification of what is 
realised and what is unrealised, this letter agrees with all of the proposals in para 27B. They 
suggest an additional qualitative disclosure to clarify one matter. 
Requests for clarification or application guidance did not indicate disagreement. Requests 
for additional disclosure did not indicate disagreement.  
Original extract from letter 
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Example 4 ED/2009/3 
 
CL82 Korea Accounting Standards Board (Regulator) Example of letter coded as 
disagree for question 11, which asked stakeholders whether they agreed with the proposed 
disclosures for derecognised assets. 
This respondent says that they agree with the proposed disclosures however believe that they 
may be excessive for preparers. They then identify a large block of proposed uniform 
disclosures as an example of what is excessive. Respondent says this information “could” 
already be provided in existing IFRS 7. Indicates they would prefer disclosure to be less 
prescriptive. 
Requests to reduce a proposed disclosure, make it optional or a make a quantitative 
disclosure qualitative, are coded as disagreement with the reason coded separately to 
facilitate additional analysis.  
Original extract from letter 
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Example 5 ED/2010/13 
 
CL40 Grant Thornton (Audit firm) Example of letter coded as disagree for question 13(a) 
which asked whether respondents agreed with the proposed amendments to IFRS 7 for hedge 
accounting. 
This respondent says that they agree with the “objectives” of the disclosures. They believe 
that large amounts of the proposed new disclosures are overly prescriptive and that entities 
should have more freedom of what to disclose. 
Requests to reduce a proposed disclosure, make it optional or a make a quantitative 
disclosure qualitative, are coded as disagreement with the reason coded separately to 
facilitate additional analysis. 
Original extract from letter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
